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NOTE
EROSION OF THE HEARSAY RULE
"... the process [hearsay reform] has been too unconscious to be
healthy...." Cross, The Scope of the Rule against Hearsay, 72 L. Q.
REv. 91, 117 (1956).
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EROSION OF THE HEARSAY RULE
I. INTRODUCTION
Over a quarter of a century ago, the consensus among evidence scholars
was that the rules of evidence were in need of thorough reform.' Case law
had become so confusing and contradictory that the American Law Insti-
tute regarded a straightforward restatement of the law of evidence as a
practical impossibility. 2 Instead that body decided upon a new proposal
which might readily be adopted by the states as a comprehensive set of
evidence rules.3 Its aim was a more sensible and simple guide for trial
judge and attorney than the existing rules. Leading scholars and jurists
collaborated to produce a Model Code of Evidence, but the proposal failed
to win acceptance.5 Not a single jurisdiction adopted it.
Within a decade, its proponents conceded that the Model Code would
not be received by the legal profession; hence, its chance of passage in
the legislatures was all but foreclosed.6 In its place, the Uniform Rules
of Evidence were offered by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws.7 These rules were admittedly a compromise measure
1See MORGAN ET. AL., THE LAW OF EVIDENCE SOME PROPOSALS FOR ITS REFORM
(Commonwealth Fund 1927). See also 4 CHAMBERLAYNE, EVIDENCE vi (1913); 2
THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 522 (1898) [hereinafter cited as THAYER];
TREGARTHEN, HEARSAY EVIDENCE 183 (1915); 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 8C (3d ed.
1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]; Baldwin, The Artificiality of Our Law of Evi-
dence, 21 YALE L. J. 105 (1911); Maguire, Heresy about Hearsay, 8 U. CHI. L. REv.
621 (1941) ; McCormick, Tomorrow's Law of Evidence, 24 A.B.A.J. 507, 508 (1938);
Peck, The Rigidity of the Rule against Hearsay, 21 YALE L. J. 257 (1912); Thayer,
Observations on the Law of Evidence, 13 MICH. L. REv. 355, 361 (1915).
2 16 ALl PROCEEDINGS 46 (1939). Director Davis:
The existing rules of evidence are often in their application uncertain; some pre-
vent rather than promote the correct ascertainment of facts. Their overhauling
by a body capable of distinguishing the absurd and obstructive from the useful
and necessary is long overdue. When we first started our work on the Restatement
of the Law we considered undertaking a Restatement of Evidence. We then came
to the conclusion the edsting confusion and defects in the present law of evidence
can be remedied only by legislative action.
3 18 ALI PROCEEDINGS 85 (1941).
4 Cf. Morgan, Foreword to MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 12-13 (1942).
5 But see Goodrich, ALI ANN. RzEP. 9-10 (1954):
[C]ourts have cited it and learned articles have cited it. Students have studied
it. It has been a handbook for some administrative bodies. In other words, this
Code, even without legislative adoption, has had a very considerable influence
upon the law.6 See Fryer, Note on Code as a Means of Promoting Nation-Wide Reform, in
SELECTED WRITINGS ON EVIDENCE AND TRIALS 1160, 1161 (1957): "There is no record
of approval having been given to the Model Code of Evidence by any bar association."
7 See Gard, The New Uniform Rules of Evidence, 2 KAN. L. REv. 333 (1954). The
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designed to eliminate the obstacles to passage found in the Model Code.8
One of the major obstacles had been the Code's radical departure from
the traditional treatment of hearsay.9 But another of the obstacles-broader
discretion in the trial judge in receiving evidence-remained. 0 To the
chagrin of the drafters, the American Bar Association, and the American
Law Institute which endorsed the Uniform Rules, the reception of this pro-
posal by the legal profession has been less than enthusiastic. 1 Only a few
states have adopted the Uniform Rules or used them as the basis for
legislative reform.12
Radical reform, thought to be imperative a quarter of a century ago,
seems less likely to succeed today than it did then. 3 In no other area of
the law of evidence is the need for thoroughgoing reform more crucial than
in the area of hearsay. It is at the bottom of over one-third of all evidence
problems.14 Nowhere else is there such complexity, inconsistency, and con-
fusion.15 The present treatment of hearsay has also been blamed for
contributing to the overcrowding of court dockets. 16 Pressure for reform has
come from many directions, and points to the inadequacy of any proposal,
such as the Uniform Rules, that leaves the substance of the hearsay rule
intact while liberalizing it by the addition of new exceptions and the expan-
sion of old ones.17 The hearsay rule needs drastic change, not patching up.'
drafters of the Uniform Rules used the Model Code of Evidence as the starting point
for their own work. See also McCormick, Some Highlights of the Uniform Rules of
Evidence, 33 Tax. L. REv. 559 (1955).
8 See UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 63, comment at 198; McCormick, supra note 7,
at 561.
9 See Fryer, supra note 6, at 1165.
10 UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 45.
11 See Stopher, The Uniform Rules of Evidence: Government by Man Instead of by
Law, 29 INS. COUNSEL J. 405 (1962).
12 The Uniform Rules of Evidence have been adopted with minor changes in three
jurisdictions. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-401-470 (1964); C. Z. CODE tit. 5, §§ 2731-2996
(Panama Canal Zone, 1963) ; V. I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, §§ 771-956 (Virgin Islands, 1957).
Two other jurisdictions used the Uniform Rules as a starting point in devising new,
comprehensive evidence codes of their own. CAL. EVID. CODE (1967); N.J. STAT. ANN.
2A:84A-1-32 (Supp. 1965).
13 Morgan, Practical Difficulties Impeding Reform in the Law of Evidence, 14 VAND.
L. REv. 725, 732 (1961).
14 See Noyes, The English Jury and the Law of Evidence, 31 TUL. L. REv. 153, 167
(1956).
15 See Maguire, supra note 1, at 621.
16 See Smith, The Hearsay Rule and the Docket Crisis: The Futile Search for Paradise,
54 A.B.A.J. 231 (1968).
17 See Loevinger, Facts, Evidence and Legal Proof, 9 W. REs. L. REv. 154, 162
(1958):
What is now needed most in the law of evidence is a new analysis and re-formula-
tion of the basic terms and concepts, particularly of the important "hearsay"
[Vol. 3 :89
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Until such change comes about, the rule will continue to suffer from in-
herent inconsistencies, arbitrary classifications, and erroneous assumptions.
The growing number of disputes being taken to nonjudicial tribunals
where legal rules of evidence do not apply dramatically symbolizes the
public's dissatisfaction with judicial fact determination.19 Businessmen and
others who base important decisions on hearsay reports day after day
fail to see the value of a rule which excludes such evidence.20 Too often
they find, as judges have,21 that the rule frustrates or delays the search for
the true facts. The judiciary is well aware of the challenge of arbitration
boards and administrative tribunals. Judges have suggested again and again
that the hearsay rule be reformed so that the courts might protect their
role as the principal public forum for the settlement of disputes. Even if
the traditional rule is sound, the very individuals that it purports to pro-
tect have become so disenchanted with it that they are taking more cases
than ever to tribunals which are not bound by the hearsay rule.
But, as psychologists have shown, the hearsay rule is far from being
soundP Discoveries in the field of psychology contradict or add little sup-
concept, rather than a mere liberalizing of the rules based on these illogical
and archaic classifications.
-See also Chadbourn, Bentham and the Hearsay Rule-A Benthamic View of Rule
63(4)(c) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 75 HAav. L. REv. 932, 950 (1962);
Maguire, The Hearsay System: Around and through the Thicket, 14 VAND. L. REv.
741, 774 (1961); Note, Ancient Documents as an Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 33
YALE L. J. 412, 418 (1924).
18See Goodhart, A Changing Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 VA. L. REv.
759, 780 (1965):
The only solution seems to be to sweep the whole mass away and begin again
by stating a few basic principles which a judge should follow unless in his discre-
tion an exception ought to be made.
19See BOTEIN & GOnON, THE TRIAL OF THE FUTURE 78 (1963); MAGUIRE, Evi-
DENCE: COMMraON SENSE AND COMMON LAiv 161-65 (1947); Davis, Hearsay in Ad-
ministrative Hearings, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 689, 692-93 (1964).
20 See Taeuch, Extrajudicial Settlement of Controversies-The Business Man's Opinion:
Trial at Law v. Nonjudicial Settlement, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 147, 150-51 (1934); Rosen-
thal, A Business Man Looks at Arbitration, 4 ARB. J. (N.S.) 138, 139 (1947).
2 1 See, e.g., FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 123 (1949).
22 See Wyzanski, J., in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F.Supp.
349, 356 (1950); STATE OF NEW YORK, FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 101-02 (1960).
23See MARSHALL, LAW & PSYCHOLOGY IN CONFLICT 14-15 (1966); McCARTY,
PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAV 275 (1960); MiINSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND:
ESSAYS IN PSYCHOLOGY AND CRIME 15-36, 50 (1923); Britt, The Rules of Evidence-
An Empirical Study in Psychology and Law, 25 CORNELL L. Q. 556, 574 (1940);
Hutchins, The Law and Psychologists, 16 YALE REv. 678 (1927); Hutchins & Sles-
inger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence: Spontaneous Exclamations, 28
COLUmn. L. Rav. 432 (1928); Memory, 41 HvAR. L. REv. 860 (1928); Competency of
Witnesses, 37 YALE L. J. 1017 (1928) ; State of Mind in Issue, 29 COLUm. L. REv. 147
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port to the basic assumptions upon which the rule rests. Psychologists have
little faith in the notion that the trier of fact can determine the sincerity,
memory, recall, and articulation of a witness by observing his demeanor
on the witness stand.2 4 They insist not only that the value of cross-exami-
nation has been exaggerated,25 but also that cross-examination can produce
great harm. While it can uncover falsehood and half-truth, it can also lead
to distortion and inaccuracy in the answers elicited because of the suggesti-
tibility of many witnesses.27 The danger that a witness may acquiesce in a
false suggestion is the very reason that leading questions may not be put to
one's own witness. 28 Yet during cross-examination, when leading questions
may be asked, psychologists have found that the danger of distorted testi-
mony remains.2 9 Psychologists also criticize the method of eliciting facts
from a witness on the stand.30 A narrative statement by the witness, without
interruptions from counsel in the form of objections, would be much more
helpful to a jury than the bits and snatches they now get.31
(1929); Consciousness of Guilt, 77 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1929); Legal Psychology, 36
PSYCHOL. REV. 13 (1929). See also 3 CHAMBERLAYNE, EVIDENCE 1774 (1916):
To a certain extent, greater than is perhaps generally understood, each examining
counsel and every member of the court and jury is, in dealing with evidence,
called upon to act as an amateur psychologist. So regarded, the methods employed
by them must, in the light of modern knowledge, be regarded as crude, clumsy
and ineffectual. Probably the reason for this lies in the conservative persistency
with which we are carrying into the present day the methods and machinery
of what might be called the stone age of legal evolution.
See generally WIGMORE 990; MCCoRmiCK, Law of the Future: Evidence, 51 Nw. U. L.
REV. 218, 220 (1956); Touster, Law and Psychology: How the Twain Might Meet, 5
Am. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, May 1962, No. 9, at 3; Winick, A Primer of Psychological
Theories Holding Implications for Legal Work, 7 Am. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, Dec.
1963, No. 4, at 45.
24 Britt, supra note 23, at 574. In a survey of practicing lawyers, law professors and
psychologists, the first two groups saw great value in a rule which required the witness
to give his testimony in the presence of the trier of fact, while the third group saw
little value in it.
25 See also MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMERICAN
SYSTEM OF LITIGATION 167 (1956).
2 6 
ee MARSHALL, supra note 23, at 30.
27 See MCCARTY, supra note 23, at 205-22. See generally Abraham, The Suggestible
Personality: A Psychological Investigation of Susceptibility to Persuasion, 20 AcTA
PSYCHOLOGIA 167 (1962); Asch, The Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification
and Distortion of Judgments, in CARTWRIGHT & ZANDER, GROUP DYNAMICS: RESEARCH
AND THEORY 189 (2d ed. 1960); Evans, Suggestibility in the Normal Waking State, 67
PSYCHOL. BULL. 114 (1967); Haward, Some Psychological Aspects of Oral Evidence,
3 BRIT J. CRIMINOL. 342 (1963); Marston, Studies in Testimony, 15 J. GRIm. L.C. &
P.S. 32 (1924).
28 See MARSHALL, supra note 23, at 30.
29 Id. at 30-37.
30Id. at 30.
31 See MAGUIRE, supra note 19, at 33
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Evidence scholars have been vocal, persistent, and unanimous in their
attacks upon the hearsay rule. To be sure, not all have advocated reform
as radical as that of the Model Code, but all agree that reform is needed.
The inherent weaknesses of the rule, which owes more to historical accident
than to logical development,33 is all too obvious to those who study it. Any
rule which admits more under its exceptions than it excludes under its
general provisions is certain to invite criticism in regard to its utility.34
And any rule which admits evidence, according to such artificial classifica-
tions without regard to the relative weakness and probative value of each
bit of evidence in its particular factual setting will be called arbitrary.3 If
hearsay is so obnoxious, why does the law admit the dying declaration of a
homicide victim while it excludes the more valuable statement of a dis-
interested eyewitness who also happens to be an ordained minister?36
And why would the law treat as untrustworthy under one exception, the
same declaration it deems trustworthy under another exception?3 7
The mere fact that so much hearsay must be received in order that
courts might get on with their business without unreasonable delay and
expense is reason enough to search for a more sensible and consistent basis
for admitting it than the present exceptions. The alternative should be
simple and should allow for a consideration of the peculiar value or weak-
ness of the particular evidence offered.-3 This would go a long way toward
eliminating the all too frequent situation under the present rule wherein
hearsay evidence is excluded which has a far greater probative value and
which involves far less danger than hearsay evidence which would have
been received under one of the exceptions.
Faced with such a situation, courts have occasionally refused to follow
the traditional rule and instead have applied common sense.39 Such liberal
decisions are relatively uncommon; and, as one judge has said, they are
32 See Davis, supra note 19, at 695.
33 Cf. Note, Declarations Against Interest: A Critical Review of the Unavailability
Requirement, 52 CORNFLL L. Q. 301, 303 (1967).
34See Maguire, supra note 17, at 774; Smith, supra note 16, at 235; Strachan, The
Hearsay Rule, 116 Nmv L. J. 869 (1966).
35 Smith, supra note 16, at 235.
36 Loevinger, supra note 17, at 165.
37 Dying declarations which fail to meet the technical requirements of the dying
declarations exception may frequently be admitted under the res gestae exception. State
v. Mcelain, 125 N.W.2d 765, 769, 4 A.L.R. 3d 134, 143 (Iowa, 1964).
3 8 See Weinstein, The Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IowA L. R!v. 331, 353 (1961).
See also Goodhart, supra note 18 at 780.
59 See, e.g., Hurwitz v. Shiu Yim Poon, 364 F.2d 878, 887 (C.O.P.A. 1966); Ameri-
can Luggage Works, Inc. v. United States Trunk Co., 158 F.Supp. 50 (D.Mass. 1957);
Moore v. Atlanta Transit System, 105 Ga. App. 70, 123 S.E.2d 693 (1961).
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ill-advised since the traditional rule is so firmly established that it should
only be changed by legislation.40 At this point in the history of the hearsay
rule, any reform by the courts in a case-by-case manner would probably
create more confusion and lead to greater harm than the present rule.
Many of those courts which have not frankly denounced the hearsay
rule have so distorted the hearsay rule to reach desired results that the result-
ing uncertainty in the law has caused more confusion than before. 41 The
exceptions, particularly res gestae, have been so abused and extended that
their outer limits no longer seem finite. There is hardly a hearsay statement
that could not be admitted under one of the exceptions if the judge felt it
should come in and was willing to force it. At other times, judges either ig-
nore the hearsay nature of the out-of-court statement or admit it for limited
purposes when such limitation cannot effectively be imposed. One writer, in
fact, claims that no shrewd trial judge is hampered any longer by the
restrictions of the hearsay rule.42 Such duplicity in the law of evidence
should not be allowed to continue.
The courts have further limited the effect of the hearsay rule by refusing
to apply it at all or with its full force in cases where special factors exist.
For example, judges sitting without juries have generally refused to follow
the hearsay rule as they would in jury trials.4' The peculiar demands of
cases in family courts, eminent domain cases, and antitrust, trademark and
patent cases have produced a hearsay rule far different from that applied
in the usual case. Judges have frankly refused to apply the rule by rote
to cases in which special treatment of hearsay is so obviously required.
Even in the usual case, judges have undermined the effectiveness of the
hearsay rule by relying upon judicial notice or pretrial conferences. Hearsay,
which in the last century very clearly was not considered good circumstantial
evidence, is today admitted as such. Some courts have even developed
40 Frank, J., in United States v. Costello, 221 F.2d 668, 679 (2d Cir. 1955) (dissent),
aff'd, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
41 See, e.g., Gray v. State Capital Life Ins. Co., 254 N.C. 286, 118 S.E.2d 909
(1961), where the statement of a man insured by the defendant that he had been
injured while breaking into a store was admitted as a declaration against pecuniary
interest, since North Carolina does not recognize an exception for declarations against
penal interest. The court reasoned that the statement was admissible against the plain-
tiff, the beneficiary under the policy, on the ground that, by making such a statement,
the insured risked the chance that his beneficiary would not recover on the policy
since a provision therein excluded recovery when death resulted from the insured's own
criminal act. It is highly unlikely that such a thought occurred to the insured or, if it
did, that it had any effect on his sincerity.
42 Weinstein, supra note 38, at 343 n.70.
43 For a detailed study of the trends which are eroding the hearsay rule, see the
text material that follows at p. 161 et seq.
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new theories or rejuvenated old ones for admitting hearsay. The com-
bined effect has been a steady erosion of the hearsay rule.
Simultaneously, there has been a renewed interest in the proposals for
legislative reform advanced by Jeremy Bentham in the early nineteenth
century. 4 The Model Code treatment of hearsay roughly parallels his
suggestions.45 Quite independently, administrative agencies arrived at a
similar result; 46 while arbitration boards were doing the same4 7 Courts in
non-jury cases are approaching the same treatment of hearsay. Then, too,
the experience of foreign courts, who manage tolerably well while receiving
hearsay freely,43 has led many to believe that the abandonment of the
traditional Anglo-American hearsay rule would not be visited with the
sacrifice of our precious institutions.
II. DEFINING THE HEARSAY PROBLEM
A. Nature of Judicial Proof
Fact-finding is the process of arriving at a workable certainty in an
area of previous uncertainty.1 Using available data, the fact-finder must
mentally reconstruct the unknown or disputed fact, which in most instances
involves a past event.2 This is inductive rather than deductive reasoning
since the fact in question goes beyond the assertive content of the available
data from which it is inferred.3 The fact-finder proceeds from what he
4 4 See Chadbourn, supra note 17, at 950.
45 Id. at 943.
4 6 See Davis, supra note 19, at 695.
47 Am. ARB. ASS'N, MANUAL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATORS 14-15 (1964).
48Q C. Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, Phases of German Civil Procedure, 71
HIARV. L. REv. 1193, 1237 (1958); Kunert, Some Observations on the Origin and
Structure of Evidence Rules under the Common Law System and the Civil Law System
of "Free Proof" in the German Code of Criminal Procedure, 16 BUFFALO L. REV. 122
(1966). See also Harnmelmann, Hearsay Evidence, A Comparison, 67 L. Q. REV. 67
(1951); Ireton, Hearsay Evidence in Europe, 66 U.S. L. Rav. 252 (1932).
1 See STEPHEN, DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE Xviii (1876). See also Loevinger,
Facts, Evidence and Legal Proof, 9 W. REs. L. REV. 154, 160( 1958).
2 See Kunert, Some Observations on the Origin and Structure of Evidence Rules under
the Common Law System and the Civil Law System of "Free Proof" in the German
Code of Criminal Procedure, 16 BUFFALO L. REv. 122, 123 (1966); Patterson, Hearsay
and the Substantial Evidence Rule in the Federal Administrative Process, 13 MERCER
L. REv. 294, 296 (1962).
3 See Rescher & Joynt, Evidence in History and in Law, 56 J. PHILOSOPHY 561, 562
(1959). See also MILL, LOGIC 211 (1843); THILLY, THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 531
(Wood rev. ed. 1952):
Mill's entire logical theory is based on the laws of association. The child infers that
the fire will burn because fire and burn came together before; the inference,
1968]
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can observe to what he was previously unable to assert as true or probable. 4
Often the terms "proof" and "inference" are used interchangably to de-
scribe this process, but whether a fact is proved or inferred is essentially
the same thing.5 In arriving at the ultimate fact in question, there may be
several steps of proof. For example, the fact which is established inferen-
tially from available data becomes in turn a premise from which another
fact is inferred, and so on, until the ultimate fact is inferred. Or several items
of proof may be offered to establish a single fact, each item having a ten-
dency to prove that fact but insufficient standing alone to convince the fact-
finder of that fact's existence.
In this inductive process, good rather than conclusive reasons are re-
quired to support the fact-finder's conclusions.6 He is, then, necessarily
concerned with degrees of proof and probabilities. 7 In order for fact A
to provide a strong basis from which fact B may be inferred, two conditions
must be met:
(1) Given fact A, the probability of the existence of fact B must be
high, and
(2) The probability of fact B's existence must be significantly higher
than its probability without the evidence. 8
in this case, is from one particular to another, and not from the universal to the
particular, nor from the particular to the universal. . . . The conclusion in an
induction extends what is observed in certain particulars to one or more similar
particulars and thus embraces more than is contained in the premises.
4 Michael & Adler, The Trial of an Issue of Fact, 34 COLuins. L. REV. 1224, 1271
(1934).
5 Id. at 1270 n.69:
We shall use the words "proof" and "inference" as names for the same process.
It is indifferent whether a proposition is said to be proved or to be inferred ....
The same process which from the point of view of the parties is proof is from the
point of view of the tribunal inference; that is, the parties actively undertake
to prove propositions, whereas tribunal passively learns .by following these dem-
onstrations....
6 Rescher & Joynt, supra note 3, at 562.
7 See Ball, The Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards of Proof, 14
VAND. L. REV. 807 (1961):
Specialists in all the fields involved agree that the process of proof and persua-
sion in judicial proceedings presents problems in the application of probability
theory and communication theory.
See also GOOD, PROBABILITY AND THE WEIGHING OF EVIDENCE § 6.3 (1950); KINGSTON,
PROBABILITY AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS 93 (1966); James, Relevancy, Probability and the
Law, 29 CALIF. L. REV. 689 (1941); Kingston, Applications of Probability Theory in
Criminalistics, 60 AM. STAT. ASS'N 70 (1965); Loevinger, Jurimetrics, 33 MINN. L.
REV. 455 (1949); Michael & Adler, supra note 4, at 1284 ("There are no degrees of
relevancy, but there are degrees of probative force."); Stoebuck, Relevancy and the
Theory of Probability, 51 IOWA L. REV. 849 (1966).
8 See Rescher, A Theory of Evidence, 25 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 83 (1958).
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What has been said to this point can be applied with equal force to
court-room fact determinations, business, scientific research, and daily life.9
Legal proof, however, has peculiar properties which are generally not to be
found in other types of fact-finding.'0 The difference springs from the nature
and purpose of judicial proceedings. It is often said that a trial is not a
search for the truth in the sense that laboratory experimentation is a search
for truth.' Instead a trial is "an attempt to settle a controversy between
two persons without physical conflict." 12 A lawsuit is an adversary pro-
ceeding for the adjustment of a dispute, and necessity demands that the
court reach a speedy decision with the evidence at hand.' 3 The Anglo-
American trial represents a compromise among three competing elements:
(1) a search for the truth concerning the event in question; (2) the
adversary procedure employed; and (3) manifest fairness to the litigants in
the process of settlement' 4 The search for truth, then, has practical limita-
tions imposed upon it for reasons of policy; nevertheless, the dispute must
be resolved "on as close an approximation to truth as is possible." 
15
9See Loevinger, supra note 1, at 161; 1 BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL
PaOOF 208 (Mill ed. 1827): ". . . questions of evidence are continually presenting them-
selves to every human being, every day, and almost every waking hour of his life. . .
10See generally 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *367 (1768); GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE
1 (3d ed. 1846); THAYER 263-76; WIGMORE § 1, at 1-9. The unique feature which sets
legal evidence apart is the exclusion of some admittedly relevant facts for reasons of
policy. See Loevinger, supra note 1, at 161. Ordinarily, there are four stages in the foren-
sic factfinding process: (1) defining the question for inquiry; (2) gathering pertinent
data; (3) screening out unreliable data or evaluating the weight of conflicting data;
and (4) applying rules of logic or common sense to reach a final answer. Freese, The
Warren Commission and the Fourth Shot: A Reflection on the Fundamentals of
Forensic Fact-Finding, 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 424 (1965).
U See Frankfurther, J., in Johnson v. United States, 366 U.S. 46, 54 (1948): "... a
court room is not a laboratory for the scientific pursuit of truth. . . ." See also Cleary,
Evidence as a Problem in Communicating, 5 VAND. L. REv. 277 (1952): "The adver-
sary approach to facts usually presents a dog fight between two conflicting versions out
of which the trier is expected to emerge triumphantly carrying in his teeth the bone
of 'truth.'"; Hart & McNaughton, Evidence and Inference in the Law, 87 DARDALUS 40,
45 (1958):
[lit is always necessary to bear in mind that this is a last-ditch process in which
something more is at stake than the truth only of the specific matter in contest,
[since the parties involved have] a view not so much to establishing the whole
truth as to winning the case [and] there is at stake also that confidence of the
public generally in the impartiality and fairness of public settlement of disputes.
12 Chafee, Book Review, 37 HARv. L. R.Ev. 513, 519 (1924).
13 See Morgan, The Relation between Hearsay and Preserved Memory, 40 HARv. L.
REv. 712 (1927).
14This notion comes from Schiff, The Use of Out-of-Court Information in Fact
Determination at Trial, 41 CAN. B. REV. 335 (1963).
15 MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
LTIGATION 128 (1956).
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Different considerations are involved in criminal as opposed to civil
trials. 16 Expediency cannot play so important a role in criminal cases;
moreover, these are not disputes between private litigants, but between the
state and the criminal defendant. The determination of facts upon which
convictions are based should accord with truth. If there is reasonable
doubt, such doubt must be resolved in the defendant's favor' 7 This is not
to say that a different kind of proof is required in criminal cases; rather
it means that the law requires more of it.j8 Furthermore, rules requiring
the exclusion of certain evidence in criminal cases which would be received
in civil cases are predicated upon extrinsic policy, such as the interest in
protecting the privacy of the individual,19 and the need for insuring that
the state will not force the individual to incriminate himself.2° These are
procedural rather than evidentiary rules and are designed, at least in part,
to protect the individual from overreaching by the state.21 They attempt
to create an artificial balance in an inherently imbalanced contest.
It is for the very reason that fact determinations in criminal as well
as civil proceedings are made within practical limitations of time and ex-
pense, that any evidence which "is capable of a reasonably satisfactory
valuation, should be received for what it is worth." 22 But it is inevitable
that, in any rational system of proof, restrictions will be imposed on the
amount and quality of evidence which is received by the fact-finder.Y In
judicial proceedings, the fact-finder does not ordinarily determine the
amount of data to be considered.24 The parties themselves are initially re-
sponsible for the production of evidence. As a general proposition, they
are entitled to present any relevant evidence,25 but the many rules which
16 Nevertheless, courts often speak of one body of evidence rules applicable alike to
civil and criminal cases; see p. 149, infra, and the material cited in n. 5 on that page.
17 Urquidi v. United States, 371 F.2d 654, 657 (9th Cir. 1967).
18 judge Weinstein made this same point in an address at the Trial Lawyers Institute
on Practical Trial Evidence, Nov. 17, 1967, in Washington, D.C.
19 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
20 U.S. CONST. amend. V; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
21 Cf. Frankfurter, J., in Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961).
22 Morgan, supra note 13, at 712.
23 See Morgan, The Jury and the Exclusionary Rules of Evidence, 4 U. Cur. L. REV.
247, 248 (1937).
24 There are instances in which the trial judge assumes an active role in the produc-
tion of evidence. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 366 U.S. 46, 54 (1948); Rex v.
Dora Harris [1927] 2 K.B. 587, 96 L.J.K.B. 1069 (C. Crim. App.). See also Schiff,
supra note 14, at 336-37.
25 Morico v. Cox, 134 Conn. 218, 225, 56 A.2d 522, 525 (1947):
No litigant can be deprived of the right to support his cause by the introduction
of evidence tending to prove all facts upon which issue has been joined, provided
it is relevant and not excluded by some rule of law.
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operate to exclude certain relevant evidence tend to obscure this general
rule of admissibility. No one would argue that it is improper to reject
relevent evidence which has no appreciable probative value. Such evidence
would only tend to confuse and delay the fact-finding process. But it is
the exclusionary rules of auxiliary probative value, such as the character,
opinion, best evidence and hearsay rules, that have been the cause of most
of the criticism of the existing law of evidence.26 These rules are the product
of experience and are designed to strengthen the kind of evidence which
will ultimately be considered by the trier of fact or to eliminate evidence
which might lead the trier of fact to an improper conclusion.27 The hearsay
rule, it is believed, will improve the quality of evidence by requiring that
all testimony be given in open court where the declarant himself may be
tested by cross-examination while under oath and subject to observation
by the trier of fact.28
B. The Need for a Rule Excluding Hearsay
Although claims have been made that the hearsay rule is valued be-
yond its worth,29 none of its critics will deny the logic of the rule's under-
lying rationale.30 Clearly today, the justification for the rule is in the
opportunity it affords to cross-examine one who would offer evidence
which depends upon his belief, sincerity or memory.3 1 Cross-examination
is capable of exposing perjury, half truths, inability to articulate, poor
memory, inadequate opportunity to have perceived the event, bias, and
2 6 See FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 123 (1949).
2 7 See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 10, 11, 153, 224, 410 (1954).
28See WIGMORE § 1364, at 9.
29 WIGMORE § 8c, at 277 (".. . overworshipped and overworked").
3 0 MODEL CODE OF EvmENCE, Introductory Note, ch. VI, at 217; see 3 BENTHAM,
RATiONALE OF JUDICIAL PROOF 396 (Mill ed. 1827) [hereinafter cited as BENTHAM];
Maguire, Hearsay System: Around and through the Thicket, 14 VAND. L. REV. 741, 742
(1961).
31See MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE: COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAw 15 (1947);
McCoarasncs § 224, at 458; MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 216 (1957);
WiGmORE §§ 1362,-63,-66,-67. Baker lists ten reasons for the hearsay rule. BAKER, THE
HEARSAY RULE 18 (1950):
(1) Hearsay is irrelevant.
(2) There is danger of error in repeating an out-of-court declaration.
(3) Hearsay causes undue protraction of cases.
(4) Possibility for fraud.
(5) Hearsay is inherently weak.
(6) Systematic exclusion tends to provide stronger proof.
(7) The rule prevents surprise and prejudice.
(8) Jury would be confused and misled.
(9) Hearsay is not subject to oath.
(10) Hearsay is not subject to cross-examination.
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other dangers that lurk in testimonial proof.32 The reason for preferring
evidence tested by cross-examination to that which is not is obvious:
the former will less likely mislead the trier of fact.
All will agree that, as a general principle, the party against whom the
testimony is offered should be given the opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant if the declarant is available.3 It is at this point that many of the
critics depart from the traditional hearsay on the ground that, if the
declarant is unavailable, the hearsay evidence should not be categorically
rejected. 4 It is the best evidence available in many instances, and should
be presented to the trier of fact for what it is worth.35 The danger involved
in excluding it is often greater than the danger involved in receiving it.36
It is not hard to imagine a situation in which hearsay evidence constitutes
32 See Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and an Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62
HARv. L. REv. 177 (1948).
33 See 3 BENTHAM 406-10; Chadbourn, Bentham and the Hearsay Rule-A Benthamic
View of Rule 63(4) (c) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 75 HARV. L. REv. 932,
938-39 (1962).
34See 3 BENTHAM 413; 1 STEPHEN, ENGLISH UTILITARIANS: JEREMY BENTHAM
277 (1900) :
• . . as Bentham shows with elaborate detail, a reason for suspecting evidence
is not a reason for excluding it. . . . He exposes the confusion implied in an
exclusion of evidence because it is not fully trustworthy, which is equivalent to
working in the dark because a partial light may deceive.
See also the argument of Littleton in Fendwick's Trial, 13 How. St. Tr. 537, 597
(1696), during a debate in Commons over the reception of certain hearsay in pro-
ceedings on a bill of attainer. Earlier, an indictment had been procured on the
evidence given to a grand jury by two men, Porter and Goodman. Thereafter, Good-
man disappeared and the suggestion was made that his unavailability was somehow
attributable to Lady Fenwick. Many of the members of Commons had argued that
the former testimony of Goodman should not be considered by that body, not be-
cause Fenwick might have been responsible for the witness' absence, but simply because
it was hearsay. Littleton, on the other hand, argued thus:
I told you before, I should not reckon myself so tied by the rules of law,
but that I would hear all evidence that should be offered: and I do not think
it is for our honour to stifle any thing that may bring out the truth.... I hope
we shall not be debarred from the satisfaction of hearing what they might
hear in the courts below. Here are two witnesses that have been examined
against him, which the jury did believe that found the bill. If we cannot have
these two witnesses, let us have as much as we can.
The former testimony of Goodman at the grand jury hearing was admitted against
Fenwick. 13 How. St. Tr. at 607.
35 See Moore v. Atlanta Transit System, 105 Ga. App. 70, 123 S.E. 2d 693 (1961);
Recreation & Park Comm'n v. Perkings, 231 La. 869, 93 So. 2d 198 (1957); Langdon
v. Manor, 133 N.Y. 628, 31 N.E. 98 (1892). See also Morgan, The Relation between
Hearsay and Preserved Memory, 40 HARv. LAw REv. 712 (1927).
36 See 3 BENTHAM 410. To Bentham, the danger of "misdecision" caused by the
exclusion of hearsay evidence that is nonetheless relevant, outweighs the danger of
giving such evidence too much weight when it has not been tested by cross-examination.
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the only evidence in or the crucial part of a deserving plaintiff's case.
Such relevant evidence should not be excluded unless there are policy
considerations which clearly override the interest of this individual.37 Such
balancing should not be done lightly.
A hearsay rule which treats as offensive the medium by which the
evidence is offered, either deliberately or incidentally, fails to recognize
that some hearsay has more probative value than much of the evidence
that is tested by cross-examination.38 Likewise, some hearsay arises in
factual settings which make it reasonable to assume that cross-examination
would uncover no falsehood. For example, learned treatises are arbitrarily
excluded under the traditional rule without regard to the fact they may
reflect the product of careful scrutiny by other experts in the field. 39 Such
testing may often constitute a better safeguard against inaccuracy than
anything a cross-examiner might do. Evidence of this type, however, is
treated just as off-hand remarks and neighborhood gossip.
When the general principle of preference is replaced by a rigid rule
which excludes all hearsay unless it falls into one of many well-defined and
equally rigid exceptions, great hardship is certain to result because the rule
and its exceptions cannot anticipate every situation such as the one above.4'
There will be times when the evidence which is excluded is much more
trustworthy than the evidence admitted.4 1 The need for a rigid rule of
exclusion is questionable when the exigencies of the trial have forced the
courts and the legislatures to amass such a long list of equally rigid excep-
tions.42 Returning to a guiding principle for the admission of hearsay
evidence would not necessarily mean that more hearsay would be received.4'
The use of a principle allowing flexibility in the trial judge would, how-
ever, have the potential effect of eliminating situations in which the rote
application of a rigid rule would exclude obviously trustworthy hearsay.
37 This is the general thrust of the cardinal principal of evidence which Thayer,
Wigmore and Starkie advocated. THAYER 198, 264-65; WIGMORE § 9, at 289; 1 STARIIE,
EvmENCE 17 (ist Amer. ed. 1824).
3 8 See Loevinger, supra note 1, at 165.
39 Cf. ibid.
40See James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29 CALIF. L. REV. 689. 704
(1941):
The history of evidence has been in the development of sound principles into
arbitrary and unworkable rubrics, a development not to be encouraged in case
law or by code.
41 See McCoRIhcK 626.
42 See Smith, The Hearsay Rule and the Docket Crisis: The Futile Search for Paradise,
54 A.B.A.J. 231, 235-36 (1968); Strachan, The Hearsay Rule, 116 N-w L. J. 869
(1966).
43 See Weinstein, Some Difficulties in Devising Rules for Determining Truth in judicial
Trials, 66 COLUm. L. REv. 223, 245 (1966).
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What Bentham and his followers would advocate is not only a retreat
from the rigidity of the present rule, but a more liberal attitude in the
reception of hearsay.' The criterion for admissibility sfiould not be such
unavailability as amounts to death or insanity. Instead the law should
receive hearsay whenever the declarant is unavailable for any reason where
it is not due to the fault of the proponent of such evidence and where
the non-production of the declarant would raise no inference that the
proponent is hiding adverse evidence which would be exposed by cross-
examining the declarant. Therefore, where the proponent has used all
reasonable efforts to produce the declarant when production would ap-
pear to the court to be expected under the circumstances, the hearsay
should come in. And where men would ordinarily and naturally rely upon
hearsay and would not expect the declarant to be produced, the proponent
would not be required to show any effort toward producing the declarant.
C. Scope of the Rule
So many definitions of hearsay have been advanced that it would be
impractical to list them.45 Because no one definition is commonly ac-
cepted, confusion among decisions in the common law world is inevitable. 46
Morgan preferred to couch his definition in terms of the dangers which
the rule seeks to counter: consistency dictates that whenever the trier
is asked to rely upon the perception, memory, sincerity, or use of language
of a declarant who is not available for cross-examination, the hearsay
rule comes into play.47 This functional rule is much more helpful than a
definition of hearsay which speaks of extrajudicial statements offered in
44 See 3 BENTHAM 541.
45 Maguire in one of his works decided not to attempt a definition of hearsay, but
chose to illustrate the concept by examples. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE: COMMON SENSE AND
COMMON LAW 11 et. seq. (1947); see Cross, The Scope of the Rule against Hearsay,
72 L. Q. Rav. 91 (1956); Falknor, The "Hear-say Rule as a "See-Do" Rule: Evidence
of Conduct, 33 RocKY MT. L. REV. 133 (1960); Falknor, Silence as Hearsay, 89
U. PA. L. REV. 192 (1940); Hardman, The Twilight Zone of Hearsay, 57 W. VA. LAW
REV. 137 (1955); Maguire, The Hearsay System: Around and through the Thicket, 14
VAND. L. REv. 741 (1961); McCormick, The Borderland of Hearsay, 39 YALE L. J.
489 (1930); Morgan, Hearsay and Non-Hearsay, 48 HARV. LAW REV. 1138 (1935);
Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L.
REV. 177 (1948); Rucker, The Twilight Zone of Hearsay, 9 VAND. L. REV. 453 (1956);
Wheaton, What Is Hearsay?, 46 IOWA L. REV. 210 (1961).
4 6 See Goodhart, The Changing Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 VA. L. REV.
759, 779 (1965).
4 7 MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE: COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAY 17 (1947); Morgan,




court to prove that what the statement asserts is true. In the latter, it is
necessary to define as well some of the terms contained therein.
But while Morgan's rule is much more helpful and consistent, it also
tends to be broader in scope. In addition to oral and written statements
and assertive conduct, it would also cover non-assertive conduct, so long
as the sincerity, perception, memory or use of language of the out-of-court
declarant or actor are involved. Most courts have refused to go so far,
or perhaps have not recognized the potential for hearsay dangers in non-
assertive conduct.48 These courts would treat such evidence as circum-
stantial evidence.4
9
There are many other troublesome problems encountered in any attempt
to set out the scope of the hearsay rule. Some argue that the rule does not
apply to prior consistent statements of one who is presently in court.L'
Wigmore treated former testimony and admissions as beyond the scope of
the hearsay rule.5 Questions have arisen concerning the application of
the hearsay rule to evidence of the out-of-court conduct of animals5 2 and
to the readings taken on mechanical devices such as radar5 3 For the pur-
48See, e.g., Mash v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 341 S.W. 2d 822 (Mo. 1960). Action
by R.R. engineer for wrongful dismissal from employment. Statement by conductor
(when trainmaster stopped the train to dismiss the engineer for alleged intoxication)
that he had been expecting such a thing was held to be admissible as circumstantial
evidence.,
49 See the discussion at p. 178, infra. The Uniform Rules of Evidence clearly treat
non-assertive conduct as non-hearsay. Rule 62 (1).
50BAxER, THE HEARSAY RULE 1 (1950) (His definition puts such statements
beyond the scope of the hearsay rule.); Cross, What Should Be Done about the Rule
against Hearsay?, 1965 CGlu. L. REv. 68.
51 WirMORE §§ 1030, 1032 (former testimony), 816, 1049 (admissions). He also
treated many declarations which were a part of the res gestae as akin to verbal acts
and, therefore, non-hearsay. Id. § 1766. Wigmore considered declarations offered to
prove a state of mind to be circumstantial evidence and not hearsay. Id. §§ 1788-92.
52 State v. Storm, 125 Mont. 346, 238 P. 2d 1161 (1951), noted in 9 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 248 (1952); see McWhorter, The Bloodhound as a Witness, 54 Am. L. REv.
109 (1920) ; Annot., 94 A.L.R. 413 (1935).
53 People v. Offermann, 204 Misc. 769, 125 N.Y.S. 2d 179 (1953); Crosby v. Com-
monwealth, 204 Va. 266, 130 S.E. 2d 467 (1963); see Symposium-Radar Speedo-
meters, 33 N. C. L. REv. 343 (1955); Campbell, 'Evidence of Speed-Highway Radar,
30 WASH. L. Rv. 49 (1955); Loevinger, Facts, Evidence and Legal Proof, 9 W. REs.
L. REv. 154, 167 (1958) (Loevinger argues that, if there is any basis at all for
excluding radar evidence, it is because the radar device is unreliable, not that the
readings which are offered in court are hearsay.); Woodbridge, Radar in the Courts,
40 VA. L. REv. 809 (1954). Test results from a mechanical device which measured
the degree of intoxication have been excluded as hearsay. City of Sioux Falls v.
Kohler, 118 N.W. 2d 14 (S.D. 1962). Results of a polygraph have been excluded on
the ground that it is "blatant hearsay." United States v. Stromburg, 179 F. Supp.
278 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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poses of this note, no precise definition of hearsay will be attempted. In-
stead the word will be given its broadest application unless a particular
section herein indicates otherwise.
III. HISTORY OF THE HEARSAY RULE
A. Origin of the Jury and Development of the English Law of Evidence
Since the Anglo-American hearsay rule has no counterpart outside the
common law world,' its roots must surely be in the history of the English
law of evidence. Actually, the historical factors which gave rise to the
rule may even antedate the emergence of a discrete body of evidence
rules. Until the English abandoned superstition as the means of arriving
at truth in the settlement of disputes, there was no body of evidence law.2
Before 1066, trials generally were either by ordeal or by compurgation,
each grounded in the belief that an appeal to the deity was the ultimate
test of truth.3 William and his Norman invaders did not put an end to
reliance upon superstition in England, although they did introduce, in the
form of the public inquest, the forerunner of the grand jury proceeding.4
Under this new system, a group was selected by a public officer to make
a rational inquiry. into the facts to determine whether a crime had been
committed.5 If they believed a crime to have been committed and suspected
a particular individual of committing it, he was allowed to establish his
innocence by undergoing one of three trials: ordeal, battle or compurga-
tion.6 The English soon developed a second body whose duty it was to
decide to which of these trials the accused must submit.7
By the close of the twelfth century, trial by ordeal was for all practical
purposes the only one of these three methods remaining.8 In 1215, Pope
1 See Davis, Hearsay in Administrative Hearings, 32 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 689, 690
(1964); Hammelmann, Hearsay Evidence, A Comparison, 67 L. Q. REv. 67 (1951);
Ireton, Hearsay Evidence in Europe, 66 U.S. L. REv. 252 (1932).
2 See 9 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 130 (1926) [hereinafter cited as
HOLDSWORTH]; WIGMORE § 8.
3See Goodhart, A Changing Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 VA. L. REv.
759, 761 (1965). Trial by battle was introduced by William the Conqueror and was not
a publicly sanctioned method of settling disputes in England before that time. Id. at
762. See also Morgan, The Hearsay Rule, 12 WASH. L. REv. 1, 2 (1937).
4 See Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62
HARV. L. REv. 177 (1948).
5 See Wells, The Origin of the Petty Jury, 27 L. Q. REv. 347 (1911). See generally
THAYER 53-65.
6 Wells, Early Opposition to the Petty Jury in Criminal Cases, 30 L. Q. REv. 97, 98
(1914).
7 See Goodhart, supra note 3, at 761.
8 See Wells, supra note 5, at 347.
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Innocent III banned the clergy from any further participation in such
trials.9 During this century and the latter part of the preceding century,
the development of another system of deciding disputes and determining
guilt was in progress. Henry II had sent judges throughout the country
during his reign from 1154 to 1189.10 To cope with the sudden disappear-
ance of trial by ordeal and the resulting lack of a satisfactory method of
determining guilt, 1 the regents of Henry III in 1219, issued a writ which
instructed the judges to find a new means of deciding guilt. The writ
concluded:
We have left to your discretion the observance of this aforesaid order...
according to your own discretion and conscience)1
The second jury, which before had been called upon only to decide what
type of trial the accused would be given, was now given the task of
investigating the event in question to determine from the facts whether
the accused was guilty.13 Such a jury trial had previously existed in civil
cases even before the twelfth century.' 4
From the beginning, the jury was to determine the truth about the
disputed facts from information obtained outside of the court.15 They were
obliged to make suffcient inquiries and the event in question after they
were summoned, but before they came into court.1 6  Unquestionably,
jurors often relied upon hearsay in making their investigations.17 Witnesses,
except for preappointed deed or transaction witnesses, were not at first
called into court.1 8 One of the principal reasons was that witnesses were
94 U. PA. TRANS. & REPRINTS, No. 4, at 16-17; see Wells, supra note 6, at 98.
10 See Wells, supra note 6, at 98; Goodhart, supra note 3, at 762. See also Ladd,
A Modern Code of Evidence, 27 IowA L. REv. 213, 215 (1942).
11 See Wells, supra note 5, at 347; Wells, supra note 6, at 98.
12 Quoted in Wells, supra note 6, at 98-99. See also PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY
OF THE COMMON LAW 117, 144-45 (5th ed. 1956).
13 See Wells, supra note 6, at 98-99.
14 See THAYER 53-65.
15 Bushel's Trial, 6 How.St.Tr. 999, Vaughan 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670).
See also Schiff, The Use of Out-of-Court Information in Fact Determination at Trial,
41 CAN. B. REv. 335, 343 (1963).
16See BRUNNER, THE ORIGIN OF JuRY COURTS 427, 452 (1872); 2 POLLOCK &
MAITLAND, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 622, 625 (2d ed. 1899).
17 See Morgan, supra note 4, at 180; Goodhart, supra note 3, at 767.
18 See MCCORMICK § 223, at 455; 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 16, at 601.
Sometime before the Magna Carta, there came into existence the practice of calling a
certain group of persons, i.e., deed-witnesses and transaction-witnesses, to court as
preappointed witnesses. The function of this "secta" was to testify as to the genuineness
of the claim rather than to supply evidence as to the facts in issue. Because they were
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reluctant to testify in court because of the threat of a charge of maintenance,
which roughly meant intermeddling in the dispute of others.' 9 Those who
had any personal knowledge were called as jurors until the fourteenth
century ° It may have been as late as the end of the next century before
such practice was abandoned altogether.21
Additional information through witnesses did not reach jurors in court
with any regularity until the close of the fifteenth or the beginning of the
sixteenth century.2 When witnesses were first allowed to testify in court,
it was for the purpose of supplementing what the jurors already knew3'
Witnesses were permitted to given an account of facts which the jurors
could not be expected to know. It was at this point that the first sign of
anything resembling the hearsay rule came into existence. Since these wit-
nesses were called to relate matters which the jury could not be expected
to know, their testimony could not be based on hearsay. 24 The jurors them-
selves would ordinarily have heard all the hearsay reports out of court; thus,
the witness would be offering no additional information. The objection was
to the medium by which the information was presented to the jury: addi-
tional information, if it were to be received at all, had to come from
the lips of an eye-witness, not one who spoke from hearsay.25
Since the use of witnesses developed as a privilege, use could not be
summoned with the jurors, their testimony was not given in open court but rather
presented to the jury during deliberation. As a result of the nature of this testimony, no
line could be drawn between it and the jury's verdict, and it was thus not
unnatural to have a joint verdict from the jury and the "secta." "Toward the end
of the 14 0 0's it became uncommon, because of the inconvenience of numbers, to sum-
mon them with the jurors, and their function as joint juror-witnesses fell into disuse."
8 WimORE § 2190, at 63 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). Transaction witness did not
answer questions but gave oath. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 16, at 601.
See also THAYER 101; 9 HOLDSWORTH 179.
1 9 See WIGMORE § 2190, at 64 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
20 See THAYER 498, citing a case in 1349 (23 Ass. 11), where a transaction witness
had been summoned not merely with the jury, but on the jury panel itself.
He was ousted, and Thorpe, C.J., said there must be a jury wholly separate from
witnesses; and witnesses can only be joined to the jury, and testify to them the
fact. It is the jury, itself, he went on, who render the verdict, and not the wit-
nesses; the two have different oaths; the witnesses swear to tell the truth, i.e.,
what they see and hear; and the jury to say the truth according to the best
of their knowledge. This remark imports of course that conclusions from the facts
in evidence were only for the jury, and we may see here the roots of the rule
against opinion evidence as well as hearsay.
THAYER 498-99.
21 See 8 WIGMORE § 2190 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
22 COKE, THIRD INSTITUTE *163 (1628).
23 See THAYER 500.
2 4
,See Burrows, Book Review, 67 L. Q. REv. 111 (1951).
2 5 See THAYER 501, 518.
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made of them unless they could be of real help.26 The jurors were expected
to know the facts before they came to court. It was presumed that no
evidence need be presented in court.2 7 The witness was thought to be of
no help when he merely related what another had witnessed. "A gossip
would merely repeat what the jurors could hear for themselves." 2 The
hearsay rule developed, then, as an enabling rule rather than as a rule of
exclusion: parties were given the privilege of presenting additional infor-
mation in court but they could do so only through witnesses who could
speak from personal observationYm
B. Treatment of Hearsay Under a Best Evidence Principle
Although the witness had become a common figure in the trial by the
beginning of the sixteenth century,' the threat of a charge of maintenance
discouraged many from testifying.2 Since "what a man does by compul-
sion of law cannot be called maintenance," 3 it was thought that the
problem could be corrected by the passage of a law of general compulsion
for all persons who could supply information needed by the parties.4
Thus in 1562-63, the first compulsory process for ordinary witnesses was
enacted;5 it penalized "any person who refused to attend after service of
process and tender of expenses." 6 According to Holdsworth,7 this statute
began a new epoch in the law of evidence because of the extensive use of
oral testimony brought about by this general rule of compulsion.
By the early 1600's it was becoming increasingly difficult for the jury
on its own to obtain a sufficient amount of information on which to base
its verdict; corresponding to this was the marked increase in the quantity
of information obtained from ordinary witnesses. 8 Coke said that at this
2 6 See Burrows, supra note 24, at 112.
27 Ibid.
281d. at 111.
2 9 Throughout this period, however, parties were allowed to give their accounts to
the jurors. Morgan, supra note 4, at 180.
18 WVIUORE § 2190, at 62 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); see THAYER 122-34.
2 "Maintenance" roughly meant meddling in a dispute to which one was not a party.
See THAYER 126 et seq. To escape a charge of maintence, it was necessary for the
person to show either that he was an interested party or that he had been officially
called by the jury or the judge. See 8 WIGMORE § 2190, at 64 (McNaughton rev. ed.
1961).
3 Littleton arguing in Y.B. 28 Hen. VI, 6, 1, quoted in THAYER 128.
4 8 WIGMORE § 2190, at 65 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
5 5 Eliz. I, ch. 9, § 12.
6 8 WIG ORE § 2190, at 65 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
7 9 HOLDSWORTH 185.
8 WIGMORE § 1364, at 12.
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time "most commonly juries are led by deposition of witnesses." 9 From
its origin as an investigatory proceeding, trial by jury had by this point
evolved into an adversary proceeding.10 History had gone full circle and
returned to a method of settling disputes which in part remained under
the control of the parties themselves as it had in trial by battle, ordeal,
and compurgation.11
An outgrowth of the tranformation of the jury trial from an inquisitorial
to an adversary proceeding was the realization that "more attention
should be paid to the nature of the evidence by which juries were led," 1
as they were no longer basing their verdicts upon their own knowledge
but rather upon the testimony of ordinary witnesses. 13 As a result of the
increase in oral testimony caused by the Compulsory Process Act of
1562-63,14 it was inevitable that questions soon arose as to the competency
of certain witnesses and as to conditions under which certain testimony
should be admitted.
In spite of the fact that witnesses were to testify from personal knowledge,
hearsay was often interspersed in their testimony. 15 The notion that a witness
would only be allowed to testify when he could offer more than second-
hand information did not immediately precipitate a rigid rule of exclusion.
1 6
It seems to have been recognized from the beginning of the practice of
allowing testimony that better evidence lay behind hearsay and that such
better evidence was preferable to hearsay and should be offered if it could
9 COKE, THIRD INSTITUTE *163 (1628).
10See Morgan, The Hearsay Rule, 12 WASH. L. REv. 1, 2 (1937).
11 See Morgan, The Jury and the Exclusionary Rules of Evidence, 4 U. CHI. L. REv.
247, 248 (1937).
12 9 HOLDSWORTH 215-16.
13 COKE, THIRD INSTITUTE *163 (1628); THAYER 102, 121, 122, 126.
14 5 Eliz. ch. 9, § 12.
15 See, e.g., Rolfe v. Hampden, 1 Dyer 53b, 73 Eng. Rep. 117 (K.B. 1543); Duke
of Somerset's Trial, 1 How. St. Tr. 516, 520 (1551); Thomas's Case, I Dyer 99b, 73
Eng. Rep. 218 (K.B. 1553); Sir Nicholas Throckmorton's Trial, 1 How. St. Tr. 869,
875, 880, 883, 884 (1554); Stranham v. Cullington, Cro. Eliz. 228, 78 Eng. Rep.
484 (K.B. 1590); cf. WIGMORE § 1364, at 15.
16 The explanation may have been supplied by Thayer when he described the transi-
tion of the jury from witnesses and triers of fact to triers of fact alone. THAYER 524:
In the loose and easy administration of the law of trials that existed so long as
jurors went on their own knowledge, and needed no witnesses of evidence at all,
and at a time when, even if they had witnesses, they were at liberty to disregard
them and to follow their own personal information, it was possible to get along
without nice discriminations; so that the law of evidence had hardly any develop-




be conveniently had.1 7 But this was not a hard and fast rule of exclusion;
rather it was a "shaping principle." 18
Upon the whole, then, it may be said that the Best Evidence rule
was originally, in days when the law of evidence had not yet taken
definite shape, a common and useful phrase in the mouths of judges
who were expressing a general maxim of justice, without thinking of
formulating an exact rule.1 9
It would appear that hearsay was first excluded in scattered instances
on the basis of a best evidence principle.P But one writer has argued that
these early cases may not have excluded hearsay on the ground at all, but
rather that the best evidence principle was an "ex post facto rationaliza-
tion" by judges of a later period 2 Regardless, a rule which consistently
and systematically excluded hearsay did not come until the last quarter of
the seventeenth century. Until that time, the primary question with respect
to hearsay was its value or probative weight.22
17 Y.B. 20 H. VI. 20, 16 (c. 1450), discussed in THAYER 499.
18 THAYER 488.
19 Id. at 506.
20 See James, The Role of Hearsay in a Rational Scheme of Evidence, 34 ILL. L. Rav.
788, 796 (1940) ("This best evidence principle was at the very least one of the basic
elements in the early development of the rule of hearsay exclusion."); Weinstein, The
Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IowA L. REy. 331, 344 n. 73 (1961); Comment, Hear-
say and the English Evidence Act, 1938, 34 ILL. L. REV. 974, 975 n.4 (1940)
("One of the first reasons given for the rule was based on a 'best evidence' prin-
ciple....").
The notion persisted even after the hearsay rule became a hard and fast rule of
exclusion. Pickering v. Barkley, Style 132, 82 Eng. Rep. 587 (K.B. 1673); Ireland's
Trial, 7 How. St. Tr. 79, 105 (1678); Busby's Trial, 8 How. St. Tr. 526, 545 (1681);
Elizabeth Canning's Trial, 19 How. St. Tr. 283, 406 (1754); Grant v. Gould, 2 Bl. H.
69, 104, 126 Eng. Rep. 434 (C.P. 1792); Mima Queen v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. (7 Crunch.)
290, 295 (1813); Claiborne v. Parrish, 2 Va. (2 Wash.) 188, 190-91 (1795) ("But these
cases which form exceptions from the general rule, are regulated by another, and that
is, that it should appear that there is no better evidence behind, and in the power of
the party to produce. . . ."); Gregory v. Baugh, 25 Va. (4 Rand.) 611 (1827);
Langdon v. Manor, 133 N.Y. 628, 637, 31 N.E. 98, 101 (1892); Recreation & Park
Comm'n v. Perkins, 231 La. 869, 93 So.2d 198 (1957); Moore v. Atlanta Transit
System, 105 Ga. App. 70, 123 S.E.2d 693 (1961); 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*368 (1768); STARKIE, EVIDENCE 390 (1824); GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 99 (3d ed.
1846).
An approach based on a best evidence principle has been suggested as an alternative to
the present, unsatisfactory hearsay rule. Address of judge Weinstein at the Trial
Lawyers Institute on Practical Trial Evidence, Nov. 17, 1967, in Washington, D.C.;
Note, Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule, 75 YALE L. J. 1434, 1440-41 (1966).
21 Morgan, Book Review, 5 VAND L. REV. 672, 678 (1952).
22 See MCCORMICK § 223, at 456.
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C. Emergence of a Rigid Rule of Exclusion
From the very beginnings of trial by jury down to the middle of the
sixteenth century there was hardly a thought of systematically prohibiting
hearsay;' it was admitted and relied upon in both civil and criminal cases.
2
Even as late as the middle of the seventeenth century, hearsay statements
were constantly received even over objection and opposition; but "in the
meantime, the appreciation of the impropriety of using hearsay statements
by persons not called is growing steadily." 3 The courts were beginning
now to realize that hearsay evidence was inferior to that of personal knowl-
edge 4
Thayer claims that the roots of a rule against hearsay can be traced
back in history at least as far as 1349, to a case before the English Court
of Common Pleas.5 In this case a deed witness had been summoned on the
jury panel itself rather than with the jury as was the practice. Thorpe,
C. J., ousted the witness saying that the jury must be separate from the
witnesses because of their separate oaths and functions. Thorpe went on
to explain how the witness swears to tell the truth as to what he has
seen and heard while the jury swears to find the truth according to the
best of its knowledge. According to Thayer, the notion that witnesses
could testify only as to facts and then only those personally perceived,
leaving it to the jury to draw conclusions from the facts, led to the develop-
ment of both the hearsay and the opinion rules. 6
There was a statutory attempt in 1533 toward the beginning of a hearsay
rule in that the statute required the accuser in a treason case to be
personally present at the trial rather than being represented by a deposition. 7
This first step toward requiring the personal production of one who had
I See WIGMORE § 1364, at 27. There is some disagreement over the role played by
the old rule that a witness must testify de visu et auditu, that is, from his own personal
observation, in the development of the hearsay rule. Wigmore insists it had no influence,
applied to a different situation, and had a different rationale. Ibid. Holdsworth feels
that the old rule probably had some effect on the establishment of the hearsay rule.
9 HOLDSWORTH 211, 214. Thayer also seems to recognize the influence of the old rule
on the evolution of the hearsay rule, THAYER 18, 498-99.
2 See, e.g., Rolfe v. Hampden, 1 Dyer 53b, 73 Eng. Rep. 117 (K.B. 1543); Duke
of Somerset's Trial, 1 How. St. Tr. 516, 520 (1551); Thomas's Case, I Dyer 99b,
73 Eng. Rep. 218 (K.B. 1553); Sir Nicholas Throckmorton's Trial, 1 How. St. Tr.
869, 875, 880, 883, 884 (1554); Duke of Norfolk's Trial, 1 How. St. Tr. 957, 992
(1571); Stranham v. Cullington, Cro. Eliz. 228, 78 Eng. Rep. 484 (K.B. 1590).
s WiGMORE § 1364, at 27.
4 9 HOLDSWORTH 216.
5 THAYER 498.
6Id. at 498-99, 523-24; see p. 172, infra.
7 Edw. VI, ch. 12, 22 (1533).
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made a statement under oath was avoided by judicial construction and,
according to Wigmore,8 was destined to be a dead letter because it was an
"innovation... too much in advance of the times .. " 9 But this statutory
failure did serve a useful purpose-it furnished "moral support for the
opinion which was already working towards a general hearsay rule." 10
In respect to hearsay statements under oath," it had previously been the
custom for the deponent to be present at the trial to confirm his sworn
statement upon its being read to the jury.12 Now, because of the general
attitude against hearsay, it became the practice to have the statement openly
adopted by the witness in order to show no fear of a recantation. It was
thus natural that the emphasis was "transferred from the sworn statement,
as the sufficient testimony, to the statement on the trial as the essential
thing." 13 By the middle of the seventeenth century, the principle became
8 WIGiORE § 1364, at 19.
9Ibid. See also Duke of Norfolk's Trial, 1 How. St. Tr. 957, 992 (1571):
Norfolk: . . . I pray you, let them be brought face to face to me: I have often
required it, and the law I trust is so.
Serjeant: The law was so for a time, in some cases of Treason: but, since, the
law hath been found too hard and dangerous for the prince, and it hath been
repealed.
Raleigh's Trial, 2 How. St. Tr. 1, 18 (1603):
Lord Cecil: Sir Walter presseth that my lord Cobham should be brought face to
face....
Lord C. J.: This thing cannot be granted, for then a number of Treasons should
flourish: the Accuser may be drawn by practise, whilst he is in person.
justice Gwady: The Statute you speak of concerning two Witnesses in case of
Treason, is found to be inconvenient, therefore by another law it was taken
away.
* * *X * *
Raleigh: The wisdom of the Law of God is absolute and perfect. . . . But now
by the Wisdom of the State, the Wisdom of the Law is uncertain. Indeed, where
the Accuser is not to be had conveniently, I agree with you; but here my Accuser
may; he is alive, and in the house. Susanna had been condemned, if Daniel
had not cried out, "Will you condemn an innocent Israelite, without examina-
tion or knowledge of the truth?" Remember, it is absolutely the Commandment
of God: If a false witness rise up, you shall cause him to be brought before the
Judges; if he be found false, he shall have the punishment which the accused
should have had....
... let my Accuser come face to face, and be deposed.
Lord C. J.: You have no law for it....
10 WIGOMORE § 1364, at 20.
11 The courts did not always treat sworn statements as they did unsworn ones; conse-
quently, the development of the hearsay rule as to one was not identical to the develop-
ment as to the other.
12 See Lord Audley's Trial, 3 How. St. Tr. 401, 402 (1631):
Certain Examinations having been taken by the lords without oath: It was re-
solved, Those could not be used until they were repeated under oath, unless
of the party to be tried; which might be read without an oath.
13 WIGBORE § 1364, at 21.
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established that extra-judicial statements under oath should not be used
unless the deponent could not be had in court.1 4 Although this rule was by
now much more prominent than the orthodox one of allowing the use of
sworn hearsay, it was nevertheless still thought of as an innovation.15
Notwithstanding the widespread distrust and condemnation of hearsay
statements because of their alleged weaknesses, such statements were still
freely admitted up to the middle of the seventeenth century even though
judges were saying that "hearsays must condemn no man" 16 and that such
are of no value and insufficient in themselves. 7 As a result of this con-
tinued notion of impropriety of hearsay, oral hearsay statements began to
be held inadmissible,18 and within twenty years after the Restoration of
1660, this rule of exclusion had a substantial following throughout the
courts of England.19 No exact date can be fixed for the creation of the
doctrine. Wigmore believed that it was established sometime between
1675 and 1690.20
This general rule against unsworn hearsay statements "must have helped
to emphasize the anomaly of leaving extra-judicial sworn statements un-
affected by the same strict rule," 21 since the irregularity no longer existed
by 1696, the year in which the trials of Painez2 and of Fenwick23 took place.
14 See, e.g., Bushnell's Trial, 5 How. St. Tr. 633, 641 (1656); Bushel's Trial, 6 How.
St. Tr. 999, 1003, Vaughan 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670); Ireland's Trial
7 How. St. Tr. 79, 105 (1678); Busby's Trial 8 How St. Tr. 526, 545 (1681). In
Mordant's Trial, 5 How. St. Tr. 907, 922 (1658), after showing that the deponent
had fled and could not be found, his deposition, which included hearsay, was read
by the justice. This was hearsay upon hearsay, but it was admitted nevertheless. See
also Lord Morely's Trial, 6 How. St. Tr. 769, 776 (1666) where it was said that, if
the deponent's unavailability was caused by the defendant, the deposition should be
admitted. In Massachusetts, in this same period, depositions were allowed to be used
by statute except in felony cases. MAss. REv. LAws, Witnesses, § 2 (1660).
15 See WIGMORE § 1364, at 22.
16 Modger's Trial, 6 How. St. Tr. 273, 276 (1663).
17 See WIGNORE § 1364, at 15.
18See, e.g., Bushnell's Trial, 5 How. St. Tr. 633, 641 (1656); Moder's Trial, 6 How.
St. Tr. 273, 276 (1663); Samson v. Yardly, 2 Keb. 223, 84 Eng. Rep. 140 (K.B.
1679) (Deposition of deceased was admitted, but what deceased generally out of court
was rejected.)
19 See Bushel's Trial, 6 How. St. Tr. 999, 1003, Vaughan 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006
(C.P. 1670); Braddon & Speke's Trial, 9 How. St. Tr. 1127, 1188-89 (1684) :
Braddon: What expression did you hear from a gentleman in the coach?
Lord C. J.: We must not suffer such a question to be asked, that is not evidence.
20 WIGMORE § 1364, at 16.
21 Ibid.
22 Rex v. Paine, 5 Mod. 163, 164, 87 Eng. Rep. 584, 585 (K.B. 1696): "But deposi-
tions of this sort are never allowed to be read as evidence in a civil cause, and much less
in a criminal case."
23 Fenwick's Trial, 13 How. St. Tr. 537 (1696) (proceedings on a bill of attainder).
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"From this time on, the applicability of the hearsay rule to sworn state-
ments in general, as well as to unsworn statements, is not questioned." 24
While the writers of the early eighteenth century did not refer to the
hearsay rule as a definitely fixed exclusionary rule, there was, by the
middle of the century, no opposition to the rule, and the only question
that remained was the extent of specific exceptions to it0 6 Scholars, how-
ever, continue to disagree about the true origin of the rule with the majority
arguing that it is the product of the jury system,27 while others argue that
the rule has its roots in the adversary system.28
IV. EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE
A. Inherent Weaknesses and Inconsistencies
There was once a time when all hearsay was receivable; there was never
a time when all hearsay was rejected. From its inception the anti-
hearsay rule has had its exceptions.1
If the hearsay rule were applied without qualifications, valuable evi-
24 WIOMORE § 1364, at 24.
25 The first evidence treatise is said to be that of Baron Gilbert. GILBERT, EVIDENCE
(ante 1726). It was actually a digest of case law. See Montrose, Basic Concepts of the
Law of Evidence, 70 L. Q. REv. 527, 529 (1954). But Thayer is critical of Gilbert's
practice of reducing to a rigid rule what older judges had suggested as a shaping
principle. See THAYER 488. Gilbert turned the best evidence principle into a narrow
rule rejecting any offer of proof which suggests that there is something better behind
it. See THAYER 506. Gilbert did not allude to a "hearsay rule" as such. Apparently,
the major texts on evidence did not consider the hearsay rule as a rule separate and
distinct from the best evidence rule until the end of the last century. See BACON'S
ABRMGEMENT, Evidence (K) (1736); BATHURST, TRIALS (1760) (also published
as BULLER, Nisi PRIuS): 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *368 et seq. (1768);
PEAKE, EVIDENCE (1801); PHILLIPS, EVIDENCE (1814 ed.); STARKiE, EVIDENCE (1824);
GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE (Ist ed. 1842); TAYLOR, EVIDENCE (1848); BEST, EVIDENCE
(1st ed. 1849). Stephen recognized an independent rule excluding hearsay, but based
exclusion on the ground that the hearsay was irrelevant. STEPHEN, EVIDENCE ch. 4,
art. 14 (1st ed. 1876). Bentham also recognized the hearsay rule as an independent
rule of exclusion. 3 BENTHAm, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL PROOF 558 (Mill ed. 1827).
But it was Thayer who put an end to the classification of the hearsay rule as a branch
of the best evidence rule. THAYER 505. For a discussion of the etymology of the word
"hearsay," see MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAw 55, 171 (1963).
26 See WiGraoRE § 1364, at 24.
2 7 See, e.g., HOLDSWORTH 127; THAYER 47; WIGMORE § 4b, at 31; Davis, Hearsay in
Administrative Hearings, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 689, 693 (1964).
28 See Morgan, The Jury and the Exclusionary Rules of Evidence, 4 U. CHI L. REv.
747 (1937); Ladd, A Modern Code of Evidence, 27 IowA L. Rv. 213, 216 (1942).
1 Morgan, The Relation Between Hearsay and Preserved Memory, 40 HDv. L. REv.
712, 714 (1927).
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dence would be lost and great hardship would result.2 Practical considera-
tions require courts to admit some hearsay in order that they might get on
with the business of deciding the growing number of cases being brought
to them.3 The exceptions supposedly limit the admissible hearsay to that
which is most likely to be trustworthy; 4 but the exceptions are not the
product of a careful and methodical analysis of the hearsay rule, the need
for receiving some hearsay, and the type of hearsay which would ordinarily
be trustworthy.5 There was no rational scheme for the development of ex-
ceptions to the rule.6 For the most part, they existed as independent rules
before the hearsay rule came into existence. The hearsay rule never ex-
cluded evidence which was covered by one of these rules.8
Wigmore claimed that a single rationale supports all of the exceptions:
they are predicated upon necessity and some circumstantial guarantee of
trustworthiness. 9 Morgan disagreed.' 0 He found no single theory that
explained all of the exceptions. Even if there is an underlying rationale
common to all of them, it would not obscure the fact that "the exceptions
to the hearsay rule constitute one of the most unsatisfactory portions of our
law." U Numbering over forty by some counts, 12 the exceptions are often
so confusing and contradictory that they frustrate rather than further the
search for truth.'3 Psychologists have observed that most of the assump-
tions upon which the exceptions are based cannot be supported.14
2 See Hinton, Changes in the Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, 29 ILL. L. REv. 422,
425 (1934); Strahorn, A Reconsideration of the Hearsay Rule and Admissions, 85
U. PA. L. Rav. 484, 487 (1937) ("The hearsay rule is more famous for what it per-
mits than for what it forbids.").
3 See Loevinger, Facts, Evidence and Legal Proof, 9 W. REs. L. REv. 154, 165
(1958).
4 See WIGMORE § 1420, at 203.
5 Cf. THAYER 519-21; Morgan, The Hearsay Rule, 12 WASH. L. Rv. 1, 12 (1937)
(". . . the result of . . . conflicting considerations modified by historical accident.").6 Note, Declarations against Interest: A Critical Review of the Unavailability Re-
quirement, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 301, 303 (1967).
7 See THAYER 520-21; Hinton, supra note 2, at. 424.
8 See THAYER 521.
9 WIGMORE § 1420, at 202.
10MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 221 (1957). See also MAGUIRE, Evz-
DENCE: COMMON SENSE AND COMON LAW 130 (1947).
11 Green, Federal Civil Procedure Rule 43(a), 5 VAND. L. REv. 560, 564 (1952).
12 See Smith, The Hearsay Rule and the Docket Crisis: The Futile Search for Para-
dise, 54 A.B.A.J. 231, 235 (1968); Strachan, The Hearsay Rule, 116 NEW L. J. 869
(1966).
13 See FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 123 (1949) ; MCCORMICK § 300, at 626.
14 See MARSHALL, LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONFLICT 30-31 (1966); MCCARTY,
PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW 276 (1960); Hutchins, The Law and the Psychologists,
16 YALE REv. 678 (1927); Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of
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The admission of hearsay under an exception for spontaneous exclama-
tions is predicated upon the assumption that one making a statement shortly
after a startling event does not have sufficient time to fabricate; hence, his
statement is more likely to be true than if he had not been under emotional
shock.' 5 Psychology has shown that the time in which one may reflect (and,
thus, fabricate his story) is so slight that it cannot be measured by a psy-
chologist even under ideal conditions. 16 Furthermore, the startling event
usually causes an emotional reaction which inhibits, rather than fosters
accurate perception.' 7 Hutchins and Slesinger make the following point:
One need not be a psychologist to distrust an observation made under
emotional stress; everybody accepts such statements with mental reserva-
tion.18
They would not exclude spontaneous declarations, but would abandon the
present distinction which often admits hearsay that is of less value than that
which it rejects. 19 For example, the declaration of a disinterested by-stander
is apt to be more accurate than that of the person under emotional shock.2
The res gestae exception has been severely criticized.2 ' It is a convenient
Evidence: Spontaneous Exclamations, 28 COLum. L. Rxv. 432 (1928); Hutchins &
Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence: Memory, 41 H.Av. L. R.v. 860
(1928); Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence: State of Mind
in Issue, 29 COLU31. L. REv. 147 (1929); Marston, Studies in Testimony, 15 J. CRIM.
L.O. & P.S. 5 (1924).
15 See WIGMORE § 1420, at 203.
16Hutchis & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence: Spontaneous
Exclamations, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 432, 440 n. 43 (1928); "... speed is of relatively
slight importance in the absence of instruments."
17 See Marston, supra note 14, at 32:
. .. emotion may virtually hold connected perception in abeyance so that the
subject has only isolated sensations to remember instead of a logically connected
unit perception.
18 Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 16, at 437.
19 Id. at 440.
20 Ibid.
21 See United States v. Matot, 146 F.2d 197, 198 (2d Cir. 1944) (L. Hand, J.:
.. and as for 'res gestae' . . . if it means anything but an unwillingness to think at
all, what it covers cannot be put in less intelligible terms."); Estate of Gleason, 164
Cal. 756, 762, 130 Pac. 872, 875 (1913) ("Definitions of res gestae are as numerous
as the prescriptions for the cure of rheumatism and generally about as useful.");
People v. Poland, 22 Ill. 2d 175, 180, 174 N.E.2d 804, 806 (1961) ("[The term 'res
gestae'] not only fails to contribute to an understanding of the problem but may actually
inhibit any reasonable analysis."); MCCARTY, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW 276 (1960)
("In many cases admission seems to be based on expediency rather than on any sound
psychological basis."); STEPHEN, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 156 n. v (2d ed.
1876) ("[The term 'res gestae'] seems to have come into use on account of its con-
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catch-all for much of the hearsay that is inadmissible under the other ex-
ceptions. 2 According to some interpretations, it includes spontaneous ex-
clamations, statements of present pain, statements evidencing an existing
state of mind, and statements of intent. 23 It would be more helpful if each
were treated as a separate exception.
Statements of present pain and suffering are generally admissible, while
statements of past pain are not 2 4 Some courts, however, refuse to follow
the distinction between the two and have admitted statements made to
physicians concerning past pain.25 Likewise, the "mental states" exception
has generally been limited to declarations of a present state of mind.2 Such
declarations are admissible since there may be no other way of establishing
the declarant's state of mind when it is a fact in issue.27 Under the rule
in Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hillmon,28 declarations evidencing a state
of mind are also admissible even when state of mind is not a material fact
venient obscurity."); Letter of Sir Frederick Pollock, HOLMES-PLLOCK LETTErRS 284-
85 (1941) ("I am reporting a case, with some reluctance, on the damnable pretended
doctrine of res gestae, and wishing some high authority would prick that bubble of
verbiage: the unmeaning term fudges the truth.") ; Thayer, Bedingfield's Case: Declara-
tions as a Part of the Res Gesta, 15 Am. L. Rav. 1, 9-10 (1881):
. .. lawyers and judges seem to have caught at the term 'res gesta' . . . as one
that gave them relief at a pinch. They could not in the stress of business, stop to
analyze minutely; this valuable phrase did for them what the 'limbo' of the
theologians did for them, what a 'catch all' does for a busy housekeeper or an
untidy one,-some things belonged there, other things might for purposes of
present convenience be put there. . . . the singular form of phrase soon began to
give place to the plural; this made it considerably more convenient; whatever
multiplied its ambiguity multiplied its capacity; it was a larger 'catch all.'
22 See Holtzoff, Institute on Practical Evidence, 18 F.R.D. 376 (1956); Payne, The
Mysteries of Virginia's Res Gestae Rule, 18 WAsHr. & LEE L. REv. 17 (1961); Thayer,
supra note 21, at 9-10.
23 See MORGAN, BASIC PRO13LEMS OF EVmENCE 284-300 (1957). Morgan argues
that the term should be confined to its original meaning, that is, declarations which are
a part of the transaction and which are themselves operative facts. Id. at 285. See also
2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *368 n. 25 (1726) ("But the objection does not apply
. . . whenever the declaration or entry is in itself a fact, and is part of the res
gestae.")
24 See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Mosley, 8 Wall (U.S.) 397 (1869); Etzkorn v. Oelwein,
142 Iowa 102, 120 N.W. 636 (1909); La Duke v. Exeter, 97 Mich. 450, 56 N.W. 851
(1893) ; Annot., 90 A.L.R. 2d 1084 (1963).
25See, e.g., Meaney v. United States, 112 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1940); Peterson v.
Richfield Plaza, Inc., 252 Minn. 215, 89 N.W. 2d 712 (1958), noted in 43 MINN. L.
REv. 149 (1958). See also MORGAN, supra note 23, at 287-88; Slough, Spontaneous
Statements and State of Mind, 46 IowA L. REy. 224 (1961).
26 See MORGAN, supra note 23, at 290-91.
27 Cf. Hutchins & Slesinger, Observations on the Law of Evidence: State of Mind in
Issue, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 147 (1929), State of Mind to Prove an Act, 38 YALE L. J.
283 (1929).
28 145 U.S. 285 (1892).
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in issue.29 Where evidence of the declarant's state of mind tends to establish
a subsequent act, that is, where the existence of such a state of mind makes
it more likely that the declarant performed the act in question than if no
such state of mind existed, then it should be admittedso One writer severely
criticized the use of this evidence for such a purpose.nl Once evidence of the
declarant's state of mind is admitted to prove a subsequent act, the next
step is to admit it to prove a previous event.3 2 Just as a statement of intent
was admitted as circumstantial proof of the occurrence of the thing intended,
a statement of memory would be admitted as circumstantial evidence of the
happening of the event remembered. 3
Whatever the added hearsay dangers involved in the use of statements of
memory as opposed to statements of intent, there is little justification in
theory for admitting the one and rejecting the other.M Most courts have
rejected statements of memory, however, for practical reasons3 The hear-
say rule would be almost completely circumvented if both were admissible.
Mr. Justice Cardozo recognized this problem in Shepard v. United States:ss
Declarations of intention, casting light upon the future, have been sharply
distinguished from declarations of memory, pointing backwards to the
past. There would be an end, or nearly that, to the rule against hearsay
if the distinction were ignored.37
Several cases, nevertheless, have ignored the distinction38 and writers have
urged that it be abandoned.39
2 9 Declarations of intent, for example, are often admitted to prove by inference the
occurrence of the act intended.
so 145 U.S. at 296. See also Hinton, States of Mind and the Hearsay Rule, 1 U. CI.
L. REv. 394 (1934); Maguire, The Hillmon Case-Thirty-three Tears After, 38 HARV.
L. REv. 709 (1925).
31 Seligman, An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 26 HARv. L. Rav. 146 (1912).
32 Id. at 156-57.
33 Cf. Payne, The Hillmon Case-An Old Problem Revisited, 41 VA. L. Rav. 1011,
1012, 1057 (1955).
34 5ee Seligman, supra note 31, at 157.
35 See People v. Hamilton, 55 Cal. 2d 881, 13 Cal. Rptr. 649, 362 P.2d 473 (1961).
36 290 U.S. 96 (1933).
37 Id. at 105-06.
38
,See Garford Trucking Corp. v. Mann, 163 F.2d 71, 73 (1st Cir. 1947); Emden v.
Verdi, 124 Cal. App. 2d 555, 269 P.2d 47 (1954); Kelley v. Bank of America Nat'l
Trust & Savings Ass'n, 112 Cal. App. 2d 388, 246 P.2d 92, 34 A.L.R. 2d 578 (1952);
Thompson v. Steinkamp, 120 Mont. 475, 187 P.2d 1018 (1947); Mower v. Mower,
64 Utah 260, 228 Pac. 911 (1924); United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Con-
struction Corp., 194 Va. 872, 75 S.E. 2d 694 (1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 656 (1954). See
also MORGAN, supra note 23, at 295-96; Annot., 141 A.L.R. 704 (1942).
39 See Payne, supra note 33, at 1057.
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Dying declarations have traditionally been limited to criminal prosecu-
tions for homicide,40 but occasionally courts have admitted hearsay declara-
tions of dying persons in civil cases. 41 Criticism has been made of the prac-
tice of admitting dying declarations of hysterical victims while often exclud-
ing the much more trustworthy hearsay statements of a bystander.42 As in
so many of the exceptions, the rationale of the dying declaration exception
is based on an outmoded ethic. "Modem ethics and psychology do not up-
hold any such fine-haired distinctions or superstitutions. . ." 43
Psychologists would also question the assumption upon which the ex-
ception for declarations against interest is predicated. 44 They have found
the distinction between self-serving declarations, which are excluded, and
declarations against interest, which are received, to be without sound psy-
chological justification. 45 All declarations against interest contain a self-
serving element.46 But if there is any justification for an exception such
as this, surely it should not arbitrarily be limited to declarations against
pecuniary and proprietary interests. It should extend as well to declarations
against penal and social interests. 47
Most of the other exceptions have been criticized from time to time. For
example, the rigid restrictions on the admissibility of former testimony seem
unnecessary when one considers that nothing resembling a substitute for
cross-examination can be found in the other exceptions. The law appears to
be content with some circumstantial quarantee of the declarant's sincerity
in these other exceptions and not with a satisfactory substitute for cross-
examination. When a man speaks under oath before a tribunal with power
to punish him for perjury, would there not be a greater likelihood that he
40 Cummings v. Illinois Central R.R., 364 Mo. 868, 879-82, 269 S.W. 2d 111, 119-21
(1954); Blair v. Rogers, 185 Okla. 63, 89 P.2d 928 (1939).
41 See, e.g., United Services Automobile Ass'n v. Wharton, 237 F. Supp. 255
(W.D.N.C. 1965); Thurston v. Fritz, 91 Kan. 468, 138 Pac. 625 (1914).
42 Loevinger, Facts, Evidence and Legal Proof, 9 W. RES. L. REv. 154, 165 (1958).
4 3 
MCCARTY, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW 276 (1960).
44 See MARSHALL, LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONFLICT 30-31 (1966).
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
4 7 See MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE: Co IMION SENSE AND COMiuON LAW 145 (1947); Note,
Statements against Penal Interest as an Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 26 U. PITT. L.
REv. 129 (1964). Only a handful of states recognize an exception for declarations against
penal interest. People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal. 2d 868, 36 Cal. Rptr. 841, 380 P.2d 377
(1964); Thomas v. State, 186, Md. 466, 47 A.2d 43, 167 A.L.R. 390 (1964); Sutter v.
Easterly, 354 Mo. 282, 189 S.W. 2d 284, 162 A.L.R 437 (1945); Band's Refuse Re-
moval, Inc v. Fair Lawn Borough, 62 N.J. Super. 522, 163 A.2d 465 (1960), noted in 15
RUTGERS L. REV. 359 (1961); McClain v. Anderson Free Press, 232 S.C. 448, 102
S.E. 2d 750 (1958); Blocker v. State, 55 Tex. Crim. Rep. 30, 114 S.W. 814 (1908);
Newberry v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 445, 61 S.E. 2d 318 (1950).
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is speaking the truth than there is under the dying declarations exception?
Although the business entries exception is subject to less criticism than
most of the other exceptions, it can exclude hearsay that is highly probative
and substantially trustworthy.48 Often it fails to accommodate the rapid
changes which modem technology has brought to record keeping.49 Never-
theless, some courts have admitted copies of business records stored on
magnetic tape in spite of objections that they did not meet the require-
ments of the best evidence rule.5°
The notion that hearsay admissible under the exceptions is trustworthy
and that hearsay not covered by the exceptions is inherently untrustworthy
is refuted almost daily in the courtroom. If no objection is made to the
reception of inadmissible hearsay, it may be considered by a jury and given
whatever weight it deserves under the circumstances.M Morgan went fur-
ther: he argued that much untrustworthy hearsay may be admitted if the
exceptions are applied uncritically and mechanically. 2 Furthermore, he
insists that a great deal of trustworthy hearsay is excluded under the tradi-
tional exceptions. 53
There is a great need for flexibility in regard to exceptions to the hearsay
rule, but this has not traditionally been allowed. It was very early estab-
lished that courts should recognize only those exceptions which were as old
as the hearsay rule itself.M Writers have decried the fact that presentday
judges do not have the same flexibility enjoyed by earlier judges who de-
cided the question of admissibility by applying general principles.55 Yet new
48See generally MAGUIRE, supra note 47, at 155-61; Laughlin, Business Entries and
the Like, 46 IowA L. REv. 276 (1961).
49 Cf. Weinstein, Some Difficulties in Devising Rules for Determining Truth in
Judicial Trials, 66 COLUm. L. REv. 223 (1966).
50See, e.g., Transport Indemnity Co. v. Seib, 178 Neb. 253, 132 N.W. 2d 871
(1965). Under Uniform Business Records Act, calculations prepared and printed by an
electronic computer from information stored on magnetic tape was admitted.
51 See Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 450 (1912); Continental Oil Co. v.
United States, 184 F.2d 802, 813 (9th Cir. 1950); People v. Grayson, 172 Cal. App.
2d 372, 378, 341 P.2d 820, 824 (1959); Weinstein, The Probative Force of Hearsay,
46 IowA L. REv. 331, 350 (1961); Annot., 104 A.L.R. 1130 (1936).
52 Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV.
L. REv. 177, 219 (1948).
53 Ibid.
54See Rex v. Eriswell, 3 T.R. 707, 100 Eng. Rep. 815 (K.B. 1790). See also Myers
v. Director of Public Prosecutions, t1964] 3 W.L.R. 145, holding that courts could not
create any new exceptions to the hearsay rule.
55 See Peck, The Rigidity of the Rule against Hearsay, 21 YALE L.J. 257, 260
(1912): "Why should not the judges of 1911 have as much power to establish excep-
tions to the hearsay rule as their predecessors of 1811?" See also Cross, Reform in the
Law of Evidence, 24 MO. L. REv. 32, 52 (1961).
1968]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
exceptions have developed and old ones have been expanded from time to
time.56
B. Judicial Expansion, Distortion, and Misapplication of the Exceptions
The liberalization of the hearsay rule by the courts has followed two
divergent courses: (1) a frank refusal to be bound by the archaic excep-
tions' and (2) a process of forcing obviously trustworthy and reliable hear-
say into one of the exceptions.2 Courts following the latter course appear
to be caught between a realization of the well-established nature of the
exceptions with the concomitant desire that reform be accomplished by
legislation, and a recognition of the hardship which these exceptions often
produce by excluding highly probative and trustworthy evidence. The fol-
lowing cases will illustrate the extent of the distortion of the exceptions by
the courts.
In Powell v. State,3 the court allowed an otherwise inadmissible prior
identification of the prosecutrix to come in by resorting to a "back-door"
approach. The court permitted a police officer to answer the following ques-
tion: "In your conversation with the prosecutrix did you learn the identity
5 6 See, e.g., Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892); United Services
Automobile As'n v. Wharton, 237 F. Supp. 255 (W.D.N.C. 1965); Band's Refuse
Removal, Inc. v. Fair Lawn Borough, 62 N.J. Super. 522, 163 A.2d 465 (1960).
1 Hurwitz v. Shiu Yim Poon, 364 F.2d 878 (C.C.P.A. 1966); United States v.
DeSisto, 329 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1964); Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assur.
Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961); Glowe v. Rulon, 284 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1960);
Meaney v. United States, 112 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1940); United Services Automobile Ass'n
v. Wharton, 237 F.Supp. 255 (W.D.N.C. 1965); American Luggage Works, Inc. v.
United States Trunk Co., 158 F.Supp. 50 (D. Mass 1957); United States v. United
States Mach. Corp., 89 F.Supp. 349 (D. Mass. 1950); People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal.2d
868, 36 Cal. Rptr. 841, 389 P.2d 377 (1964); Moore v. Atlanta Transit System, 105
Ga. App. 70, 123 S.E.2d 693 (1961); People v. Poland, 22 Ill.2d 175, 174 N.E.2d 804
(1961) ; Goodale v. Murray, 227 Iowa 843, 289 N.W. 450 (1940) ; Thurston v. Fritz, 91
Kan. 468, 138 Pac. 625 (1914); Lucas v. Morefield, 18 La. App. 497, 137 So. 633
(1931); Peterson v. Richfield Plaza, Inc., 252 Minn. 215, 89 N.W.2d 712 (1958);
Transport Indemnity Co. v. Seib, 178 Neb. 253, 132 N.W.2d 871 (1965); O'Haire v.
Breton, 102 N.H. 448, 451, 159 A.2d 805, 807 (1960); Perry v. Parker, 101 N.H. 295,
141 A.2d 883 (1958); Gagnon v. Pronovost, 97 N.H. 500, 92 A.2d 904 (1952); Robert-
son v. Hackensack Trust Co., 1 N.J. 304, 63 A.2d 515 (1949); Fleury v. Edwards, 14
N.Y.2d 647, 200 N.E.2d 550 (1964); Healey v. Rennert 9 N.Y.2d 202, 213 N.Y.S.2d
414, 173 N.E.2d 777 (1961).
2 See, e.g., Cook v. Latimer, 279 Ala. 294, 184 So.2d 807 (1966); Cook v. Com-
monwealth, 351 S.W.2d 187 (Ky. 1961); Gifford v. Iowa Mfg. Co., 243 Iowa 145, 172,
51 N.W.2d 119, 133 (1952); Gray v. State Capital Life Ins. Co, 254 N.C. 286, 118
S.E.2d 909 (1961).
3332 S.W.2d 483 (Ark. 1960), discussed in Levin, Evidence, 1960 ANN. SURVEY
AM. L. 554, 558 (1961).
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of anybody you later picked up?" The officer's response to the question
was admitted on the theory that it served to explain his actions.4
There is a line of cases holding hearsay declarations of employees admis-
sible under the res gestae exception when they make such declarations
shortly after their conduct has been called into question.5 In Lumber-
men's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Renuart-Bailey-Cheely Lumber & Supply
Co.,6 written confessions of employees of insured were obtained imme-
diately after polygraph tests. These confessions were received under the
res gestae exception. Several cases have admitted hearsay under the res
gestae exception even though the declarations were made over an hour
after the events to which they related. 7 The res gestae doctrine has also
been relied upon to justify the reception of the accusatory statements of a
dying victim which did not qualify as dying declarations.8 In Cooke v.
Latimer,9 the statement of a declarant that he and another individual
planned to take a trip by automobile and that he would drive was admitted
under the res gestae exception.
In a state in which declarations against penal interest were not admis-
sible, the court admitted the statement of a deceased individual that he had
been injured while attempting to break into a store.10 The case involved an
attempt by the beneficiary to recover on the deceased's life insurance policy
which excluded recovery where death resulted from the criminal act of the
insured. The court reasoned that the statement of the deceased was a
declaration against pecuniary interest because it would preclude recovery
by the beneficiary on the life policy of the deceased."
4 332 S.W.2d at 485.
5 Thomas v. Howard Co., 228 F.2d 550 (4th Cir. 1955); Piggly Wiggly Yuma Co. v.
New York Indemnity Co., 116 Cal. App. 541, 3 P.2d 15 (1931); Alexander Grant's
Sons v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 25 A.D.2d 93, 267 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1966); Nock v. Fidelity
& Deposit Co., 175 S.C. 188, 178 S.E. 839, 98 A.L.R. 757 (1935); American Surety
Co. v. North Texas Nat'l Bank, 14 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
6 387 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1968).
7 See, e.g., Bandoni v. United States, 171 A.2d 748 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1961);
Gifford v. Iowa Mfg. Co., 243 Iowa 145, 172, 51 N.W.2d 119, 133 (1952); Cook v.
Commonwealth, 351 S.W.2d 187 (Ky. 1961), noted in 51 Ky. L. J. 176 (1962).8 See, e.g., Roberts v. United States, 332 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1964); Stevens v. State,
138 Ala. 71, 35 So. 122 (1903); People v. Vernon, 35 Cal. 49 (1868); Jones v.
Commonwealth, 313 Ky. 827, 233 S.W.2d 1007 (1950); Stevens v. State 232 Md. 33
192 A.2d 73, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 886 (1963); Bradford v. State, 372 S.W.2d 336
(Tex. Crim. App. 1963); Kuckenbecker v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 619, 110 S.E.2d
523 (1958); Bliss v. State 117 Wis. 596, 94 N.W. 325 (1903); Annot., 4 A.L.1.3d
149 (1965).
9 270 Ala. 294, 184 So.2d 807 (1966).
10 Gray v. State Capital Life Ins. Co., 254 N.C. 286, 118 S.E.2d 909 (1961).
11Id. at 911: "We tried to break in and I got shot." The court admitted that the
time which had elapsed between the shooting and the questioning by an interrogating
police officer who arrived later, precluded admission under the res gestae exception.
1968]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
V. LEGISLATIVE REFORM
A. Bentham and Nineteenth Century Reform Attempts
The very foundations of late eighteenth century English society were
shaken by the French Revolution and its impact on the political, social,
and intellectual life of Europe.' Yet there were forces already loose in
England, prior to the French Revolution, which had been undermining
English social, political, economic, and legal concepts and traditions.2 The
humanizing effect of all these forces provided the atmosphere for a re-
evaluation of fundamental legal principles.3 The chief architect of the legal
reform movement was Jeremy Bentham of the utilitarian school of philoso-
phy. He and his followers, notably James Mill and his son, John Stuart
Mill, "advocated wholesale reforms of the legal system by means of the
Legislature in order to give effect to the many detailed deductions which
Bentham had drawn from his principle of utility." 4 Bentham's ambition
was to draft a comprehensive code for England or some other country.5
Although his ambition was never fulfilled, his writings and advice, which
was actively solicited by the leading men of the age in Europe and in
America, had a great influence on the progress of nineteenth century
law.6
Bentham's Rationale of Judicial Proof, containing his proposals for re-
form of the law of evidence, was published first in French 7 and later in
English.8 The editor of the French edition omitted Bentham's criticisms of
English law.9 But John Stuart Mill, the English editor, incorporated Bent-
ham's "stricture on English law" 10 and even "read ... the most authorita-
1 13 HOLDSWORTH 3, quoting from a letter to Bentham written in 1794 from
Dresden:
The French Revolution notwithstanding its atrocities, has produced a kind of
revolution in the human mind in Europe, and mankind think on many points
as they never thought before.
2 1 STEPHEN, THE ENGLISH UTILITARIANS 121 (1900):
It has been easy to ascribe to the contagion of French example political move-
ments which were already beginning in England and which were modified rather
than materially altered by our share in the great European convulsion.
3 DIcEY, LAW AND OPINION 398-404 (1905).
4 13 HOLDSWORTH 5.
5 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, Jeremy Bentham 747, 748 (1 lth ed. 1910).
6 Ibid.
7 BENTHAM, TRAITE DES PREUVES JUDICIAIRES (Dumont ed. 1823).
8 BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL PROOF (Mill ed. 1827); see THAYER 263 n.l.
Thayer pointed out that Bentham had written "... a philosophical discussion and ...
not ... a law book."
9 J. S. Mill, Preface to BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL PROOF Vi (Mill ed. 1827);
see 13 HOLDSWORTH 65.
10 Mill, supra note 9, at 65.
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five treatises on the English Law of Evidence, and commented on a few
of the objectionable points of the English rules, which had escaped Bent-
ham's notice." 11 In spite of Mill's great labor and the keen Benthamic
insight which for the most part remained hidden beneath the "discursive-
ness" 12 and "barbaric terminology," 13 the criticism of the English hearsay
rule had no immediate influence on the law of evidence. For the most
part, the nineteenth legal reformers ignore& that portion of Bentham's
treatise on evidence dealing with hearsay.14 Even Brougham, in his famous
speech in the House of Commons on the need for procedural reforms in
England,15 did not follow Bentham's lead in calling for the abolition of
the traditional hearsay rule. And while Bentham's treatise had great
influence in New York in other areas of evidence reform, his criticism
of the hearsay rule was not even noted. 16
Whatever influence Bentham was to have on the treatment of hearsay
had to wait until the twentieth century. The provisions of the Model Code
of Evidence dealing with hearsay bear striking resemblance to the sugges-
tions of Bentham.17 Both advocate admission of hearsay where the decla-
rant is not readily available. 18
B. Model Code of Evidence
The Model Code of Evidence, as promulgated by the American Law
Institute in 1942, represents a radical departure from the common law
rules of evidence especially with regard to the admissibility of hearsay evi-
dence. The Code prescribes a workable remedy for eliminating irrational
11 Ibid.
12 Chadbourn, Bentham and the Hearsay Rule-A Benthamic View of Rule 63(4) (c)
of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 75 HARV. L. REV. 934 (1962).
13 Ibid.
14 Id. at 940.
158 PARL. DEB. (N.S.) 127-247 (1828).
16 See COMMnISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS, THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
OF THE NEw YORK STATE 694 (1850); Chadbourn, supra note 12, at 940-41.
17 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 503; see Chadbourn, supra note 12, at 945.
18 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 503 (a); BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL PROOF
407-10 (Mill ed. 1827).
1 After giving careful consideration to the possibility of drafting a Restatement of the
Law of Evidence, the Council of the Institute unanimously rejected such an'undertak-ing
from their "belief that however much the law needs clarification in order to produce
reasonable certainty in its application, the Rules themselves in numerous and important
instances are so defective that instead of being the means of developing truth, they
operate to suppress it." As a consequence, the Council "felt a Restatement of the
Law of Evidence would be a waste of time or worse; that what was needed was a
thorough revision of existing law." See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Introduction viii
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inconsistencies within the hearsay rule by abandoning the arbitrary exclu-
sion of hearsay (subject to well-defined exceptions) and returning to what
resembles a best evidence approach.2
Under common law principles, hearsay testimony is precluded from
reaching the factfinder primarily because it is untempered by cross-exami-
nation.3 The exceptions to the exclusionary general rule are predicated pri-
marily upon necessity and a circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness,
which Wigmore suggests is a substitute for cross-examination. 4 The framers
of the Code recognized the need for restricting some hearsay evidence
while at the same time admitting other hearsay evidence. They rejected,
however, the common law rationale for delineating between the two on
the basis of finding a substitute for cross-examination as "imperceptible." 5
Instead, the draftsmen proceeded with two fundamental premises: (1) that
relevant hearsay evidence has definite probative value and should be
rationally admitted if there is no better evidence available,6 and (2) that
jurors are far more capable of evaluating hearsay evidence than past decisions
(1942). And as to hearsay evidence in particular, "that the common law rules, as
evolved and developed in our many jurisdictions, have become so refined and complex
as to require a complete and radical re-examination." See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE,
Introductory Note ch. VI, at 217.
2 See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Introductory Note ch. VI, at 221; James, The Role
of Hearsay in a Rational Scheme of Evidence, 34 ILL. L. REv. 788, 795-797 (1940)
for discussion of the best evidence rule and its application to hearsay evidence. James
argues that
the proper criterion, the criterion applied in all other applications of the best
evidence which, in the nature of the fact to be proved, could ordinarily be offered
to prove it. It is the best evidence which, under the circumstances of the case
at bar, this particular litigant could be expected to present. If the "best evidence"
theory is accepted. . . . some hearsay rule may be justified as one of the essential
rules of Evidence ....
3 Wigmore § 1362.
4 Matthews v. United States, 217 F.2d 409, 417 (5th Cir. 1954). See also WIGMORE
§§ 1421, 1422.
5 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Introductory Note ch. VI, at 222. Professor Morgan
more clearly expressed his dissatisfaction with the hearsay rule when he said, "Indeed
a proper appreciation of the history of the hearsay rule, a searching analysis of its
supposed rationality and an examination of its exceptions might well lead to its prac-
tical abolition." Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 59 HARv. L. REv. 481, 545 (1959).
6MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Introductory Note ch. VI, at 217. See Chadbourn,
Bentham and the Hearsay Rule-A Benthamic View of Rule 63(4)(c) of the
Uniform Rules of Evidence, 75 HARV. L. REV. 932 (1962), for a discussion of Bentham's
theories for reform of the hearsay rule. The author suggests Bentham's reforms have
been incorporated into the Code. See also Morgan, supra note 5, at 541: "The exclusion
of hearsay evidence is not grounded upon its lack of probative value, for if inadmissible
hearsay is received without objection, it is to be weighed by the trier of fact, and




would have us believe. 7 Upon these considerations the draftsmen formu-
lated the heart of the rule admitting hearsay declarations in rule 503
which provides:
Evidence of a hearsay declaration is admissible if the judge finds that the
declarant
(a) is unavailable as a witness, or
(b) is present and subject to cross-examination.
By virtue of this rule, "a statement made by a person which would be
received by him if he were now in court and offering it as part of his
testimony, is admissible if he is unavailable as a witness." 8 The whole
question of admissibility turns upon the availability of the declarant rather
than upon the more nebulous theory of a circumstantial guarantee of
trustworthiness. 9
Unavailability of the declarant, as defined by Rule 1 (15), includes any
physical, mental or legal obstacle, whether permanent or temporary, which
prevents the declarant from testifying at the trial. The rule is qualified
to prevent fraud by disallowing hearsay testimony if the obstacle causing
unavailability is brought about either directly br indirectly by the pro-
ponent of the hearsay evidence through procurement, wrongdoing, or culp-
able neglect.10 The exercise of due diligence to find the declarant is
enough.'1 "The mere fact that a deposition might be taken does not make
the witness available," for he is still "unavailable if he is absent were
though you might have taken his deposition." 12 By rejecting the precau-
tionary measures of the traditional hearsay rule and its exceptions, the
7 Morgan, Foreword to MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 48 (1942). The jurors are treated
"as normal human beings, capable of evaluating relevant material in a court-room as
well as in the ordinary affairs of life." James, supra note 2, at 794-95; see Chadbourn,
supra note 6. Morgan rejects Justice Coleridge's statement in Wright v. Doe d. Tatham:
"The fallacy that whatever is morally convincing and whatever reasonable beings would
form their judgments and act upon, may be submitted to a jury." Morgan, The Jury
and the Exclusionary Rules of Evidence, 4 U. CHI. L. REv. 247 (1936). See also
Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HAv. L.
REv. 177, 179-188 (1948); Morgan, Book Review, 5 VAND. L. Rv. 672, 678 (1952).
8 18 ALI PROCEEDINGS 91 (1940-1941).
9A determination by the trial judge that the declarant is unavailable does not
necessitate acceptance of hearsay testimony. By Rule 303 the trial judge may within
his discretion exclude it if he finds its probative value out weighted by undue consump-
tion of time, creation of undue prejudice or unfair surprise. See also Swietlick &
Henrickson, A Code of Evidence for Wisconsin?, 1947 Wis. L. REv. 88.
10MODEL CODE OF EvIDENcE Rules 1(15)(a), 503, comment a, at 232 (1942).
11 18 ALI PROCEEDINGS 91.
12 18 id. at 92.
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Code adopts a consistent and rational approach for admitting the most cogent
evidence available rather than excluding it merely because it is evidence
which has not been tested by cross-examination. 13
This approach proved to be too radical a change. 14 In spite of the dis-
tinguished list of professors, jurists, and authorities who either drafted or
advocated adoption of the Code, its practical effect was minimal.' 5 Very
few courts have cited this section of the Code to support a ruling,16 and no
jurisdiction has enacted these provisions. 16 Professor McCormick suggests,
however, that "this probably is the position towards which our law is
moving." 17
13 Judge Learned Hand suggested such an approach in the 1920's:
When a witness is not available at all or available only with a disproportionate
expense of time, let us hear what he has said on the matter, just as we do in every
other concern of life, even in affairs which may involve our lives or the safety
of the state. . . . I agree that it involves chances, but in answer I argue that, as
the law now stands, the party who has only such proof is deprived of any
chances at all. It would of course be undesirable to open the doors to hearsay
evidence when better was available, but I ask you whether Baron Gilbert was not
right in saying men should use in their disputes the best means they can get to
reach the truth?
Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the Heart o1 the Matter, in 3 N.Y.C.B. Ass'N
LECTURES ON LEGAL Topics 99 (1926).
14 Morgan describes Rule 503 as the most radical departure from the common law.
Morgan, The Code of Evidence Proposed by the American Law Institute, 27 A.B.A.J.
694, 695 (1941). McCormick concludes that "This system of hearsay rules is the most
complex and technical part of the whole subject of evidence, and the code has atttempted
a partial, but only a partial, reform." Although McCormick considered rule 503 as a
primary reason for the Code's rejection, he believed the hearsay provision to be a
"partial reform" only because many hearsay exceptions were retained in the Code.
McCormick, The New Code of Evidence of the American Law Institute, 20 TEXAs L.
REv. 661 (1942). "It [the Code] was thought to be over-radical in its reforms, especially
in opening the door too wide for the admission of hearsay and in conceding too wide a
scope for the trial judge's discretion." McCormick, Some Highlights of the Uniform
Evidence Rules, 33 TEXAs L. REV. 559, 559 (1955); see Gard, The Uniform Rules of
Evidence, 31 TUL. L. REV. 19, 23-24 (1956). For a summary of criticism of the Code,
the reactions of various state bar associations, see Fryer, Note on Code as Means of
Promoting Nation-Wide Reform, in SELECTED WRITINGS ON THE LAw OF EVIDENCE AND
TRIAL 1160 (1957).
15 Wigmore, chief consultant for the Model Code, refused to accept the formulation
of rules: "Now, my disagreement is not with the policy of many of the Draft Code's
Rules as such .... But it is the draftmanship that in my opinion is ground for rejecting
it." Wigmore, The American Law Institute Code of Evidence Rules: A Dissent, 28
A.B.A.J. 23 (1942).
16 In re Petango, 24 N.J.M. 279, 48 A.2d 909, 913 (1942); noted in 32 IowA L.
REV. 779 (1947); Robertson v. Hackensack Trust Co., 1 N.J. 304, 63 A.2d 515, 522-
523 (1949).
17 McCormick, supra note 14, at 561. But according to Morgan, it is moving in that
direction with "glacier-like speed." Morgan, Practical Difficulties Impeding Reform in
the Law of Evidence, 14 VAND. L. REV. 725 (1961).
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C. Uniform Rules of Evidence
The underlying principle of this body of rules is that all witnesses are
competent to testify and all relevant evidence is admissible except where
specific disqualifications or limitations govern.1 This corresponds to the
cardinal rule of evidence which both Thayer2 and Wigmore3 advocate.
The purpose of the Uniform Rules, as stated by the chairman of the
committee which drafted them,4 closely resembles the stated purpose of
the Model Code: 5
[W]e have tried to be very sure that every rule which limits or restricts
in any way the evidence available to the fact-finder, is justified by some
paramount consideration of public policy. If that element of public
necessity does not clearly appear, the restriction is omitted, because as
all will agree, truth is difficult of ascertainment unless the fact-finder
has access to all of the evidence and the opportunity to weigh each part
against the other.6
Nevertheless, the specific provisions of the Uniform Rules are far more
conservative than those of the Model Code, particularly in regard to the
hearsay problem.7 Even though the Uniform Rules would allow some
hearsay evidence to be received that is now admitted in many jurisdictions,
they do not go far beyond the existing law of evidence in some of the more
liberal jurisdictions. 8 In those jurisdictions, adoption of the Uniform
Rules would serve only to simplify and clarify the law of evidence. In
the other more conservative jurisdictions, adoption of these Rules would
undoubtedly have a liberalizing effect; but the root problem would still
remain. The Model Code purported to deal with that problem: in effect,
I UNIFORm RULE OF EVIDENCE 7; see Gard, Kansas Law and the New Uniform
Rules of Evidence, 2 KAN. L. REv. 333, 336-37 (1954).
2 THAYER 198, 264-265.
3 WIGMORE § 9, at 289.
4 Judge Spencer A. Gard of Kansas headed the committee and was assisted by a
distinguished group of judges, practitioners, and scholars. Professor Morgan played
an important role as an advisor along with Maguire and Falknor.
5 See Morgan, Forward to MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 10-11 (1942).
6 Gard, supra note 1, at 337.
7 See Chadbourn, Bentham and the Hearsay Rule-A Benthamic View of Rule 63(4)
(c) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 75 HARV. L. REV. 932, 946-47 (1962);
McCormick, Some High Lights of the Uniform Evidence Rules, 33 TEXAS L. REV.
559, 561 (1955).
8 See McCormick, supra note 7, at 561-62. Weinstein points out that the Uniform
Rules may even be more restrictive in certain respects than the rules currently in
force in the more liberal jurisdictions. Weinstein, The Probative Force of Hearsay,
46 IowA L. REv. 331, 346 (1961).
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it would have inverted the present rule making the admissibility of hearsay
the general rule and exclusion of hearsay the exceptionY The Code,
therefore, would have changed the hearsay rule in its very substance rather
than adjust the rule's form by expanding the exceptions to allow more
hearsay to come in as the Uniform Rules do.
In attempting to overcome the problems encountered with the Model
Code, the drafters of the Uniform Rules of Evidence arrived at a proposal
which, in effect, merely restated the law of evidence with respect to
hearsay that was then current in some of the more liberal jurisdictions."
A restatement of current law was precisely what the drafters of the Model
Code did not want. 1 This amounted to a radical shift in approach from
that of the Model Code. The drafters of the Uniform Rules returned to
the traditional tests for admissibility, necessity and trustworthiness, except
in two instances.
The first instance amounted to a new exception for declarations made
by one who was unavailable. 12 The Uniform Rules sought a compromise
with the traditional rationale and rejected unavailability of the declarant
as a sole criteria. Hearsay evidence would be admissible under the
Uniform Rules if the declarant is unavailable and the judge finds the
extra judicial statement was made in good faith while the subject matter
was still fresh in the declarant's mind. This approach leaves the question
of admissibility with the judge and implements the task by giving him
various alternatives for excluding the hearsay.
Among the various reasons for which the judge may exclude hearsay
is that he believes the statement being recounted by the witness was never
made. Another possibility of exclusion arises if the judge believes the
declarant was lying when making the statement. The judge is also given
the opportunity to exclude the hearsay evidence if he believes the pro-
9 MODrL CODF OF EVIDENCE Rule 503.
10 See McCormick, supra note 7, at 561-62.
11 See 16 ALl PROCEEDINGS 46 (1939).
12 UNiFORm RULE OF EVIDENCE 63 (4) (c):
Evidence of a statement which is made other than by a witness while
testifying at the hearing offered to prove the truth of the matter stated is
hearsay evidence and inadmissible except: . . . (4) . . . (c) if the declarant is
unavailable as a witness, a statement narrating, describing or explaining an event
or condition which the judge finds was made by the declarant at a time when
the matter had been recently perceived by him and while his recollection was
clear, and was made in good faith prior to the commencement of the action....
13 See Chadbourn, supra note 7, at 946. Chadbourn criticizes that part of Rule 63(4)
(c) which allows the judge to exclude the evidence because he thinks the statement is
false. Id. at 947-51.
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ponent has failed to show affirmatively compliance with the conditions of
admissibility set forth in rule 63(4) (c).
The other instance is a provision for admitting extrajudicial declarations
of one who is present at trial and available for cross-examination with
respect to the statement and its subject matter. 4 The Model Code had a
similar provision. This rule allows the proponent to prove his case by the
use of prior consistent and prior inconsistent statements of one who is
subject to cross-examination at the trial in which they are related by
another. Such statements are received as substantive evidence. This is a
common sense rule which recognizes what in reality had been the effect
of the admission of prior statements to credit or impeach a witness. The
jury, no doubt, attached substantive weight to them in spite of the limiting
instructions of the court.1 5
The Uniform Rules also liberalize many of the traditional exceptions. 16
Dying declarations are not limited to homicide cases.' 7 Learned treatises are
admissible as substantive evidence." Depositions and former testimony
are admissible without the requirement that the parties be identical.'9
Admissions of an agent are admissible against his principal so long as
they relate to the scope of his employment or duty and are made before
the agency relationship is terminated.20 No longer would vicarious ad-
missions be limited to statements made by "speaking agents," i.e., agents
with authority to speak for the principal. Declarations against interest
were expanded by the Uniform Rules to include declarations against penal
or social interest.21
Morgan, who had been chiefly responsible for the Model Code, felt
that the Uniform Rules should be adopted; but perhaps out of loyalty,
14 UNIFORm RULE OF EVIDENCE 63 (1).
15 See Donnelly, The Hearsay Rule and Its Exceptions, 40 MINN. L. REv. 455, 461
(1954).
16 See generally Symposium, 40 MINN. L. REv. 297 (1956); Symposium, 49 Nw. U.
L. REv. 481 (1954); Symposium, 10 RUTOERS L. REV. 479 (1956); Symposium,
2 U. C. L. A. L. Rlv. 1 (1954); Powers, The North Carolina Hearsay Rule and
the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 34 N. C. L. REv. 171 (1955); Stopher, The Uniform
Rules of Evidence: Government by Man Instead of by Law, 29 INS. COUNSEL J.
405 (1962); Comment, A Comparison of the Uniform Rule of Evidence 63(1) and
(4) and Virginia Law, 18 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 358 (1961). Professor Green lists
six significant items in the Uniform Rules. Green, Drafting Uniform Federal Rules of
Evidence, 52 CORNELL L. Q. 177, 187 (1967).
17 UNIFOREI RULE OF EVIDENCE 63(5).
18 UNIFORmI RULE OF EVIDENCE 63 (31)
19 UNIFORm RULE OF EVIDENCE 63(3)
2 0 UNIFORMi RULE OF EVIDENCE 63 (9).
21 UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 63 (10)
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he clung to the belief that something closer to the proposal originally
adopted by the American Law Institute (the Model Code of Evidence)
would have been more acceptable.
22
D. Dead Man Statutes
The typical dead man statute disqualifies the survivor of a transaction as
a witness in an action by or against the administrator or executor of the
deceased party.' This is due primarily to a notion of fair play,2 as the
statements or declarations of the deceased are generally inadmissible unless
under some exception to the hearsay rule.3
Chadbourn points out that, generally, three alternatives to the usual dead
man statute have crystallized.4 One would allow the survivor to testify
in the discretion of the trial judge where the interests of justice would be
better served.5 New Hampshire, 6 Montana, 7 and Arizona are representa-
tive jurisdictions following this approach.9 The second alternative qualifies
the survivor, yet no judgment may be rendered in his behalf unless his
testimony is corroborated.' 0 New Mexico's statute" is of this variety.' 2
The third alternative is more pertinent to this discussion as it creates a
new exception to the hearsay rule for the declarations of the deceased. 3
Virginia 14 and Oregon 5 admit the hearsay statements of the deceased if
22Morgan, The Uniform Rules and the Model Code, 31 TUL. L. REV. 145, 151-52,
(1956).
1 WIGMORE § 578.
2 Morgan, Practical Difficulties Impeding Reform in the Law of Evidence, 14 VAND.
L. REV. 725, 728 (1961):
[T~he fundamental notion was that since the dead man could not testify in denial
or explanation of the offered testimony and had had no opportunity to cross
examine the witness, it would expose his estate to all sorts of false claims. The
refutation of this argument by many commentators and some judges had had no
appreciable effect.
3 Chadbourn, History and Interpretation of the California Dead Man Statute: A
Proposal for Liberalization, 4 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 175, 214 (1957).
4 1d. at 212-17.
5 Id. at 212.
6N. H. Rav. LAws ch. 392, §§ 25-26 (1955).
7 MONT. REV. CODE ANN. tit. 93, ch. 701, § 3 (Repl. vol. 1947).
8 ARiz. CODE ANN. ch. 23, § 105 (1956).
9 Chadbourn, supra note 3, at 212.
'Old. at 213.
1'N.M. STAT. ANN. ch. 20, §§ 2-5 (1953).
12 Chadbourn, supra note 3, at 213.
13 Id. at 214.
14 VA. CODE ANN. § 8-286 (Repl. vol. 1957).
15 ORE. COMP. LAWS ANN. tit. 4, ch. 41, § 850 (1953).
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corroborated in an action by or against the administrator or executor of
the deceased if the survivor first testifies. 16  Connecticut 17 and South
Dakota18 admit the declarations of the deceased without limit on an action
by or against the decedent's executor or administrator,19 although South
Dakota requires that the declaration be made in good faith, by the declarant
and upon his personal knowledge.20 Massachusetts?, and Rhode Island,22
however, go all the way and admit the declarations of any decedent in any
action.23 Even though the element of necessity is the primary requisite,24
the Massachusetts statute is not without adequate safeguards of reliability
and trustworthiness for, as in the South Dakota statute, the declarations
must have been made in good faith upon the personal knowledge of the
deceased declarant before the commencement of the action,25 and the state-
ment must be one of fact, not of opinion.
26
Referring to the admission of all the declarations of the decedent without
limit, Wigmore states that such came near to being a settled exception in
the early 1800's,27 and although it was later negatived, it "commends itself
as a just addition to the present sharply defined exceptions, and represents
undoubtedly the enlightened policy of the future." 28
Rule 7 of the Uniform Rules would abolish the dead man statutes. The
successful experience of those jurisdictions which have long been without
such statutes has demonstrated that abuses do not follow in the wake of
their abolition.2 There is strong support for this liberal proposal of which
Uniform Rule 7 is only the most recent example. 30
16 Chadbourn, supra note 3, at 214.
17 CONN. REV. GEN. STAT. § 7895 (1958).
18 S.D. Code § 36.0104 (1962).
19 Chadbourn, supra note 3, at 214.
20 S.D. CODE 36.0104.
21 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, § 65 (1959).
22 R.I. GEN. LAWS ch. 538, § 6 (1956).
23 Chadbourn, supra note 3, at 214.
24 JONES, EVIDENCE § 274, at 528 (5th ed. 1958).
25 MASS. ANN. LAWs ch. 233, § 65 (1956).
26 JONES, supra note 24.
27 WIGMORE § 1576, at 435.
28 Ibid.
2 9 See Levin, Pennsylvania and the Uniform Rules of Evidence: Presumptions and
Dead Man Statutes, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 9 (1954); McCormick, Some Highlights of
the Uniform Evidence Rules, 33 TExAs L. REv. 559, 563 (1955) ; McCormick, The New
Code of Evidence of the American Law Institute, 20 TEXAs L. REv. 661, 666 (1942).
30 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 101; MORGAN ET. AL., THE LAW OF EVIDENCE-
SOME PROPOSALS FOR ITS REFORM 27-30 (1927); VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS
OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 334 et. seq. (1949); WIGMORE § 8c.
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E. Miscellaneous Statutes
The legislation dealing with particular problems of hearsay evidence are
so numerous and varied that they could not adequately be handled here.
In fact, it would be unnecessary even to list all of these statutes. None
appear to have any substantial impact on the common law hearsay rule
with the exception of the English Evidence Act.' This Act creates a
broad, new exception for written hearsay offered in civil proceedings under
certain circumstances 2 Statements written after the dispute arises, how-
ever, are inadmissible. 3 The Act does not make unavailability a prerequisite
to admission, and it even allows the judge to admit the hearsay without
calling the declarant to the stand when he is available.4 The judge is
also given the power to exclude the statement if, in the exercise of his
discretion, he finds that it is "inexpedient in the interests of justice to admit
it." 5
VI. HEARSAY IN NON-JUDIcIAL TRIBUNALS
A. Administrative Agencies
(1.) Background.-Administrative bodies are hardly new in Anglo-
American history. They flourished and were a potent political force in
sixteenth and seventeenth century England.1 Before the American Revolu-
S1I & 2 Geo. 6, ch. 28 (1938)
2 See MAGUIRE, WEINSTEIN, CHADBOURN & MANSFIELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EVIDENCE 542 (5th ed. 1965). See generally Cross, What Should Be Done About the
Rule against Hearsay?, 1965 CRIM. L. REV. 68; Hellamn, The Reform of the Law
of Hearsay, 17 CAN. B. REV. 302 (1939); Nokes, Some Suggestions on Hearsay, 1965
CRim. L. REV. 85; Stone, The Evidence Act, 1938, 85 L. J. 409, 425, 441 (1938);
Comment, Hearsay and the English Evidence Act, 1938, 34 ILL. L. REV. 974 (1940);
52 HARv. L. REV. 539 (1939).
3 1 & 2 Geo. 6, ch. 28, § 1(3) (1938).
4 1 &2 Geo. 6, ch. 28,§ 1(2) (a) (1938).
5 1 & 2 Geo. 6, ch. 28,§ 1(5) (1938).
1 See POUND, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: ITS GROWTH, PROCEDURE AND SIGNIFICANCE 27
(1942). In fact, administrative law may be traced back to ancient Rome. Id. at 9. In
England, it dates back to the Year Books. See LAVERY, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
§§ 3-4, at 5-6 (1952). But see DICEY, LECTURES INTRODUCTORY TO THE STUDY OF THE
LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 180 (1885):
In England, and in countries which, like the United States, derive their civiliza-
tion from English sources, the system of administrative law and the very
principles on which it rests are in truth unknown.
Dicey later modified his position. See Dicey, The Development of Administrative Law
in England. 31 L. Q. REV. 148 (1915). His views are criticized in CARROW, THE
BACKGROUND OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 14-15 (1948); FREUND, THE GROWTH OF AMmu-
CAN" ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 9-16 (1923); JENNINGS, THE LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION
293 (3d ed. 1943). See also 1 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 1.04, at 24-25 (1958)
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tion, they functioned in the colonies and were a major cause of the ultimate
breakaway from England. Due largely to the fact that there was no
separation of powers, colonial administrative bodies were characterized
by arbitrariness; and the distaste for administrative process, survived the
founding of the new nation. The excessive reaction to this process led to
what, by the end of the next century, Pound has called a "law-ridden"
society.3 The judicial process in the late 1800's had become cumbersome and
overly technical.
At the same time, there was a heavier demand on the courts than ever
before as a result of the great number of disputes growing out of the rapid
development of railroads, industry, and public utilities4 The courts failed
to accommodate this demand 5 In the face of the pressing need for a way
to handle controversies which the courts could not or would not handle, the
public put aside its fear of abuses, which historically had accompanied
administrative bodies, and turned to such bodies as a means of alleviating
the problem.6 Administrative bodies had never ceased to exist during the
intervening period,7 but now in the last two decades of the nineteenth
century their growth and prominence took a sharp swing upward.8 The
[hereinafter cited as DAvis]: "Administrative law existed long before the term 'adminis-
trative law' came into existence." Professor Goodlow was said to have 'discovered' the
existence of administrative law in the United States. See ibid. In GOODLOW, COM-
PARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 6-7 (1893), he wrote that
the general failure in England and the United States to recognize an administra-
tive law is really due, not to the non-existence in these countries of this branch of
the law but rather to the well-known failure of English law writers to classify
the law. For . . . there has always existed in England as well as in this country,
an administrative law....
But the term "administrative law" had been used before. See HOLLAND, ELEMENTS OF
JURISPRUDENcE 374 (1880); Index to 13 OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 599
(U.S. 1869), cited by LAVERY, supra, at 6 n. 8.
2 See POUND, supra note 1, at 27.
3 Ibid. See also 1 COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATrIVE LAw 15 et. seq. (1965).
4 See GELLHORN, FEDERAL ADmINISTRArE PROCEDURE 8-9 (1941).
5 DAviS § 1.05, at 34-35.
6 See POUND, supra note 1, at 28.
7 A Maryland statute in 1781, set up an administrative board to license the operation
of ferries. LAws OF MD,., ch. 22 (Nov. Sess. 1781). The first federal statute establishing
an administrative agency came eight years later. 1 Stat. 29 (1789). This board was
created to provide for the effective enforcement of customs laws. See GELLHORN, supra
note 4, at 3-4. In spite of the steady rise in the number of administrative agencies
during the next century, the first important agency was not created until 1887, when
Congress saw the need for the Interstate Commerce Commission. 24 Stat. 379. Cf.
CARuow, supra note 1, at 61-64; PRETTYMAN, TRIAL BY AGENcY 44 (1959); 1 VON
BAUR, FEDERAL ADMINsSTRATrvE LAw § 82, at 93 (1942); Patterson, Hearsay and the
Substantial Evidence Rule in the Federal Administrative Process, 13 MERCER L. REV.
294, 302 (1962).
8 See GELLHORN, supra note 4, at 4.
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administrative machinery has increased markedly since that time and has
attained a position rivaling that of the courts in the amount of disputes
handled.9
The principal characteristic of administrative hearings is informality.'0
Free from the cumbersome legal rules of evidence and procedure, they have
proved to be adaptable and simple. A resort to sources of information
ordinarily relied upon by businessmen and others in the conduct of the daily
affairs has replaced the confining technicalities of the courtroom." Some
writers suggest that the legal rules of evidence should be refashioned after
the principle which guides administrative tribunals in deciding fact dis-
putes.' 2 On the other hand, there are those who advocate an application
of the legal rules of evidence to administrative hearings, at least to the
extent that they are applied in non-jury trials.13 Most of this latter group
would concede that administrative hearing officers should be allowed at
least as much discretion as judges in equity proceedings.' 4 This would not
effect a strict application of the hearsay rule, but would make it a guide
for the hearing officer to use in his discretion when hearsay evidence be-
comes too remote. 5 However, the basic principles of relevancy, materiality,
and probative force would be applied, as much for reasons of practicality
as for fairness.1
6
(2.) Federal Administrative Hearings.-As a general principle, the
hearsay rule does not apply to federal administrative hearings primarily
because the administrative agency has as its first responsibility the protec-
tion of the public interest.' 7 The interest in deciding the case correctly as
9 BOTEIN & GORDON, THE TRIAL OF THE FUTURE 78 (1963); MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE:
COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW 161 (1947); Davis, Hearsay in Administrative
Hearings, 32 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 689, 692-93 (1964).
10 See POUND, supra note 1, at 77-78.
11 See Learned Hand, J., in John Bene & Sons v. FTC, 299 Fed. 468 (2d Cir. 1924);
Loevinger, Facts, Evidence and Legal Proof, 9 W. REs. L. REv. 154, 171 (1958).
12 See Loevinger, supra note 11, at 171-72.
13 See COMM'N ON ORGANIZATION OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF Gov'T, TASK FORCE
REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE 199 (1955) (Second Hoover Commission);
COOPER, supra note 3, at 379-84; Stephan, The Extent to Which Fact-Finding Boards
Should Be Bound by Rules of Evidence, 24 A.B.A.J. 63 (1938).
14See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 13, at 199; Attorney General's Committee,
Administrative Procedure in Gov't. Agencies, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 70-71
(1941). See also A.B.A., CODE OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE § 1006 (4) (Proposed
Draft, Apr., 1957).
15 CHAMBERLAIN, DOWLING & HAYS, THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN FEDERAL ADMINIS-
TRATIVE AGENCIES 22 (1942).
16 See Statement of McFarland, Stason & Vanderbilt, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong.,
1st Sess. 241 (1941).
17See Attorney General's Committee, Administrative Procedure in Gov't Agencies,
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between the litigants is not the pre-eminent concern in such hearings as it is in
the courtroom.18 It has long been settled that in the absence of statute, the
rules of evidence applicable to jury trials do not apply to the federal
agencies. 9 In 1946, Congress enacted the Federal Administrative Proce-
dure Ac6O which today governs the reception of evidence in most agency
hearings. It provides that "... . any oral or documentary evidence may be
received, but every agency shall as a matter of policy provide for the exclu-
sion of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence ... ." 21
Congress has enacted statutes expressly superseding the Federal Administra-
tive Procedure Act where certain agencies are involved.
The federal agencies fall into three general categories with respect to
their treatment of hearsay evidence offered at administrative hearings:
(1) those agencies which provide by regulation that relevant and material
evidence should be admitted while irrelevant, immaterial, and unduly repe-
titious evidence should be excluded;22 (2) those which apply the rules of
evidence found in non-jury civil cases tried in federal courts;2 3 and finally
(3) those which allow the introduction of any evidence that reasonably
prudent men consider probative. 24
S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. 70 (1941); STEPHENS, ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS
AND THE RULES OF EVIDENCE, A STUDY IN JURISPRUDENCE AND ADMIINISTRATIVE LAW
93 (1935) ; Patterson, supra note 7, at 341.
18 See Patterson, supra note 7, at 304.
19 WIGM ORE § 4(c), at 43-44.
20 60 Stat. 237, 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1958).
2160 Stat. 241, 5 U.S.C. § 1006(c) (1958).
2 2 Included in this first group are the Federal Trade Commission, the Civil Aero-
nautics Board, and the Securities and Exchange Commission. 16 C.F.R. § 3.43 (b) (1968)
(FTC); 14 C.F.R. § 301.32 (1967) (CAB); 17 C.F.R. § 201.14(a) (1968) (SEC); see
Note, The Federal Trade Commission and Reform of the Administrative Process, 62
COLUm. L. REv. 671, 692-94 (1962); 46 MINN. L. REv. 778 (1962).
23The Federal Communications Commission and the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion have regulations setting out the rules of evidence applicable to civil non-jury
cases as a guideline to be followed by the hearing officer as far as it is practical. 47
C.F.R. § 1.351 (1968) (FCC); 49 C.F.R. § 1.75 (1967) (ICC). Both of these regula-
tions provide that the standards of admissibility may be relaxed in the interest of justice.
The National Labor Relations Board requires that the rules of evidence as determined
under Rule 43a of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure must be enforced in its
hearings. 29 C.F.R. § 102.39 (1968). This means that the same rules applicable in
federal cases are applicable in NLRB hearings, but Rule 43a provides in part that
the rules of evidence which formerly governed the admissibility of evidence in equity
proceedings may be applied. This provision is hardly more precise than those of the
FCC and the ICC.
24 This third group is composed of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal
Power Commission. The FPC provision contains language reminiscent of that found in
the more liberal federal cases dealing with evidence in administrative' hearings. 18
C.F.R. § 1.26(a) -(1968); see John Bene & Sons v. FTC, 299 Fed. 468, 47-1 (2d Cir.
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In immigration2' as well as deportation cases, 26 the judicial rules of evi-
dence are not applicable. Hearsay, in particular, is thought to be needed
in such cases because of the likelihood that the basic source may be thou-
sands of miles away.27 In deportation cases, however, there is a growing
tendency to require the production of extrajudicial declarants if the re-
spondent wishes to cross-examine them, and if they are available.28 But one
court has held that hearsay evidence was properly admitted at an adminis-
trative hearing over respondent's objections where he failed to request
that witnesses be produced; 2 and there has not been any indication in
these cases that the respondent has an absolute right to be confronted
by all witnesses.3
1924); NLRB v. Remington Rand, 94 F.2d 862, 873 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 304
U.S. 576 (1938). The AEC provision is the only one specifically dealing With the
hearsay question. 10 C.F.R. § 2.743(c) (1968):
E.. Bvery reasonable effort will be made to obtain the best evidence reasonably
available. Hearsay evidence will be admitted without regard to technical rules
of admissibility and accorded such weight as the circumstances warrant.
25 Loy v. Cahill, 81 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1936); Smith v. Curran, 12 F.2d 636 (2d
Cir. 1926). See also 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, ImIORATION LAW AND PROCEDURE
§ 3.20f (1967).2 6 Tisi v. Tod, 264 U.S. 131 (1924); Pang v. INS, 368 F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1037 (1967). Greene v. INS, 313 F.2d 148 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 374 U.S. 828 (1963); Schoeler v. INS, 306 F.2d 460 (2d Cir. 1962); Morgans
v. Pilliod, 299 F.2d 217 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 924 (1962); Bufalino v.
Holland, 277 F.2d 270 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 863 (1960); Impasato v.
O'Rourke, 211 F.2d 609 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954). See generally
GoRDoN & ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, § 5.10; Taffet, Evidence in Deportation Pro-
ceedings, 38 INT. REL. 142 (1961).
27 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, at § 3.20f.
28Maltez v. Nagle, 27 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1928); Matter of M., 6 I.N. 300 (1954);
Matter of M., 5 I.N. 738 (1954). See GoRDoN & ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, § 5.9g.
This trend is due at least in part to a new reading being given the applicable statute
in the light of modern criminal cases, such as Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
The statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (b), reads:
The alien shall have a reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence against
him, to present evidence in his own behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses pre-
sented by the Government.
29 Wei v. Robinson, 246 F.2d 739, 746 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 879 (1957).
See also Maltez v. Nagle, 27 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1928); Matter of R., 5 I.N. 612
(1954).
3O See Moncado v. Ramsey, 167 F.2d 191 (8th Cir. 1948); Singh v. McGrath, 104
F.2d 122 (9th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 629 (1940). See also 8 C.F.R.
242.14 (c); GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, § 5.9g. But see Bridges v. Wixon,
326 U.S. 135, 156 (1945), which suggested that the admission of hearsay in a deporta-
tion hearing may deny the defendant a fair hearing. This case seems to have been
ignored by the courts. See MAGUIRE, WEINSTEIN, CHADBOURN & MANSFIELD, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 773 (5th ed. 1965); cf. Sherman v. INS, 350 F.2d 894
(2d Cir. 1965), discussed in Jaffe, Administrative Law: Burden of Proof and Scope of
Review, 79 HARv. L. REv. 914 (1966). In Sherman, the Court held that the federal
[Vol. 3:•89
HEARSAY RULE
(3.) State Administrative Agencies.-In 1946, the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws1 and the American Bar Associa-
tion2 approved the Model State Administrative Procedure Act Hawaii,
Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin have
adopted acts which are substantially similar.4 This Act provides that "agen-
des may admit and give probative effect to evidence which possesses proba-
tive value commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the conduct
of their affairs." 5 It further provides that the agencies "may exclude in-
competent, irrelevant, immaterial, and unduly repetitious evidence." 6 It
would seem, then, that the admission of hearsay evidence would be solely
within the discretion of the agency. This provision is subject to the restric-
tion that a reviewing court may reverse if the findings are unsupported by
competent, material and substantial evidence in view of the entire record
submitted.7 Taken together these provisions mean that although hearsay
evidence could be admitted, a finding cannot rest entirely on hearsay which
would be inadmissible in trial courts even if it possesses probative value and
would be accepted by reasonable men.8 This is commonly known as the
residuum rule.9
statute which made the finding of the Attorney General on deportability conclusive
when supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence did not contemplate
burden of proof. Therefore, the reviewing court, may decide that a higher degree of
proof is required in a given case. Jaffe views this to mean that a case may be re-
manded "despite the fact that the evidence is substantial." Jaffe, supra, at 915.
See also JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADINISTATIVE ACTION 651 (1965): "In de-
portation the administrative considerations warranting limited review are relatively
weak, and the claims for procedural protection relatively high."
19c U.L.A. 174 (1957). See also Symposium,-Model State Administrative Proce-
dure Act, 33 IoWA L. REv. 193 (1948).
2 32 A.B.A.J. 407 (1946).
3 MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATrVE PROCEDURE ACT (1946) [hereinafter cited as 1946
MODEL ACT].
4 HAWAI SESS. LAWS 1961, Act 103, § 10; MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 252 (Repl.
vol. 1965); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 3.560 (21.5) (1) (1961); Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.070
(Supp. 1967); ORE. REV. STAT. § 183.450 (Repl. part 1967); WASH. REV. CODE
34.04.100 (1963); Wis. STAT. § 227.10 (1961). See generally 1 COOPER, STATE AD-
MIINISTRATIVE LAW 384 et seq. (1965).
5 MODEL ACT § 9(1). The phrase is derived from Judge Learned Hand's opinion in
NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862, 873 (2d Cir. 1938); cf. Sigmon, Rules
of Evidence Before the ICC, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 258, 268 (1962). This standard
is frequently applied in administrative cases, and it has been incorporated in the rules
of the FPC. 18 C.F.R. 1.26(a) (1967)
6 1946 MODEL ACT § 9(1).
7 1946 MODEL ACT § 12(7) (c).
8 See DAVIS § 14.06, at 277.
9 Ibi-i.
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The Model State Administrative Procedure Act was revised in 196110
and has since been adopted with variations in Georgia, Oklahoma and
Rhode Island." There are two substantial changes in the evidence provi-
sions of the revised act: (1) The agencies must exclude irrelevant, imma-
terial and unduly repetitious evidence, and (2) The rules of evidence as
applied in non-jury civil cases in the state courts shall be followed. 12 The
purpose is to provide for uniform treatment of evidence in all types of
adjudication within the state.13 Thus, under the present Model Act, the
agency has lost its absolute discretion in the admission of hearsay and
must follow the rules of evidence in non-jury trials in the state court. This
may be a step backward or it may reflect the relaxation of the hearsay
rule in the state courts. The latter seems more probable.1 4
Legislation in the remaining states varies greatly, 15 but in general it bears
a closer resemblance to the Federal Administrative Procedure Act than to
the Model Act.16 Massachusetts, for example, has provided by statute that
Unless otherwise provided by any law, agencies need not observe the
rules of evidence observed by courts, but shall observe the rules of privi-
lege recognized by law. Evidence may be admitted and given probative
effect only if it is the kind of evidence on which reasonable persons
are accustomed to rely in the conduct of serious affairs. Agencies may
exclude unduly repetitious evidence, whether offered on direct examina-
tion or cross-examination of witnesses. 17
This closely parallels the treatment of hearsay in federal agencies. Hearsay
is considered on the basis of its reliability and probative value. It is not
categorically excluded. That was in essence the way hearsay was treated in
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries before a rigid rule of exclusion devel-
oped.' 8
10 9c U.L.A. 136 (Supp. 1967) [hereinafter cited as 1961 MODEL ACT].
11 GA. CODE ANN. § 3A-101 (Supp. 1967); OKLA STAT. tit. 75, § 310 (Supp. 1963);
R. I. GEN LAws ANN. § 42-35-10 (Supp. 1967).
12 1961 MODEL ACT § 10(1).
13 9c U.L.A. 153 (Supp. 1967)
14 Cf. Davis, Hearsay in Administrative Hearings, 32 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 689
(1964).
15 9c U.L.A. 153 (Supp. 1967); cf. Comment, Administrative Procedure Legislation
among the States, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 634 (1964).
16 See DAVIS § 14.06, at 252.
17 MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 30A, § 11(2) (1966).




The Virginia statute19 appears to have arrived at the best result by
adopting, in effect, the approach of Bentham and the Model Code.20 It
provides that
All relevant and material evidence shall be received, except that: ...
(2) hearsay evidence shall be received only if the declarant is not readily
available as a witness.... In deciding whether a witness or document
is readily available the agency shall balance the importance of the evi-
dence against the difficulty of obtaining it, and the more important the
evidence is the more effort should be made to produce the eyewitness or
the original document. 21
The decision of the agency must be based solely on the evidence received
at the hearing and matters which a court of record could judicially notice.
Unfortunately, the Virginia statute fails to provide that findings may be
supported by hearsay.P The judicial review provision of this statute provides
for setting aside a decision if the findings are "unsupported by the evidence
on the record considered as a whole." 24 Since hearsay can be received it
would seem that the finding could be supported by hearsay alone. 25
(4.) Substantial Evidence and Residuum Rules.-Neither the substan-
tial evidence rule nor the residuum rule is a rule of evidence. They are
rules applied by reviewing courts to determine whether the evidence pre-
sented at an administrative hearing warrants the finding of the hearing
officer.2 The court will not remand cases simply because it disagrees with
the finding; it does so only when there is insufficient evidence to justify
the finding.3 Both are rules of fairness resting on the notion that it is
19 VA. Con, ANN. § 9-6.11 (Repl. vol. 1964).
20See the material, supra, on Bentham (p. 102), and on the Model Code (p. 126).
2 1 VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.11 (a) (Repl. vol. 1964).
2 2 VA. CoDE ANN. § 9-6.11(d) (Repl. vol. 1964).,
23 See DAVIs § 14.06, at 278.
24 VA. ConE ANN. § 9-6.13(g) (5) (Repl. vol. 1964).
25 See DAVIS § 14.06, at 278. See also American Furniture Co. v. Graves, 141 Va. 1,
15-16, 126 S.E. 213, 216-17 (1925). In a Workmen's Compensation case, the court
held that hearsay could support a finding.
1 Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938); NLRB v. Thompson
Products, Inc., 97 F.2d 13, 15 (6th Cir. 1938); Appalachian Electric Power Co. v.
NLRB, 93 F.2d 985, 989 (4th Cir. 1938); see Patterson, Hearsay and the Substantial
Evidence Rule and the Federal Administrative Process, 13 MERCER L. REV. 294, 306-07
(1962).
2 See 1 COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 404-05 (1965). See also Jaffe, Judicial
Review: Question of Fact, 69 I-HRv. L. REv. 1020 (1956).
3See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); Barton Trucking
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improper to adjudicate the rights of parties and decide controversies when
evidence is lacking in probative value or when the evidence has probative
value but there is not enough of it.4
The two rules are separate but complementary, at least in theory.5 The
substantial evidence rule requires that the evidence must do more than
create suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established.' It must be
of the sort that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. 7 The residuum rule operates to determine what portion of the
evidence received at the hearing is entitled to consideration.8 Strictly
Corp. v. O'Connell, 7 N.Y.2d 299, 197 N.Y.S.2d 138, 165 N.E.2d 163 (1959). See also
Jaffe, supra note 2, at 1021:
Judicial review has the function of determining whether the administrative action
is consistent with law-that and no more. But it is generally held that the ade-
quacy of the evidence adduced to support a finding of fact is a question of
law. . . . Under the accepted test, a court will be required to sustain a finding
which it believes to be incorrect and even 'against the weight of evidence'
because it is the agency, not the court, which finds the fact.
Professor Brown argued that the adequacy of evidence was not a question of law. Brown,
Fact and Law in Judicial Review, 56 HARv. L. REv. 899, 903 (1943). See also Jaffe,
Administrative Law: Burden of Proof and Scope of Review, 79 HARv. L. REv. 914, 915
(1966), discussing Sherman v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 350 F.2d 894
(2d Cir. 1965). The Sherman case held that a reviewing court could remand a case
even when the finding was based upon substantial evidence if the court feels that the
factfinder should have required a higher quantum of proof. In the deportation case
before them, the Sherman court felt that the highest quantum (i.e., the greatest burden)
of proof was required. This was equivalent to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
4 See Nelson v. Blake, 419 P.2d 596, 597 (Wash. 1966). 9ee generally JAFFE, JuDICIAL
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (1965).
5 Cf. Note, The Weight To Be Given Hearsay Evidence by Administrative Agencies:
The "Legal Residuum" Rule, 26 BROOKLYN L. REV. 265, 266 (1960).
6 Ferrell v. Celebrezze, 232 F.Supp. 281, 282 (1964); Bd. of Education v. Comm'n
on Civil Rights, 153 Conn. 652, 661, 220 A.2d 278, 282 (1966); Ruettger v. Penn-
sylvania Public Utilities Comm'n, 164 Pa. Super. 388, 394, 64 A.2d 675, 679 (1949).
The federal substantial evidence rule is codified in 80 Stat. 393, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (E)
(1966).
7 Bridges v. Gardner, 368 F.2d 86, 90 (5th Cir. 1966); Camero v. United States, 345
F.2d 798, 800 (Ct. CI. 1965); Texas Liquor Control Bd. v. Cervantes, 333 S.W.2d
466, 468 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960). But the court must look to the whole record. 60
Stat. 244 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1966); MODEL STATE PROCEDURE ACT § 12(7);
see Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951); Gooding v. Willard,
209 F.2d 913, 916 (2d Cir. 1954); Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Boland, 282 N.Y. 256,
275, 26 N.E.2d 247, 256 (1940); DAVIS § 29.03; Jaffe, Judicial Review: "Substantial
Evidence on the Whole Record," 64 HAsv. L. REV. 1233 (1951). Contra, NLRB v.
Waterman S.S. Corp., 309 U.S. 206 (1940); Stason, "Substantial Evidence" in Adminis-
trative Law, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 1026, 1049-50 (1941).
The factfinder is not entitled to disregard altogether the evidence offered by one side
even though there is strong evidence on the other. Cf. NLRB v. A. Sartorius & Co.,
140 F.2d 203, 205 (1944).
8See DAVIS § 14.10, at 291-92. It has been suggested that the residuum rule comes
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speaking, it requires that all legally incompetent evidence be ignored by
the court in determining whether the finding is reasonably supported. 9 Any
hearsay, for example, which is inadmissible in legal proceedings under the
technical hearsay rule cannot be considered by the reviewing courtJ1 There
must be a residuum of legal evidence after the incompetent evidence is
removed to support the finding.1 In practice, this rule simply means that
the element of trustworthiness lacking in hearsay evidence must be supplied
by the corroboration of legal evidence elsewhere in the record.' 2
These rules do not restrict the administrative tribunal as to the kind
of evidence admissible before it.13 What both rules attempt to do is prevent
an arbitrary decision by the hearing officer once the evidence is in.14 They
achieve much the same result from one side as the exclusionary rules
achieve from the other. There has been a great deal of criticism of the rule
as stated above.'5 Most authorities, while recognizing the need to prevent
arbitrariness in the factfinder, argue that a rule which was designed to
apply in jury trials for the purpose of determining admissibility is ill-suited
for use by a reviewing court. 6 What the rule implies rather clearly is that
in four varieties: (1) the restrictive residuum rule, which requires that the finding rest
solely on legally competent evidence; (2) the pure residuum rule, which requires that
a prima facie case be established without legally incompetent evidence, but which
allows incompetent evidence to be considered in reaching the ultimate determination;
(3) the liberal residuum rule, which allows the use of reliable incompetent evidence
together with competent evidence to establish the prima facie case and to support the
ultimate determination; and (4) the reliability rule, which allows the use of incompe-
tent evidence, if reliable, as the sole basis of the prima facie case and the ultimate
determination. Note, The Residuum Rule and the Appellate Fact Review: Marriage of
Necessity, 13 RUTGERS L. Rlv. 254, 255-56 (1958). Cooper treats the residuum rule
as part of the substantial evidence test. It is the first step in reviewing the finding of
an administrative agency. This first step corresponds to the prima facie test mentioned
above. I COOPER supra note 2, at 405.
9 Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N.Y. 435, 113 N.E. 507 (1916). This was
the first case to announce such a rule explicitly. Even though the statute allowed the
agency to receive incompetent evidence, the court felt that the finding must be supported
by a residuum of legal evidence. 218 N.Y. at 440, 113 N.E. at 509.
10 At least not under the restrictive residuum rule. See Gilligan v. Int'l Paper Co., 24
N.J. 230, 236, 131 A.2d 503, 507 (1957).
11 See 1 COOPER supra note 2, at 405.
12 See Altschuller v. Bressler, 289 N.Y. 463, 469, 46 N.E.2d 886, 889 (1943); Note,
26 BROOKLYN L. REv., supra note 5, at 267.
13 The substantial evidence and residuum rules, however, do affect the admissibility
of evidence at hearings indirectly.
14 See Donnelly Garment Co. v. NLRB, 123 F.2d 215 (8th Cir. 1941); Patterson,
supra note 1, at 306.
15 See, e.g., DAvis § 14.10; WirBORE § 4b; Patterson, supra note 1, at 343.
16 See Davis, Hearsay in Administrative Hearings, 32 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 689, 69
(1964).
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evidence inadmissible under the legal rules of evidence is utterly lacking
in probative value, that is, incapable of inducing belief in the existence of a
fact. Yet reasonable men rely upon hearsay daily in reaching important
decisions. 17
Many courts have recognized the harshness of the rule as it was originally
enunciated.18 Although there is some confusion, the federal courts appar-
ently follow a much more liberal rule than the rigid residuum rule. 9 Only
a minority of states have frankly rejected the residuum rule,20 but it seems
fair to say that the full impact of that rule is diminished even in those
states which purport to follow it. 21 Courts strain to find corroboration,
stretch exceptions so that the hearsay will be considered competent, and
offer obscure and confusion reasons for upholding the finding so that it is
impossible to tell whether it has followed the residuum rule.2
2
(5.) Due Process Requirements and the Administrative Hearing.-When
the admission of hearsay at an administrative hearing substantially deprives
a party of any effective opportunity to cross-examine the declarants, many
courts have held that he has been denied a fair hearing.' Certain proce-
dural safeguards are deemed to be so essential that their absence amounts
to a violation of due process requirements.2 Reversible error was found in
17See John Bene & Sons, Inc. v. FTC, 299 Fed. 468, 471 (2d Cir. 1924); cf.
Loevinger, Fact, Evidence and Legal Proof, 9 W. RES. L. REV. 154, 171 (1958).
l8 See, e.g., Int'l Ass'n v. NLRB, 110 F.2d 29, 35 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd, 311 U.S. 72
(1939) ("It is only convincing, not lawyers' evidence which is required."); John Bene
& Sons, Inc. v. FTC 299 Fed. 468, 471 (2d Cir. 1924); Cabe v. Campbellsville, 385
S.W.2d 51 (Ky. 1964).
19 Compare NLRB v. Remington Rand, 94 F.2d 862, 873 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
304 U.S. 576 (1938) (A finding may be supported by "the of evidence on which
responsible persons are accustomed to rely in serious affairs: even though it in-
cludes hearsay.), with Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 230 (1938)
("Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence."); see
DAvIs § 14.11.
20 Holt v. Peterson Construction Co., 134 Kan. 149, 4 P.2d 428 (1931); Standard
Oil Co. v. Mealey, 147 Md. 249, 251, 127 Atl. 850, 851 (1925); Derby v. Swift & Co.,
188 Va. 336, 49 S.E.2d 417 (1948); McKinnie v. Dep't of Labor and Industries, 179
Wash. 245, 37 P.2d 218 (1934); see 1 COOPER 404-12; DAVIS 14.12.
21 See DAVIS § 14.12, at 313.
22 See 1 COOPER, supra note 2, at 405; Davis, The Residuum Rule in Administrative
Law, 28 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 1, 30 (1955).
1 See, e.g., Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407 (1955); United States v. Balti-
more & Ohio Southwestern R.R. Co., 226 U.S. 14 (1912); Powhatan Mining Co. v.
Ickes, 118 F.2d 105 (6th Cir. 1941); Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 96 F.2d 564
(D.C. Cir. 1938); see 1 COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 184 (1965).
2 Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 493-504 (1959), noted in 44 MINN. L. REV.
771 (1960), 29 U. CINc. L. REV. 144 (1960); Anti-Fascist Comm'n v. McGrath, 341
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a fraud-order proceeding initiated by the Postmaster General where the
defendant was not permitted to cross-examine an expert offered against
him about divergent opinions expressed in authoritative looks on the sub-
ject.3 The Court said that "one against whom serious charges of fraud are
made must be given a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine witnesses
on the vital issue of his purpose to deceive." 4
On review, the question is "not whether hearsay has been properly
admitted, but whether the hearsay admitted affected the correctness of the
administrative findings or had such a harmful or unfair effect as to vitiate
the hearing." 5 The Supreme Court indicated in a 1945 case6 that the
admission of hearsay may be improper. That case seems to stand alone,
however, and apparently is of doubtful authority. 7
B. Arbitration Boards
Especially in labor and commercial disputes, arbitration has become a
U.S. 123, 145 (1951); Erdman v. Ingraham, 28 A.D.2d 5, 280 N.Y.S. 2d 865 (1967)
(Materially influential ex parte statements used against physician during an administra-
tive hearing in which physician was fined for violating N.Y. narcotic control laws denied
him the right to confront and to cross-examine his accuser; hence, a new hearing was
required.)
At least one writer argues that Greene applied the constitutional right of confronta-
tion to security hearings in which the Government seeks to deprive the defendant of
his job. He would also agree with the dissenting Justice (Clark, J., 338 U.S. at 524)
that the day may be approaching when confrontation and cross-examination are the
constitutional right of every American before he is denied his job, his livelihood, or his
reputation. Rauh, Nonconfrontation in Security Cases: The Greene Decision, 45 VA.
L. REv. 1175, 1185 (1959). But cf. Sussman v. Overlook Hospital Ass'n, 95 N.J. Super.
418, 231 A.2d 389 (1967). A nongovernmental hospital which served the public,
which appealed to the public for financial support, and which received public
funds from municipalities it served, was public in nature. Although it could not
arbitrarily deny staff privileges to a qualified doctor, it was not essential that he be
afforded the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. The hospital need not
conduct a trial-type hearing, but it should accord the doctor an opportunity to be
heard and to present witnesses and appropriate documents.
3 Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269, 275 (1949) -see Fryer, Note on Application of Reilly
v. Pinkus, in SELECTED WRITINGS ON EVIDENCE AND TRIAL 1109 (1957).
4 338 U.S. at 276.
5 Erdman v. Ingraham, 28 A.D.2d 5, 9, 280 N.Y.S. 2d 865, 870 (1967).
6 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 156 (1945).
7 See Davis, Evidence Reform: The Administrative Process Leads the Way, 34 MINN.
L. REv. 581, 596-97 (1950):
The cases are legion in which courts uphold both the exclusion and the deporta-
tion of aliens on the basis of hearsay. [Citing cases] The outstanding case re-
jecting such evidence is Bridges v. Wixon, which, however, may rest on such
unique considerations and may involve such flagrantly unsound analysis as to be
of little value as authority for future cases.
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common substitute for litigation.' A growing impatience in the early part
of this century with the burdensome cost and delay involved in courtroom
trials led businessmen and others to look for a more satisfactory method
of deciding disputes. 2 Arbitration filled that need, but it was not until
1920 and later that it became truly effective as a substitute. Legislation
was required to make arbitration agreements stronger. At common law,
agreements to arbitrate were revocable.3 But in 1920, New York passed
an arbitration statute which in large measure remedied the situation.4
Congress' and many of the states6 followed New York's lead.
Arbitration proved to be a quicker,7 cheaper3 and more agreeable method
of settling disputes. Businessmen liked the informality of arbitration and
the fact that it provided a friendlier atmosphere which was more apt to in-
sure pleasant future relations between the disputants than would a bitter
court fight.9 Arbitration also offered fact-finders who possessed expertise
in the subject matter of the dispute.'0
It has become so prevalent that the Judicial Conference of New York
recommended that the hearsay rule be abandoned "to woo cases back into
the courts from arbitrators." " The absence of anything like a hearsay
1 BOTEIN & GORDON, THE TRIAL OF THE FUTURE 78 (1963); Davis, Hearsay in
Administrative Hearings, 32 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 689, 692-93 (1964); Morgan, The
Law of Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 HARv. L. REv. 481, 576 (1966). See generally DomzeK,
THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1968); UPDErRAFF & McCoy,
ARBITRATION OF LABOR DISPUTES (1946).
2 See Jones, History of Commercial Arbitration in England and the United States:
A Summary View, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE ARBITRATION 127 (Domke ed. 1958);
Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L. J. 595, 615 (1928);
29 VA. L. REV. 338 (1942). See also 4 ARE. J. (N.s.) 259 (1949), quoting an excerpt
from an address by Joseph D. Stecher, former President of the Ohio State Bar Asso-
ciation:
Impatient with the law's delays, aggravated by procedural technicalities and un-
conoinced that our judiciary possesses superior wisdom, business men are, with re-
curring frequency, insisting upon the insertion in their important contracts of a
clause providing for arbitration of any controversy arising thereunder.
3 Vynior's Case, 8 Co. 80a, 81b, 77 Eng. Rep. 595, 597 (K.B. 1609).
4 N.Y. LAws 1920, ch. 925, § 1410.
543 Stat. 883 (1925), as codified, 61 Stat. 669 (1949), and as amended, 68 Stat.
1233 (1954), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1954).
6 See DOMEE, supra note 1, at 381-84, for a listing of the state statutes.
7 See Braden, Sound Rules and Administration in Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 189,
190 (1934).
8See Note, Predictability of Result in Commercial Arbitration, 61 HARv. L. REv.
1022 n. 2 (1948).
9 See Taeuch, Extrajudicial Settlement of Controversies-The Business Man's Opinion:
Trial at Law v. Nonjudicial Settlement, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 147, 150-51 (1934); Rosen-
thal, A Business Man Looks at Arbitration, 4 ARB. J. (N.s.) 138, 139 (1947).
10See Note, 61 HARv. L. REV., supra note 8, at 1023.
11 Davis, supra note 1, at 692-93, paraphrasing STATE OF NEW YOR1c, FIFTH ANNUAL
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rule is one of the most significant features of arbitration. In general, the
arbitrator is not bound by the legal rules of evidence. 2 It is left to the
parties to offer whatever evidence they wish,1 even though it may be
hearsay and incompetent.14 The Rules of the American Arbitration As-
sociation provide that the parties may offer such evidence as they desire,15
subject only to the exclusion of clearly immaterial evidence by the arbi-
trator in his sole discretion.16 In addition, once the evidence is admitted
the arbitrator is the sole judge of what weight should be attached thereto,
even if the evidence is of doubtful relevance. 17
Although the arbitrator is not bound by the legal rules of evidence, he
may look to the reasons and underlying policies behind the exclusionary rules
as guides in determining the relevancy and materiality of evidence or the
weight to be given it.18 But the tenor of arbitration proceedings is a positive
one of admission in order to secure all useful and reliable evidence, the
admission being preferred to rejection of rational evidence of some probative
value unless some overriding reason militates for its exclusion.19 Caution,
however, is suggested in admitting hearsay evidence when a first-hand
account is available; 20 moreover, such evidence should be attested to by
REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE STATE Op Naw YORK 101-02 (1960).
See also Weinstein, The Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IowA L. REv. 331, 347 (1961).
12 Lauria v. Soriano, 180 Cal. App. 2d 163, 4 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1960); Pacific
Vegetable Oil Corp. v. C.S.T., Ltd., 29 Cal. 2d 228, 241, 174 P. 2d 441, 449 (1946)
("Such a requirement would tend to defeat the object of the arbitration proceeding.") ;
Application of Spectrum Fabrics Corp., 285 App. Div. 710, 139 N.Y.S. 2d 612, aft's,
309 N.Y. 709, 128 N.E. 2d 416 (1955). See also DomIxE, supra note 1, at 235-39;
WIGMORE § 4(e), at 106-07; Jones, Evidentiary Concepts in Labor Arbitration: Some
Modern Variations on Ancient Legal Themes, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1241, 1278 (1966);
Coulson, Appropriate Procedures for Receiving Proof in Commercial Arbitration, 71
DICK. L. REv. 63, 67, 73 (1966); Hepburn & Loiseaux, The Nature of the Arbitration
Process, 10 VAND. L. Rlv. 657, 670 (1957); Weinstein, supra note 11, at 347.
13 Wehringer, Arbitration and the General Practitioner, 13 PRA. LAW., Apr. 1967,
at 12, 22.
14 Petroleum Separating Co. v. Interamerican Refining Corp., 296 F. 2d 124 (2d Cir.
1962); See Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IowA L. REv. 331, 347 (1960);
Note, judicial Supervision of Commercial Arbitration, 53 GEo. L. J. 1079, 1086 (1965).
15 Am. AmB. ASS'N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES § 30; Am. AREB. Ass'N, LABOR
ARBITRATION RULES § 28.
16 AM. AE. ASS'N, PROCEDURAL STANDARDS FOR LABOR-MANAGEMENT ARBITRATION
4(e).
17 Am. ARB. ASS'N, MANUAL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATORS 14-15 (1964).
18 Coulson, supra note 12, at 67.
19 Jones, supra note 12, at 1254.
20 Op. cit. supra note 17, at 14-15. Fleming, Some Problems of Evidence before the
Labor Arbitrator, 60 MICH. L. REv. 133, 144-150 (1961). See also Abelow, Standards
of Evidence in Arbitration Proceedings, 4 ARB. J. (N.S.) 252, 256 (1949):
I would say that hearsay should be excluded where direct or personal testi-
1968]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:89
some circumstantial guarantees of its trustworthiness. 21
Evidence by means of affidavit may also be admitted by the arbitrator,
22
who gives it such weight as he deems proper. 23 However, the opponent
is still accorded an opportunity to cross-examine the affiant.24
VII. HEARSAY IN CRIMINAL CASES
A. Constitutional Limitations on Criminal Evidence
(1.) General.-The hearsay rule enjoys a "special sacrosanctity" in
criminal cases.' Certainly, any new proposal for the reform of the hearsay
rule must accommodate this fact. Three reasons may be offered for the
conservative attitude in criminal evidence as far as hearsay is concerned:
(1) the constitutional right of confrontation, 2 (2) the constitutional limita-
tion on the use of extrajudicial confessions and exculpatory statements
of the accused,3 and (3) the requirement that a greater degree of proof
be offered to sustain a verdict of guilty.4 In addition, judges in criminal
cases may be more inclined to exclude evidence in the exercise of their
discretion on the ground that it lacks sufficient probative value to warrant
mony is available and can be offered. Where such direct testimony is available,
and an arbitrator so decides, I would do away with the idea that hearsay evi-
dence should be accepted for what it is worth. I would reject it entirely and
insist that the party asserting the fact be required to prove it directly, and not
otherwise. Only where it becomes crystal clear that direct evidence is not readily
available would I accept hearsay evidence for what it is worth.
21 Jones, supra note 12, at 1278.
2 2 Am. ARE. ASS'N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES 31; Am. ARB. ASS'N, LABOR
ARBITRATION RULES 29.
23 Ibid.
24 Am. ARB. ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 16.
1 Levin, Evidence, 1961 ANN. SuRvEY Am. L. 502, 511 (1962), quoting Chadbourn,
Bentham and the Hearsay Rule-A Benthamic View of Rule 63 (4) (c) of the Uniform
Rules of Evidence, 75 HARv. L. REv. 932, 950 (1962). Levin discusses a California
case in which former testimony given at the preliminary hearing by victims who had
since left the jurisdiction was excluded because in the meantime another count had been
added to the charge and there was a suggestion that the former testimony had been
edited. Levin, supra, at 511, noting People v. Terry, 180 Cal. App. 2d 48, 4 Cal.
Rptr. 597 (1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 941 (1961).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The confrontation clause of this amendment has been
applied to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. V. Self-incrimination clause applies to the states. Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The accused has a constitutional
right to counsel whenever he is in police custody. Any statements obtained in violation
of that right are inadmissible. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4 See, e.g., Crawford v. State, 112 Ala. 1, 21 So. 214 (1896).
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its admission or that it is excessively prejudicial. In both instances, the
courts are requiring evidence of a higher quality from the outset, rather
than simply looking at all the evidence once it is in to determine whether
it supports a finding of guilt. This is so in spite of the repeated judicial
protestations that civil and criminal trials are governed by the same rules
of evidence.5
The constitutional limitations on the use of evidence in criminal cases
have a rationale distinct from that of the hearsay rule, although they are
often confused. The exclusionary rule which prohibits the use of damaging
extrajudicial statements of the accused under certain circumstances6 was
implemented by the courts as a means of safeguarding the privilege against
self-incrimination. 7 This, then, has nothing to do with the quality of the evi-
dence, but concerns the protection of the individual It is in regard to
those statements of the acused not barred by constitutional limitations that
the more difficult hearsay problems arise. Wigmore assumes that no hearsay
is involved because the accused is present in court.9 Other writers disagree,
but allow it in under an exception to the hearsay rule. 0 Exculpatory state-
ments-statements that explain the defendant's actions rather than admit
guilt"-may be made under circumstances that would not meet the require-
ments of the admissions exception.' 2 But the courts generally admit all
5 United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460, 469 (1827) (Story, J., in
dictum); United States v. Page, 302 F.2d 81, 85 (9th Cir. 1962); Kercheval v.
United States, 36 F.2d 766, 767 (5th Cir. 1930); Ex parte Messer, 228 Ala. 16, 152
So. 244 (1933); Glover v. Callahan, 299 Mass. 55, 12 N.E.2d 194 (1937); State v.
Cooper, 2 N.J. 540, 67 A.2d 298 (1949); State v. Hays, 23 Mo. 314 (1853); Melville's
Trial, 29 How. St. Tr. 549, 764 (1806) (". . . a fact must be established by the
same evidence, whether it is to be followed by a criminal or civil consequence.");
Stone's Trial, 25 How. ST. TR. 1155, 1313-14 (1796) ("There is no difference between
civil and criminal cases as to evidence; whatever is proper in one case is in the other.")
See also I STEPHEN, HISTORY OF CRIMINAL LAw 437 (1883); WIGMORE 4, at 16-19;
Orfield, The Reform of Federal Criminal Evidence, 32 F.R.D. 121, 155-58 (1963).
6 E.g., when they have been obtained by coercion or after long periods of detention
or without affording the accused the right to counsel.
7 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964).
8 Except in the sense that it may exclude confessions which are unreliable and which
were given without regard to their truth or falsity by an accused who simply wanted
to put an end to physical or psychological pressure; see MCCORMICK § 109; WIGMORE
§§ 815-67.
9 WIGMORE § 1048.
10 McCoRMICK § 113, at 234-36 (admissions); Morgan, Admissions as an Exception
to the Hearsay Rule, 30 YALE L. J. 355 (1921); Note, Proof of the Corpus Delicti
Amiunde the Defendant's Confession, 103 U. PA. L. Rzv. 638, 671-72 (1955) (res
gestae).
11 Note, 103 U. PA. L. Rav., supra note 10, at 670.
12 Note, Developments in the Law--Confessions, 79 HARv. 935, 953 (1966).
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relevant extrajudicial declarations of the accused for reasons which are
seldom articulated. 13
Another hearsay problem is encountered when the corpus delicti must
be established by other independent evidence when the confession of the
accused has been admitted.' 4 This requirement, it is felt, minimizes the
danger of convicting a man on a coerced confession or a confession resulting
from mental or emotional illness.' Evidence introduced for this purpose
must be competent. 16 It has been argued that to admit incompetent evi-
dence to corroborate the confession would defeat the purpose of the rule
requiring other independent proof of the corpus delicti because of the
supposed weakness of such evidence. 17 For this reason, hearsay has been
held to be insufficient corroboration of a confession.18
(2.) Hearsay Rule and the Right of Confrontation.-These two doc-
trines have much in common: both require the production of the declarant
in court; both are designed to give the party against whom evidence
is offered an opportunity to test it at trial by cross-examination. But one is
an evidential rule and the other is a constitutional requirement. One
applies to all evidence; the other applies only to evidence offered against
a criminal defendant. 9 It has been repeatedly held that the right of con-
frontation is not violated by the reception of hearsay which falls into one
of the well-recognized exceptions.20
Pointer v. Texas2' has had an unsettling effect on many who would
13 See. e.g., Jones v. United States, 296 F.2d 398, 403-04 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 370 U.S. 913 (1962); State v. Anderson, 10 Ore. 448 (1882); State v. Mowry,
21 R.I. 376, 384, 43 Atl. 871, 874 (1899).
14People v. Hennessey, 15 Wend. 148 (N.Y. 1836). Smith v. Commonwealth, 21
Gratt. 809 (Va. 1871); United States v. Markman, 193 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1952);
Bell v. United States, 185 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 930
(1951). See also 2 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROw 290 (1847); 39 MINN. L. REv. 902
(1955).
15 Note, 103 U. PA. L. REV., supra note 190, at 642-49.
16See Hogan v. State, 275 Ind. 271, 132 N.E.2d 908 (1956).
17 Note, 79 HARV. L. REV., supra note 12, at 1075.
18 Hogan v. State, 275 Ind. 271, 132 N.E.2d 908 (1956).
19 See Note, Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule, 75 YALE L. J. 1434, 1435-36
(1966).
20 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895). This holding has been con-
sistently followed. See, e.g., Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911) (former
testimony); Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 61 (1898) (dying declarations).
In Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542, 548 (1926), there is dictum to the effect
that the right of confrontation would not be satisfied if hearsay were admitted under a
newly-created exception. And it seems clear that the hearsay rule could not be utterly
abandoned in criminal cases. Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900).
21 380 U.S. 400 (1965). In that case, a Texas prosecutor had used the prior testimony
of a man who had since left the state given at a preliminary hearing at which the
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reform the hearsay rule. A radical change in the hearsay rule would be
unacceptable in criminal cases if it were considered.violative of the right
of confrontation. Any reform which eliminated the exclusion of hearsay
as a general premise and replaced it with a general rule of admissibility
would raise serious constitutional questions. The Model Code would
have done just that, as would the proposal of Morgan and Maguire. z2
Yet holdings such as Mattox v. United States2 put to rest any notion that
the right to confrontation is an absolute privilege. Instead extrajudicial
declarations are admissible under certain circumstances, presumably when
the declarant is unavailable, the hearsay danger is substantially minimized,
and the evidence has much probative value.24 Pointer v. Texas did not
overrule those cases which allowed dying declarations and former testimony
of since deceased witnesses to be received against the accused3P
The treatment of hearsay under the Model Code would not entail as
radical a departure as one might first suspect. It would simply be a change
in degree. The definition of unavailable would be broadened beyond
instances involving deceased declarants. In place of many well-defined
exceptions, the hearsay rule might be reformulated to provide for one
general rule which embodies the rationale theoretically underlying all of
the exceptions. It has been suggested that the right of confrontation re-
quires nothing more than a diligent, good faith effort on the part of the
prosecutor to produce the extrajudicial declarant.2 6 If this were accepted
by the courts, there would be no violation of the right of confrontation in
the reception of hearsay under a rule such as that of the Model Code of
Evidence, because such a rule is, for practical purposes, identical to the
above suggestion.
There is little likelihood, however, that such an interpretation of the
right of confrontation would be accepted by the courts.27 Even Rules 62
and 63 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, which are more conservative
than the corresponding rules in the Model Code, have been considered
defendant had not been given adequate opportunity to cross-examine. (Defendant was
not represented by counsel at the hearing.) In reversing, the Supreme Court applied
the confrontation clause to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
2 2 MODEL CODE OF EvIDENcE Rule 503; Morgan & Maguire, Looking Backward and
Forward at Evidence, 50 HARv. L. REv. 909, 922 (1937).
23 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895).
24See MoCoRMICK § 300; WIGMORE §§1421-23.
25 380 U.S. at 407.
2 6 Note, 75 YALE L. J., supra note 19, at 1439.
27 Cf. Green, Drafting Uniform Federal Rules of Evidence, 52 CORNELL L. Q. 147,
191 (1967).
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unsatisfactory for application in criminal trials on the ground that they
would infringe upon the right of confrontation. 28 The reform of the hearsay
rule can and should be accomplished without regard to the confrontation
problem. The hearsay rule and the right of confrontation, while not entirely
dissimilar, rest on entirely separate and independent bottoms. There is no
reason why the hearsay rule cannot be changed while the right of confron-
tation remains constant. Just as the courts superimpose the limitations of
the privilege against unreasonable search and seizure and the privilege
against self incrimination on a discrete and separate body of evidential rules,
they should superimpose the restrictions of the right of confrontation on a
hearsay rule which, in theory at least, applies with equal force in civil
and in criminal cases.
B. Pre-Sentence Reports
When passing upon the guilt or innocence of an accused, tribunals have
long been restrained by strict evidentiary limitations.' But historically, in
this country and in England, the courts have pursued a policy under which
a sentencing judge could exercise great freedom in gathering and ap-
praising evidence to assist him in determining the kind and extent of
punishment to be imposed upon the defendant within the limits fixed by
law.2 In addition, as emphasized by Mr. Justice Black in his opinion in
Williams v. New York, there are sound practical reasons for different evi-
dentiary rules governing trial and sentencing procedures. 3 Modem peno-
logical procedural policies have individualized punishment and made this
distinction necessary. 4
28 See MAGUIRE, WEINSTEIN, CHADBOURN & MANSFIELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EVIDENCE 411-12 (5th ed. 1965); Levin, Evidence, 1961 ANN. SURVEY AM. LAW 502,
511 (1962).
1 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949). See also Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97 (1934); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912). But see State
v. Stevenson, 64 W.Va. 392, 62 S.E. 688 (1908).
2Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949); State v. Pope, 257 N.C. 326, 126
S.E.2d 126 (1962), noted in 41 N. C. L. REV. 260 (1963). See also Annot., 96
A.L.R.2d 768 (1964); Annot., 134 A.L.R. 1267 (1941); Annot., 14 Ann. Cas. 968
(1909). See generally Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing
Processes, 75 HARV. L. REV 904 (1962); Levin, Toward a More Enlightened Sentencing
Procedure, 45 NEE. L. REV. 499 (1966); Note, Right of Criminal Offenders To Chal-
lenge Reports Used in Determining Sentence, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 567 (1949); Note,
Due Process and the Legislative Standards in Sentencing, 101 U. PA. L. Rav. 257
(1952).
3337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949).
4 Id. at 247. See also Devitt, How Can We Effectively Minimize Unjustified Disparity
in Federal Criminal Sentences?, 42 F.R.D. 218, 225 (1968), quoting Aristotle, "There
can be no greater injustice than to treat unequal things equally."
[Vol. 3 :89
HEARSAY RULE
"The aim of the sentencing court is to acquire a thorough acquaintance
with the character and history of the man before it. Its synopisis should
include the unfavorable, as well as the favorable, data... ." 5 As a matter
of necessity, much of the information gathered and considered will be
hearsay and will be weighed accordingly. 6 The judge has wide discretion and
can receive evidence of other crimes,7 statements of the prosecution without
evidence to support them,8 irrelevant and prejudicial hearsay testimony,9
and other extrajudicial information which has never been submitted to the
defendant. 0 The constitutional guarantee of the right of confrontation and
cross-examination is not applicable when sentencing is pursuant to a crimi-
nal conviction." However, Williams v. New York, the leading case in this
5 United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 721 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843
(1965).
6 Ibid.
7 Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576 (1959); United States v. Dalhover, 96 F.2d
355 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 632 (1938).
8 Stobble v. United States, 91 F.2d 69 (7th Cir. 1937).
9 Taylor v. United States, 179 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1950); State v. Alford, 98 Ariz.
124, 402 P.2d 551 (1965); see Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing
for Felony, 81 HARv. L. REv. 821, 836 (1968).
10 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). There is no per se violation of
defendant's rights in the use of confidential presentence reports. The Williams Court did
not rule on whether the defendant could see the report if he wanted. That issue was
never raised. See 41 N.C.L. Rav. 260, 264-65 (1963); 23 So. CAL. L. R~v. 105,
107 (1949). At least one writer feels that a criminal defendant does have a right of
access to such reports if he makes timely challenge. Rubin, Sentences Must Be Rationally
Explained, 42 F.R.D. 203, 215-16 (1968).
Several states have statutes expressly providing for inspection by the defendant. ALA.
CODE ANN. tit. 42, § 23 (1959); CAL. PEN. CODE § 1203 (Supp. 1967); VA. CODE
ANN. § 53-278.1 (1958). In Linton v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 437, 65 S.E.2d 534
(1951), failure to allow defendant to cross-examine the probat on officer was held to be
reversible error.
Other states have statutes requiring that information contained in presentence reports
be offered in open court. Aiuz. Cgim. RULES § 336 (1955); CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1203
(Supp. 1967), 1204 (1956); IDAHO CODE § 19-2516 (1948); MINN. STAT. § 631.20
(1947); MONT. REV. STAT. § 95-2202 (Supp. 1967); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN.
§ 29-26-18 (1960); OKLA. STAT. § 974 (1958); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 137.080, 137.090
(1959); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-13 (1953). See generally, Barnett & Gronewald,
Confidentiality of the Presentence Report, 26 FED. PROB., Mar. 1962, at 26; Higgins
Confidentiality of Presentence Reports, 28 ALBANY L. Rxv. 12 (1964); Higgins, In
Response to Roche, 29 ALBANY L. REv. 225 (1965); Lorensen, The Disclosure to
Defense of Presentence Reports in West Virginia, 69 W.Va. L. REv. 159 (1967);
Parsons, The Presentence Investigation Report Must Be Preserved as a Confidential
Document, 28 FED. PROB., Mar. 1964, at 3; Roche, The Position for Confidentiality of
the Presentence Investigation Report, 29 ALBANY L. REv. 206 (1965); Sharp, The
Confidential Nature of Presentence Reports, 5 CATH. U. L. REv. 127 (1955); Thomsen,
Confidentiality of the Presentence Report; A Middle Position, 28 FED. PROB., Mar. 1964,
at 8.
11 United States v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302, 309 (3d Cir. 1966). But see NAT.
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area, "did not foreclose a defendant's request for cross-examination if
properly raised in a suitable situation." 12
In Specht v. Patterson,13 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its decision in
Williams, but distinguished the case before it. The defendant in Specht
had been convicted of the crime of indecent liberties under a state statute pro-
viding for a maximum sentence of ten years. He was not sentenced under
this statute, but under the state's Sex Offenders Act for an indeterminate
period which could potentially extend for defendant's life. He was not
afforded notice or a full hearing. Sentencing occurred after a report
of a psychiatric examination was given to the trial judge. The Court said
that this amounted to "a new charge leading to criminal punishment." "
Unless the defendant is given adequate notice, is present with counsel, has
an opportunity to be heard, is confronted with witnesses against him, and
has the right to cross-examine, he has been denied the rights guaranteed by
the due process clause of the fifth or fourteenth amendment. 15
The need for individualized treatment is vital in adult criminal cases,
but it is all the more vital in juvenile delinquency cases. 16 If this need
is to be satisfied, the Williams distinction which allows the judge wide dis-
cretion in receiving evidence during the post-adjudicative stage, takes on
added importance in the light of the Court's directive in the Gault case that
juvenile proceedings be carefully broken down into their functional com-
ponents and that a clear line distinguish the adjudicative from the
dispositional stage. 17 The line between the actual finding of guilt or
innocence and the process of determining the nature and extent of punish-
ment, if any, to be meted out had been hazy or non-existent in juvenile
COMM'N ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, ADVISORY COMM. OF JUDGES, MODEL SENTENC-
ING ACT § 4, which would give the defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the
probation officer who submits the report. It would not, however, give him the
right to confront the out-of-court declarants interviewed by the probation officer. This
section is discussed in Rubin, Constitutional Aspects of the Model Sentencing Act, 42
F.R.D. 226, 231-32 (1968), and in Rubin, supra note 10, at 213-15.
12 See Rubin, Constitutional Aspects of the Model Sentencing Act, 42 F.R.D. 226,
232 (1968).
13 368 U.S. 605 (1967).
14 Id. at 608.
15 Id. at 610.
16See Ketcham, An International Report on Juvenile Court Achievements and
Deficiencies-1966, 6 J. FAMILY L. 191, 213 (1966): "[The juvenile court judge] is
responsible for finding the facts in an individual case and making a disposition spe-
cifically tailored to the needs of that individual delinquent." See also Note, Juvenile
Delinquents: The Police, State Courts and Individualized Justice, 79 HARV. L. REv.
775 (1966).
17In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967). For a more detailed discussion of the
juvenile courts, see p. 169, infra.
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delinquency cases. The Court in Gault expressly extended the right of
confrontation and cross-examination to the adjudicatory stage, 8 but the
Court did not pass on the application of this right to the "post-adjudicative
or dispositional process." 19 Consequently, the sentencing and dispositional
stage of juvenile proceedings is governed by the same rules as the sentenc-
ing stage of criminal cases involving adults. There is no indication that a
higher standard (including an application of the right of confrontation)
will be imposed on the dispositional stage of juvenile cases.P° Williams
allows juvenile court judges to retain broad discretion in determining the
proper treatment for each adjudged delinquent by permitting the use of
reports based on hearsay. Without such reports, the background of the
defendant could not be gleaned by the judge or could be gleaned only at
great expense and with unbearable delay and inconvenience to the out-of-
court declarants who would then have to appear in court.
C. Hearsay in Grand Jury, Habeas Corpus, and Extradition Proceedings
The hearsay rule is generally relaxed in grand jury proceedings both
on the federal' and the state level. Courts look to the function of grand
juries in determining the propriety of receiving hearsay.3 Since there is no
final adjudication of guilt but only a finding of probable cause, the need
18 387 U.S. at 42, 56.
19 Id. at 13.
2 0 GEORGE, GAULT AND THE JUVENME COURT REVOLUTION 41 (1968).
1 Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, reh. denied, 351 U.S. 904 (1956); Holt v.
United States, 218 U.S. 245, 248 (1910); Cain v. United States, 239 F.2d 263, 270
(7th Cir. 1956); Ford v. United States, 233 F.2d 56, 59-60 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 833 (1956); United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113, 116 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 897 (1955); United States v. Games, 156 F.Supp. 467, 470
(S.D.N.Y. 1957); Olmstead v. United States, 19 F.2d 842, 845 (9th Cir. 1927), aff'd,
277 U.S. 348 (1928); McGregor v. United States, 134 Fed. 187, 193 (4th Cir. 1904).
See also Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395 (1959) (Jencks rule
does not apply to grand jury proceedings; thus, the production of the transcript of
such proceedings lies in the sound discretion of the trial judge.)
2 State v. Kemp, 126 Conn. 60, 9 A.2d 63 (1939); People v. Lambersky, 410 IIl. 451,
102 N.E.2d 326 (1951); Maddox v. State, 213 Ind. 537, 12 N.E.2d 947 (1938); State
v. Martin, 210 Ia. 376, 228 N.W. 1 (1929); McIntyre v. Lands, 128 Kan. 521,
278 Pac. 761 (1929); Pick v. State, 143 Md. 192, 121 Atl. 918 (1923); Common-
wealth v. Ventura, 294 Mass. 113, N.E.2d 30 (1936); Price v. State, 152 Miss. 625,
120 So. 751 (1929); State v. Pierson, 337 Mo. 475, 85 S.W.2d 48 (1935); State v.
Lambertino, 13 N.J. Misc. 687, 180 At. 426 (1935); Hope v. People, 83 N.Y. 418
(1881); State v. Levy, 200 N.C. 586, 158 S.E. 94 (1931). But see Royce v. State,
5 Okla. 61, 65 (1897).
3 United States v. Costello, 221 F.2d 668, 679 (2d Cir. 1955), aff'd, 350 U.S. 359,
reh. denied, 351 U.S. 904 (1956). See also WIGMORE § 4(5).
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for a strict application of the hearsay rule is not present.4 Many states,
however, have enacted statutes which require the prosecution to present
"legal evidence." 5 Operating without such statutory restriction, federal
courts have taken a markedly liberal position on the reception of hearsay,
even to the extent of holding that an indictment may be supported by
hearsay alone.6
In habeas corpus hearings, on the other hand, the same relaxation of
the exclusionary rules does not occur.7 It should be borne in mind that
these are not criminal proceedings even when prisoners are attempting to
set aside their criminal convictions by collateral attack. These are civil
proceedings and the right of confrontation does not apply.' In addition,
these hearings are always conducted by a judge sitting without a jury;
consequently, the application of the hearsay rule in such instances is gen-
erally less stringent than in jury-tried cases.9 In Townsend v. Sain,'0 the
Court held that a state court record of the petitioner's trial may be admitted
at a habeas corpus hearing. A later federal case expressed the notion that
the court should do all things to ascertain the merits of the case." Gener-
ally, however, the hearsay rule is applied as in civil non-jury cases with
the right of cross-examination being carefully guarded. 12
Extradition does not involve the merits of the accused's case, and the
hearsay rule has not been strictly applied in such hearings.13 Because the
4See Comment, Evidence-Rules of Evidence in Disbarment, Habeas Corpus, and
Grand Jury Proceedings, 58 Mimi. L. REv. 1211, 1218-19 (1960). See also Orfield,
Hearsay in Federal Criminal Cases, 32 FORDHAM L. REv. 499, 769, 802 (1964);
Weinstein, The Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IowA L. Rav. 349 (1961); Note, Hear-
say as a Basis for Prosecution, Arrest and Search, 32 IND. L. J. 332 (1957); Note,
Exclusion of Incompetent Evidence from Federal Grand Jury Proceedings, 72 YALE
L. J. 590 (1963).
5 See WIGMORE § 4(5), at 23 n.8.
6 See Comment, 58 MicH. L. REV., supra note 4, at 1226.
7 Palakiko v. Harper, 209 F.2d 75, 103 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 979
(1954); Green v. United States, 158 F.Supp. 804 (D. Mass.), aff'd per curiam, 256
F.2d 483 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 854 (1958); Walker v. Warden of Mary-
land House of Correction, 209 Md. 654, 121 A.2d 714 (1956); Ex parte Nicely, 116
Tex. Cr. 143, 28 S.W.2d 147 (1930); see Orfield, supra note 4, at 802; Comment,
58 Miic. L. REV., supra note 4, at 1223-25, 1230; Note, Processing a Motion Attacking
Sentence Under Section 2255 of the Judicial Code, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 788, 795-97
(1963).
8 Burgess v. King, 130 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1942).
9See p. 161, infra.
10372 U.S. 293 (1963).
11 Harris v. North Carolina, 240 F.Supp. 985, 989-90 (E.D.N.C. 1965) (dictum).
12 Cobas v. Clapp, 79 Idaho 419, 319 P.2d 475 (1958).
13 Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 313 (1922); Collier v. Vaccaro, 51 F.2d 17
(4th Cir. 1931); Desmond v. Eggers, 18 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1927); Ex parte Wallace,
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information upon which the court must act is sent from out of state and is
almost entirely in the form of hearsay, great practical difficulty would
result if the rule were enforced.' 4 The hearsay nature of this evidence does
does affect its weight nonetheless.
15
VIII. HEARSAY IN FEDERAL CASES
Rule 43(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure' is a reflection of
the modem tendency toward a wide rule of admissibility with discretion in
the trial judge to exclude evidence which lacks sufficient probative value
to warrant its reception.2 It was intended to liberalize admissibility of
testimony, but it has nothing to do with what should be excluded.3 By
couching the rule of admissibility in positive terms, it revolutionized federal
evidence.4 It was accomplished by the following language of Rule 43:
(a) Form and Admissiblifty.... All evidence shall be admitted which
is admissible under the statutes of the United States, or under the
rules of evidence heretofore applied in the courts of the United States
on the hearing of suits in equity, or under the rules of evidence applied
in the courts of general jurisdiction of the state in which the United
States court is held. In any case, the statute or rule which favors the
reception of the evidence governs....
The question of admissibility, then, must be resolved by looking to three
sources. If any one of the three can be fairly read to admit the evidence in
question, such evidence must be admitted.5 The first source, federal statutes,
presents no difficulty because they are few and explicit.6 The second source,
265 Mass. 101, 163 N.E. 870 (1928); People v. Hanley, 153 Misc. 61, 274 N.Y.S.
813 (1934). Notter v. Beasley, 240 Ind. 631, 166 N.E. 2d 643 (1960). But see
People ex. rel. Stauton v. Meyering, 345 Ill. 592, 178 N.E. 122 (1931).
14 See WIGMIORE 4(6), at 24.
15United States ex rel. Klein v. Mililgain, 50 F.2d 687 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 284-
U.S. 665 (1931).
1 Promulgated in 1938 under a federal enabling statute. 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), as
amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1958).
2 See United States v. 25.406 Acres, 172 F.2d 990, 993 (4th Cir. 1949); Greene,
Federal Civil Procedure Rule 43(a), 5 VAND L. REv. 560, 563 (1952).
3 Cf. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 1 F.R.D. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1938); 5
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTiCE 43.04, at 1319 (2d ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as
MOORE].
4 See United States v. Vehicular Packing, Inc., 52 F.Supp. 751 (D. Del. 1943).
5 See Mossom v. Liberty Fast Freight Co., 124 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1942); MooRE
ff 43.04, at 1328.
6 The most important are the business records and official records statutes. 62 Stat.
19681
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federal equity practice, provides no definite body of evidence rules. 7 This
has led to confusion. The provision was included apparently in recognition
of the fact that federal courts, prior to the passage of Rule 43(a), followed
state evidence rules in actions at law but not in equity.8 The courts have
given three interpretations to the provision dealing with evidence in federal
equity cases: (1) if there are no decisions specifically applying in equity,
the evidence is excluded unless authority exists in the state for receiving it;9
(2) the federal equity court would have applied the federal rule established
on the common law side of the court;10 and (3) the federal court in which
the question arises can decide from general authority what rule would have
applied in equity." The third source, state rules of evidence, has presented
the same problem which Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins12 presents generally."
When state law is unclear or where the highest court of the state has not
decided the point, what rule should the federal court accept as the rule of
the state?
The fact that evidence may be excluded in the state court has nothing to
do with its admissibility in federal court if there is some other basis on which
it can be admitted. 14 This rule permits the "widest admissibility possible
under any existing law, state or federal of relevant evidence." 15 If there is
945, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (Supp. 1961) (business records); 62 Stat. 946, 28
U.S.C. § 1733 (1958) (official records).
7 See MOORE ff 43.04, at 1328-29; WIGMORE § 6c, at 201.
8 See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of
the United States, A Preliminary Report on the Advisability and Feasibility of Develop-
ing Uniform Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts, 30 F.R.D. 73,
94 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Preliminary Report, 30 F.R.D. 94 (1962)].
9 Mosson v. Liberty Fast Freight Co., 124 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1942); Lake Shore
Nat'l Bank v. Bellanca Aircraft Corp., 83 F.Supp. 795 (D.Del. 1949); see Preliminary
Report, 30 F.R.D. 94, 96 (1962).
10Peoples Gas Co. v. Fitzgerald, 188 F.2d 198 (6th Cir. 1951); Peck v. Pacific-
Atlantic S.S. Co., 180 F.2d 866, 869 (2d Cir. 1950); Vanadium Corp. of America v.
Fidelity & Deposit Co., 159 F.2d 105, 109 (2d Cir. 1947).
11 Hope v. Hearst Consol. Publications, Inc., 294 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 956 (1962); Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401 (5th Cir.
1960).
12 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
13 See MOORE f 43.02 [4]; Callahan & Ferguson, Evidence and the New Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 45 YALE L. J. 622 (1936), 47 YALE L. J. 194 (1937); Green,
Drafting Uniform Federal Rules of Evidence, 52 CORNELL L. Q. 177, 200 (1967);
Comment, Federal Rule 43(a): The Scope of Admissibility of Evidence and the
Implications of the Erie Doctrine, 62 COLUm. L. REv. 1049 (1962); Note, Rule 43(a)
and Erie-The Conflict in the Sixth Circuit, 34 TENN. L. REv. 671 (1967); Comment,
The Admissibility of Evidence under Federal Rule 43(a), 48 VA. L. REv. 939 (1962).
14Hope v. Hearst Consol. Publications, Inc., 294 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 956 (1962).
15 Commercial Banking Corp. v. Martel, 123 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1941).
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any doubt as to the admissibility of the evidence it should be admitted."
There have been conservative holdings, however, to the effect that evidence
specifically excluded by state law cannot be received in federal court unless
a specific rule which admits it can be found in federal statutes or equity
cases. 17 But Rule 43(a) is not a rule of exclusion; consequently, it would
seem that where the question of admissibility is open in either federal equity
practice prior to the adoption of Rule 43 (a) or under state law, the court
could admit the evidence even though the other source clearly excludes
it.18 The federal courts did not immediately respond to the liberal tone of this
rule, 19 even though they had generally been more liberal in their reception
of evidence than state courts.2 ° But since the decision in Dallas County v.
Commercial Union Assurance Co.,21 the federal courts have shown a ten-
dency toward freer admissibility of hearsay evidence. 2  Some have refused
to exclude highly probative hearsay even though it could not be fitted into
one of the traditionally recognized exceptions.23 Others have refused to treat
16 See, Mourikas v. Vardianos, 169 F.2d 53 (4th Cir. 1948).
17See, e.g., Schillie v. Atcheson T.&S.F. Ry., 22 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1955); Atlantic
Coast Line R.R. v. Dixon, 207 F.2d 899 (5th Cir. 1953); Wright v. Wilson, 154 F.2d
616, 170 A.L.R. 1237 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 743 (1946); Pen-Ken Gas
and Oil Corp. v. Warfield Natural Gas Co., 137 F.2d 871, 887 (6th Cir. 1943), cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 800 (1944).
18 Hope v. Hearst Consol. Publications, Inc., 294 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 196i), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 956 (1962); Peoples Gas Co. v. Fitzgerald, 188 F.2d 198 (6th Cir.
1951); Peoples Loan & Inv. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 151 F.2d 437, 440-41 (8th Cir.
1945) (dictum); Een v. Consolidated Freightways, 120 F.Supp. 289 (D.N.D. 1954),
aff'd, 220 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1955). Contra, Sleek v. J. C. Penney Co., 324 F.2d 467
(3d Cir. 1963).
19 See Greene, Federal Civil Procedure Rule 43(a), 5 VAND. L. Rav. 560, 565
(1952). But see Commercial Banking Corp. v. Martel, 123 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1941).
20See Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933). Montana Ry. v. Warren, 137
U.S. 348 (1890); United States v. 5139.5 Acres, 200 F.2d 659 (4th Cir. 1952);
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F.Supp. 349 (D.Mass. 1950).
21 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961), noted in 46 CORNELL L. Q. 645 (1961), 60 MICH.
L. REv. 105 (1961), 13 STAN. L. REv. 945 (1961), 35 TUL. L. Rv. 639 (1961), 15
VAND. L. REv. 288 (1961).
22 Sayen v. Rydzewski, 387 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1967); Bowman v. Kaufman, 387
F.2d 582 (2d Cir. 1967); Weymouth v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 367 F.2d 84
(5th Cir. 1966); Hurwitz v. Shiu Yim Poon, 364 F.2d 878 (C.C.P.A. 1966); Rain v.
Pavkov, 357 F.2d 506, 509 (3d Cir. 1966) (despite state statute to contrary, evidence
admitted); Hambrice v. F. W. Woolworth, 290 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1961); Ostrov v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 250 F. Supp. 152, 167 (E.D. Pa. 1966); United Services
Automobile Ass'n v. Wharton, 237 F. Supp. 255 (W.D.N.C. 1965). See also Glowe v.
Rulon, 284 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1960); Carlson v. Chisholm-Moore Hoist Corp., 281
F.2d 766 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 883 (1960); Norwood v. Great American
Indemnity Co., 146 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1944); United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp.,
25 F.R.D. 497 S.D.N.Y. 1960). See generally Degnan, The Law of Federal Evidence
Reform, 76 HARV. L. Rav. 275 (1962).
2 3 Hurvitz v. Shiu Yim Poon, 364 F.2d 878 (C.G.P.A. 1966).
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evidence as hearsay even though hearsay dangers were involved. 24 Still other
courts persist in justifying the admission of hearsay by distorting the ex-
ceptions.25
Federal courts have also shown a liberal attitude in regard to the admis-
sion of evidence in criminal cases. 26 But the confrontation clause and the
general attitude of most judges that evidence in criminal case should be
more carefully scrutinized than in civil cases have operated as a restraint
so that rulings in the area of federal criminal evidence have not been as
radical as in civil cases.2 7 Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure provides in part:
... The admissibility of evidence . . . shall be governed, except when an
act of Congress or these rules otherwise provide, by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United
States in the light of reason and experience.
This rule, like its counterpart in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is too
vague to be of practical value. It did provide, however, an excellent means
by which the courts might have liberalized federal criminal evidence..2 1
Yet the courts have not taken advance of the opportunity to the fullest.'
Under Rule 56(e), affidavits for summary judgment and opposing
affidavits "shall be made on personal knowledge and shall set forth such
facts as would be admissible in evidence . . . ." 30 This has been strictly
construed. 31 The courts have consistently interpreted the rule to mean that
24Bowman v. Kaufman, 387 F.2d 582 (2d Cir. 1967). Although proof of driver's
silence as to brake failure being cause of accident admittedly involved hearsay dangers,
the court said that the high probative value justified its admission.2 5 Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Renuart-Bailey-Cheely Lumber & Supply Co.,
387 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1968). Confessions made by employees immediately after
their conduct is called into question will come in under the res gestae exception.
2 6 See Meredith v. United States, 238 F.2d 535, 543 (4th Cir. 1956). In holding
that experts could give their opinions on the ultimate fact in issue, the court said:
"... the modem tendency in the law of evidence is to give the triers of facts all the
light they can have. . . ." See generally Orfield, The Hearsay Rule in Federal Criminal
Cases, 32 FoaRHAm L. Rav. 499, 799 (1964).
27 See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948); Green, supra note 13,
at 197. But see Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1958).
28 Preliminary Report, 30 F.R.D. 94, 99 (1962).
29 Ibid. See also Orfield, The Reform of Federal Criminal Evidence, 32 F.R.D. 121
(1963).
3 0 F.R. Civ. P. 56(e).
31 Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950);
Liberty Leasing Co. v. Hillsum Sales Corp., 380 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1967); Bowen
Electric Co. v. J. D. Hedin Construction Co., 316 F.2d 362, 364 (D.C. Cir. 1963);
Washington v. Maricoper County, 143 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1944); New Hampshire Fire
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an affidavit may not be based upon hearsay.3 2
In 1965, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States
appointed a committee to formulate uniform rules of evidence for federal
district courts.33 If adopted, they would provide uniformity not only in all
the district courts, but also as between civil and criminal cases.
IX. HEARSAY IN NON-JURY CASES
Theoretically, jury and non-jury cases are governed by the same rules
of evidence,' but the application of these rules in non-jury cases often varies
from the practice followed in jury cases This variance is attributable in
part to the following rules followed by appellate courts: a finding of fact
by the lower court judge will not be reversed where there is sufficient
competent evidence to support it, regardless of the fact that incompetent
testimony was admitted; failure to admit competent testimony will result
in reversal where such failure was prejudicial to the losing party.3 As a
result of the rules, many trial judges in order to avoid reversal make it a
practice to admit incompetent evidence when proffered and disregard it
later in reaching a decision.4 The practice is justified as one that expedites
the trial of a case by eliminating counsels' arguments over, and appeals
over a judge's rulings on, the admissibility of evidence If the practice does
Ins. Co. v. Perkins, 30 F.R.D. 382 (D. Del. 1962); Mellen v. Hirsch, 8 F.R.D. 248,
249 (D. Md.), aff'd, 171 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1948). See 6 Moore 11 56.22(1), at
2806-08.
32Jameson v. Jameson, 176 F.2d 58, 60 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Dean Construction Co.
v. Simonetta Concrete Construction Corp., 37 F.R.D. 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Dulansky
v. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Electric Co., 10 F.R.D. 566 (S.D. Iowa 1950), rez'd on other
grounds, 191 F.2d 881 (8th Cir. 1951) (Expert opinion of medical witness based on
hearsay cannot support an affidavit.)
3336 F.R.D. 128 (1965).
1fDavis, Hearsay in Administrative Hearings, 32 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 689, 693
(1964). But see Fenwick's Trial, 13 How. St. Tr. 537, 585 (1696):
It is discretionary, whether you will determine that this is evidence now, or after
you have heard it.... [I]t is one thing when a man is to be tried by a jury, and
another when he is to be tried before judges. A jury may be so swayed and
possessed by it, that it may not be fit for them to hear it: but look into the court
of Chancery; and there depositions, if one side say they are evidence, and the
other side say they are not, are every day admitted; and the rule is, that it
sooner dispatched by hearing of it, than not. [Argument of the Solicitor General]
2 McCoRAUcK § 60, at 137 (1954) ; Davis, supra note 1, at 693.
3 Builder's Steel v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 179 F. 2d 377, 379 (8th Cir.
1950) ; McCoRMCa 137.
4Donnelly Garment Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 123 F. 2d 215, 224
(8th Cir. 1941) ; McCoRmicn, 137.
5 Donnelly Garment v. National Labor Relations Board, 123 F. 2d 215, 224 (8th Cir.
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not in fact make it virtually impossible for a judge to commit reversible
error in a non-jury case by admitting incompetent evidence, 6 it at least
decreases the importance of the rules of evidence in such cases.7 However,
to what extent the practice is utilized, or whether it is utilized at all, lies
in the discretion of the trial judge and, thus, predictability is lacking in
the preparation of cases for trial.3 Moreover, reservations have been ex-
pressed on the assumed ability of the trial judge to dispel the influence of
incompetent testimony that he has received.9 The limitations of this prac-
tice have led to the demand for more positive standards for determining
the admissibility of evidence in non-jury cases. 10
The apparent irony of allowing administrative officers, sometimes lacking
a legal background, to hear and decide cases on evidence inadmissible
before judges in a non-jury cases' has led to the suggestion that the prac-
tice of administrative bodies serve as a guide in the development of rules
of evidence for the non-jury cases? 2 However, in contrast to most trial
judges, administrative officers generally deal with a narrower range of
subject matter with which they have either had, or can be expected to
develop, a more thoroughgoing acquaintance. The resulting sophistication
obtained in a particular area may justify the greater latitude they are given
in considering evidence.
13
1941); MCCORMICK 137. Contra, Note, Improper Evidence in Non-jury Trials: Basis for
Reversal?, 79 HARV. L. REV. 406, 409-10 (1965).
6 Builder's Steel v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 179 F. 2d 377, 379 (8th Cir.
1950): "In the trial of a non-jury case it is virtually impossible to commit reversible
error by receiving incompetent evidence, whether objected to or not."
7 MCCORMICK 137.
8 Davis, An Approach to the Rules of Evidence for Non-jury Cases, 50 A.B.A.J. 723, 724
(1964); Weinstein, Some Difficulties in Devising Evidentiary Rules for Determining
Truth in Judicial Trials, 66 COLUm. L. REv. 223, 245 (1966).
9 State v. Millar, 64 N.J. Super. 263, 165 A. 2d 829, 831 (Super. Ct. 1960); Kovacs
v. Szentes, 130 Conn. 229, 33 A. 2d 124, 125 (1943) (dictum); Note, Incompetent
Evidence in Non Jury Trials: Ought We Presume That It Has No Effect?, 29 IND. L. J.
446, 451 (1954). The argument, however, ignores the fact that even in cases in which a
trial judge does refuse incompetent evidence when profferred, he must often listen to
a substantial portion of it before ruling it inadmissible.
10 Weinstein, supra note 9, at 245-46; Davis, supra note 8, at 723; Note, 79 HARv. L.
REV., supra note 5, at 413.
11 Note, Exclusionary Rules of Evidence in Non-jury Proceedings, 46 ILL. L. REV.
915, 919 (1952), citing DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 448 (1951). The irony seems
more pronounced when the same case can be heard either before a judge sitting without
a jury or before an administrative body as noted in United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Corporation, 89 F. Supp. 349, 356 (D. Mass. 1950).
12 Davis, Evidence Reform: The Administrative Process Leads the Way, 34 MmIN.
L. REV. 581, 607 (1950).
13 See 5 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 18.1 [2] (3d ed. 1962), for a discussion of
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The argument is also advanced that, since the rules of evidence came
in with the jury system, they are designed to meet dangers not present when
a judge sits as trier of fact and are, thus, inappropriate to the latter cases.14
However, an argument over the disputed historical basiss for the applica-
tion of these rules to non-jury cases (whether they were products of the
jury system or adversary system) is beside the point if they have in fact
proved valuable in such cases. There is rather a need to articulate in what
particular respects a judge is superior to a jury as a trier of fact and
how these superiorities lessen or eliminate the specific dangers which each
rule of evidence seeks to avoid.16 In the case of hearsay testimony, it has
been suggested that a judge does enjoy a superiority over the jury, since
he is trained to recognize it and to evaluate its worth in the light of the
absence of an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant 7 The above situa-
tion can be contrasted with one in which a defendant's confession is
wrongfully introduced in evidence; in this situation, the judge's superiority
in avoiding prejudice is arguable.13
X. JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS REQUIRING SPECIAL TREATMENT
OF HEARSAY
A. Antitrust, Trademark, and Patent Cases
Aside from the fact that judges have at times felt compelled to relax
the exclusionary rules in some of the "big cases" in this area,' the very
nature of all of these cases ("big" or not) requires a different treatment
of hearsay than does the usual case. The subject matter of this type of
litigation requires peculiar proof, particularly in antitrust cases. "Economic
proof" has become common, if not essential, in trials involving price-fixing
and monopoly issues.2 It entails survey evidence, testimony of economists
the reasons for the great latitude granted in some jurisdictions to a board of conumis-
sioners in a condemnation proceeding.
14 Davis, supra note 8, at 723.
15 Morgan, The Jury and the Exclusionary Rules of Evidence, 4 U. CHI. L. REv. 247
(1937).16 Note, 79 HARv. L. REv., supra note 5, at 413-14.
17 Ibid.
18 State v. Dietz, 5 N.J. Super. 222, 68 A. 2d 777, 779 (App. Div. 1949).
1 See, e.g., U.S. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 349 (D. Mass. 1950),
noted in 64 HARv. L. RIEv. 340 (1950); 25 So. CALIF. L. Rav. 139 (1951); 2
STAN. L. REv. 776 (1950); 5 VAND. L. lav. 655 (1952); 60 YALE L. '. 363
(1951); see McAllister, The Big Case: Procedural Problems in Antitrust Litigation,
64 HARv. L. REv. 27 (1950). 0
2 O'Donnell, Civil Antitrust Trials, in HOFFMAN'S ANTITRUST LAW AND TECHNIQUES
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and other experts, statistical and accounting tabulations, and market
analyses, much of which is hearsay.
3
In trademark infringement cases, results of reaction time tests given
to consumers to determine whether they would confuse brand names
are generally admissible, even though hearsay, under the mental states
exception.4 But when the interviewer seeks facts rather than reactions,5
the mental states exception may not be relied upon. Yet such surveys have
been admitted because of their high probative value.6 The hearsay nature
of survey evidence goes to its weight rather than to its admissibility. 7
in patent infringement cases, results of tests carried out by a number
of persons working together are admissible over objections that parts of the
tests were based on hearsay.8 Each person need not participate in or
witness every step of the undertaking, but may rely upon the intermediate
tests of others about which he has no personal knowledge.
In this broad area of antitrust, trademark and patent litigation, courts
are inclined to treat hearsay evidence, where possible, as either circum-
297, 320-23 (Hoffman & Winard ed. 1963). See also Dession, The Trial of Economic
and Technological Issues of Fact, 58 YALE L. J. 1019, 1242 (1949).
3 Id. at 320. See generally CURRENT BUSINESS STUDIES PUBLICATION No. 1, THE
ROLE OF SAMPLING DATA As EVIDENCE IN JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
(1954); Caughey, The Use of Public Polls, Surveys and Sampling as Evidence in
Litigation, and Particularly Trademark and Unfair Competition Cases, 44 CALIF. L.
REv. 539 (1956); Christophersen, Light & Sanmis, Public Opinions as Evidence in
Unfair Competition Cases, 2 PRAC. LAW., Oct. 1956, at 15; Early, The Use of Survey
Evidence in Antitrust Proceedings, 33 WASH. L. REV. 380 (1958); Kennedy, Law and
the Courts, in THE POLLS AND PUBLIC OPINION (Meir & Saunders ed. 1949);
Shryock, Survey Evidence in Contested Trademark Cases, 57 TRADE-MAR REP. 377
(1967); Sorensen & Sorensen, The Admissibility and Use of Opinion Research Evidence,
28 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1213 (1953); Waterbury, Opinion Surveys in Civil Litigation, 44
TRA E-MARRK REP. 343 (1954); Note, Consumer Polls as Evidence in Unfair Trade
Cases, 20 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 211 (1951); Note, Public Opinion Surveys as Evidence:
The Pollsters Go to Court, 66 HARv. L. REV. 498 (1953); Note, Admissibility of Public
Opinion Polls, 37 MINN. L. REV. 385 (1953).
4 United States v. 88 Cases, 187 F. 2d 967, 974 (3d Cir. 195 ), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 86 (1951); Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Frolich, 195 F. Supp. 256 (D. C. Cal.
1961), aff'd, 296 F. 2d 740 (1961), cert denied, 369 U.S. 865 (1962); Household
Finance Corp. v. Federal Finance Corp., 105 F. Supp. 164 (D. Ariz. 1952); People v.
Franklin Nat'l Bank, 200 Misc. 557, 105 N.Y.S. 2d 81 (Sup. Ct. 1951), rev'd, 305
N.Y. 453, 113 N.E. 2d 796 (1953), rev'd, 347 U.S. 373 (1954).
5 See Zeisel, The Uniqueness of Survey Evidence, 45 CORN. L. Q. 322, 334 (1960).
The interviewer may ask, for example, whether the consumer owns a car or stove and,
if so, what kind. The answer here would clearly be hearsay.
6American Luggage Works, Inc. v. United States Trunk Co., 158 F. Supp. 50 (D.
Mass. 1957).
7 General Motors Corp. v. Cadillac Marine & Boas Co., 226 F. Supp. 716 (W.D. Mich.
1964).
8 Hurwitz v. Shiu Yim Poon, 364 F. 2d 878 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
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cumstantial evidence and beyond the hearsay rule9 or as evidence which
credits the in-court testimony of a witness.'0 And where evidence is clearly
within the traditional hearsay rule, it is often received without objection in
such cases as a matter of practice." This is so for several reasons: there
is no jury; the trial will progress faster; and an objection emphasizes a
weakness in the objecting party's case.12 Even if the extrajudicial declarant
were subject to cross-examination, it would be less valuable than in the
ordinary case because of the general expertise and competence of witnesses
in such cases.
13
In antitrust cases, the courts have developed a rule which admits all
declarations made in futherance of a conspiracy.14 The declarations of
one conspirator are admitted against any or all of the rest on the ground
that each acts in behalf of all in furtherance of the conspiracy.' 5 "Liberality
has always been accorded to the admission of evidence in cases where
conspiracy issues are present." 16 ThiUs rule allows declarations of co-
conspirators to come in if there is other independent evidence of a
combination between the declarant and the defendant. 17 A mere contract
between the two constitutes such independent evidence.' 8 Since antitrust
suits may arise in either federal district court or the Federal Trade Com-
mission, 19 courts have been encouraged to apply more liberal rules regard-
ing the admissibility of hearsay. 2° There appears to be no strong reason
9 Scholle v. Cuban-Venezuelan Oil Voting Trust, 285 F. 2d 318 (2d Cir. 1960); see
Bourns, Inc. v. International Resistance Co., 341 F. 2d 146 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
10Hfaselstrom v. McKusick, 324 F. 2d 1013 (C.C.P.A. 1963), where a "science"
article was admitted to show that the witness had made a statement therein before
the dispute arose which was consistent with his testimony.
11 See O'Donnell, supra note 2, at 312.
12 Ibid.
13 Id. at 315-16.
14 United States v. General Electric Co., 80 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); see
O'Donnell, supra note 2, at 303-06; Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy, 52 Micir. L. REV.
1159 (1954).
15Delaney v. United States, 263 U.S. 586, 590 (1924); Hitchman Coal & Coke Co.
v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 249 (1917).
16 United States v. Vehicular Parking, 52 F. Supp. 751, 753-54 (D. Del. 1943). See
also United States v. General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 903 (D. N.J. 1949).
17 Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917).
18 Galatas v. United States, 80 F. 2d 15, 24 (8th Cir. 1935); see O'Donnell, supra
note 2, at 305-06.
19 FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
20United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 349 (1950). See also
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948) (Written hearsay
often is of greater value than the in court testimony of the writer after a long period of
time has elapsed.); United States v. Corn Products Refining Co., 234 Fed. 964, 978
(2d Cir. 1916) (Interoffice memoranda constitute perfectly valid evidence where there
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for applying different rules of evidence in non-jury antitrust suits in district
court than in administrative hearings; furthermore, the more liberal ap-
proach of the Federal Trade Commission would continue to attract much
of what the courts should handle unless the courts adapted their evidence
rules to meet such a threat.21
The impact of the hearsay rule is further diminished by a liberal ap-
plication of the federal business records22 and official records statutes.'s
The first statute eliminates the requirement of calling to the stand those
who made the original entries.24 Strict proof of authenticity is no longer
needed.25 The second allows for copies of government records, such as
patents and census reports, to be admitted without the necessity of pro-
ducing the originals and the parties who made them. 26 This latter statute
makes it possible to prove government transactions without having to call
government official from all over the country.27 In cases involving volu-
minous documents, experts have been permitted to present summaries of
these documents so long as the originals are at the disposal of the court
and opposing parties.28
B. Eminent Domain Proceedings
The very nature of the evidence needed to establish the value of
property in eminent domain cases requires a relaxation of the hearsay
is every indication that they were never intended to be seen by outsiders. They are
of the "highest value as evidence of intention." Hand, J.)
21 Id. at 356:
It is difficult to imagine any satisfactory ground for deciding that evidence
which is admissible before the Federal Trade Commission is inadmissible before
a judge sitting without a jury in a civil anti-trust case brought by the Govern-
ment ...
. . . the admission of hearsay evidence by a Commission undercuts just as
effectively as the admission of hearsay evidence by a Court the fundamental
objective of the hearsay rule-the opportunity to hear the witness under oath and
to subject him to cross-examination.
See also Note, The Hearsay Rule in Civil Antitrust Suits, 60 YALE L. J. 363 (1951).
22 62 Stat. 945, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (Supp. 1961).
23 62 Stat. 946, 28 U.S.C. § 1733 (1958).
24 Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F. 2d 976 (2d Cir. 1942), aff'd, 318 U.S. 109 (1943);
United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F. 2d 376, 409 (7th Cir. 1941); Gilbert
v. Gulf Oil Corp., 175 F. 2d 705 (4th Cir. 1949); United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 35 F. Supp. 820 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
25 Cornes v. United States, 119 F. 2d 127 (9th Cir. 1941); United States v. Manton,
107 F. 2d 834 (2d Cir. 1939).
26 See O'Donnell, supra note 2, at 308.
27 Ibid.
28 Flame Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 303 F. 2d 39 (6th Cir.
1962); Greenhill v. United States, 298 F. 2d 405, 412 (5th Cir. 1962); see Comment,
Best Evidence Rule-The Use of Summaries of Voluminius Originals, 37 Micy. L.
REv. 449 (1939). See generally WIGMORE § 1230, at 434-35.
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rule. Courts in such proceedings invariably rely on opinion in determining
the amount of compensation to be awarded the condemnee.1 Strictly
speaking, such opinion evidence often violates the hearsay or first hand
knowledge rules since the witness, who is ordinarily an expert, may have no
information upon which to base his opinion other than hearsay reports
of the prices paid in sales of comparable property.2 Many courts, however,
refuse to apply these rules rigidly because in doing so the parties would
be deprived of the best and sometimes the only means of establishing the
value of the land.3  The hearsay factor goes to the weight of evidence
rather than rendering the witness incompetent.4
1 See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 258 U.S. 40 (1922). See generally Annot., Com-
petency of Witness to Give Expert or Opinion Testimony as to Value of Real Property,
159 A.L.R. 7 (1945). Expert testimony is not necessary; a non-expert may offer his
opinion as to value. Jones v. Erie & W. Valley R. Co., 151 Pa. 30, 25 AtI. 134, 31 Am.
St. Rep. 722 (1892); Lebanon & N. Turnpike Co. v. Creveling, 159 Tenn. 147, 17
S.W. 2d 22 (1929). But see Pennsylvania & P.R. Co. v. Root, 53 N.J.L. 253, 21 Ad.
285 (1891); Buffum v. New York & B. R. Co., 4 R.I. 221 (1856). Experts, however,
are given greater latitude in forming their opinions from hearsay reports. Com. v.
Citizens Ice & Fuel Co., 365 S.W. 2d 113 (Ky. 1963); State Highway Com. v.
Conrad, 263 N.C. 394, 139 S.E. 2d 553 (1965).
2 United States v. 1846 Acres of Land, 312 F 2d 287 (2d Cir. 1963). See also
Falknor, Evidence, 1963 ANN. SURVEy Aar. L. 287, 289-290 (1964); Annot., Ad-
missibility of Hearsay Evidence as to Comparable Sales of Other Land as Basis for
Expert's Opinion as to Value, 12 A.L.R. 3d 1064, 1066 (1967). Nearly all jurisdic-
dons agree that evidence of price in sales of comparable land is relevant to the issue
of value of condemned land. 1 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN § 137,
at 582 (1953). But see Tiffany v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 300 Pa. 45, 150 At. 101
(1918) (Private sales as opposed to public sales have no bearing on the issue of value
of comparable land.)
3 Montana Ry. Co. v. Warren, 137 U.S. 348, 354 (1890) ("Indeed, if the rule were
as stringent as contended, no value could be established in a community until there
had been sales of the property in question, or similar property.") Com. v. Smith,
229 Ky. 345, 347, 17 S.W. 2d 203 (1929). Recreation & Park Com. v. Perkins, 231
La. 869, 93 So. 2d 198 (1957); Johnson v. Lowell, 240 Mass. 546, 550, 134 N. E.
627 (1922); Langdon v. Manor, 133 N.Y. 628, 637, 31 N.E. 98, 101 (1892) ("Under
the circumstances it was the best evidence obtainable, which is all that can be
reasonably required is any case.") See generally 5 NICHOLs, EMINENT DOMAIN § 18.
1 et. seq. (3d ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as NICHOLS]; 1 ORoEL, VALUATION UNDER
EMINENT DOMAIN (2d ed. 1953) [hereinafter cited as ORGEL]; Rosenstein, Hearsay
Testimony in Condemnation Cases, 6 ARiz. L. REv. 112 (1964); Winner, The Rules of
Evidence in Eminent Domain, 32 DICTA 243, 259-62 (1955).
4 United States v. Delano Park, 146 F. 2d 473, 475 (2d Cir. 1944), in which Learned
Hand, J., made the following statement:
.. .it would be absurd to exclude a qualified expert's appraisal because he had
considered such [hearsay] evidence; indeed he ought to consider it; it is part of
the data on which his opinion should rest.
Saulsbury v. Ky. & W. Va. Power Co., 226 Ky. 75, 81, 10 S.W. 2d 451, 454 (1928).
The lack of direct testimony concerning sales is "only a circumstance to be considered
by the jury in weighing the evidence"
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When opinions based in substantial part on hearsay are received,
another more difficult problem arises. To what extent and for what
purpose may the hearsay reports be admitted in evidence? The cases have
fallen into three general categories: (1) the hearsay information from
which the witness forms his opinion is admissible as substantive evidence;5
(2) the hearsay information is admitted for the limited purpose of show-
ing the basis of the witness' opinion;6 (3) the hearsay basis of the opinion
is inadmissible.7 Some courts which admit these hearsay reports do so only
when there are substantial safeguards against any misuse by the jury.8 It
has been held that admission of such incompetent evidence does not violate
due process requirements. 9
Specially constituted tribunals have been set up in several states to assess
compensation in condemnation proceedings.10 These tribunals typically are
5 See, e.g., Southern Elec. Generating Co. v. Leibacher, 269 Ala. 9, 110 So. 2d 308
(1959); Stewart v. Com., 337 S.W. 2d 880, Ky., (1960); Recreation & Park Com. v.
Perkins, 231 La. 869, 93 So. 2d 198 (1957); State Highway Com. v. Hayes Estate,
140 N.W. 2d 680, 687 (S.D. 1966):
Recent and comparable sales of real estate are admissible as evidence in
condemnation cases, either as substantive proof of value of the condemned
property or as foundation and background for an expert's opinion of value.
See generally NICHOLS § 21.3 [1]; ORGEL § 137.
6 See, e.g., United States v. 5139.5 Acres, 200 F. 2d 659 (4th Cir. 1952). The
majority of cases within this category allow the hearsay to come in during direct
examination to support the opinion of the expert witness by showing the facts upon
which he based it. United States v. 25.406 Acres, 172 F.2d 990 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 337 U.S. 931 (1949); Urban Renewal Agency of Harrison v. Hefley, 371 S.W.
2d 141 (Ark. 1963); State Highway Comm'n. v. Fisch-Or, Inc., 241 Ore. 412, 406
P. 2d 539 (1965); Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Towler, 396 S.W. 2d 917 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1965). The minority allows the hearsay evidence to come in only on cross-
examination to test the knowledge of the expert. People ex rel Dept. of Public Works
v. Alexander, 212 Cal. App. 2d 84, 27 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1963); Warren v. Waterville
Urban Renewal Auth., 235 A. 2d 295 (Me. 1967), petition for cert. filed, 36 U.S.L.W.
3358 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1968).
The admission of hearsay reports for a limited purpose has been criticized on the
basis that jurors cannot distinguish between substantive and limited evidence. State
Highway Comm'n. v. Fisch-Or, Inc., 241 Ore. 412, 433, 406 P. 2d 539, 544 (1965)
(dissent); Cf. MCCARTY, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW 251-53 (1960).
7 Cf. United States v. Katz, 213 F. 2d 799 (Ist Cir. 1954); Denver v. Quick, 108
Colo. 111, 113 P. 2d 999 (1941); Newton Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Massachusetts
Turnpike Auth., 335 Mass. 189, 138 N.E. 2d 769 (1956).
8 Baker Bros. Nursery v. State, 357 S.W. 2d 163 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962), rev'd on
other grounds, 336 S.W. 2d 212 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1963).
9 Warren v. Waterville Urban Renewal Auth., 235 A. 2d 295 (Me. 1967), petition
for cert. filed, 36 U.S.L.W. 3358 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1968); cf. State v. Owens, 124
S.C. 220, 117 S.E. 537 (1922); State ex rel Alford v. Thorson, 202 Wis. 31, 231
N.W. 155 (1930).
10NIcHoLS § 18.1[3]; ORGEL § 128, at 543-44
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composed of commissioners who have peculiar knowledge of the subject
matter." The hearsay rule has an even lesser impact in these proceedings. 12
Rules of evidence as at common law may not apply to them at all, es-
pecially where their determinations of value are preliminary rather than
final and the condemnee may require a hearing before a court of law."
Even when the determination is final "subject only to the power of the
court to confirm the award or remand it for further consideration, there are
frequent judicial utterances to the effect that the commissioners are 'un-
trammeled by technical rules of evidence and unrestricted as to the sources
of their information.'" 14
California15 and New Jersey16 have provided by statute that experts may
form an opinion as to value on the basis of hearsay reports and may state
the matter upon which such opinion is based unless the hearsay is un-
supported and unreliable. Whether the admissibility of the underlying
hearsay is governed by statute or not, the trial judge is generally giveri
broad discretion in receiving both the hearsay reports and the value
opinions based on such reports.' 7 This discretion is broader than in the
reception of evidence on most other issues, 8 and the judge's decision will
not be set aside unless there is manifest error.1
C. Cases in Family Courts
The term "family court" covers a wide variety of statutory schemes
devised by the states to cope with the growing number of domestic dis-
putes.1 Generally included are child custody, juvenile delinquency, divorce,
11 NICHOLS § 18.1 [3].
12 Ibid.
13 ORGEL § 128, at 544.
141bid. quoting Matter of Staten Island R.T. Co., 47 Hun. 396, 398 (N.Y. 1888).
See also United States v. 80.46 Acres, 59 F. Supp. 876 (W.D.N.Y. 1944).
15 CAL. Evm. CODE § 814 (1967); see Carlson, Statutory Rules of Evidence for
Eminent Domain Proceedings, 18 HASTINGS L. J. 143 (1966).
16 N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:83-1 (Supp. 1965).
17Southern Elec. Generating Co. v. Leibacher, 269 Ala. 9, 18-19, 110 So. 2d 308,
317 (1959); Honolulu v. Bishop Trust Co., Ltd., 48 Hawaii 444, 404 P. 2d 373
(1965); State v. Oakley, 356 S.W. 2d 909 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
18 NICHOLS § 18.1 [3), at 135.
19 Montana Ry. Co. v. Warren, 137 U.S. 348 (1890); United States v. 124.84 Acres,
387 F. 2d 912 (7th Cir. 1968); Southern Elec. Generating Co. v. Leibacher, 269 Ala.
9, 110 So. 2d 308 (1959).
ISee, e.g., CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE § 500 et seq. (1962); HAwAI FAMILY
COURT ACT, ch. 333 (1965); N.Y. SEss. LAws 1962, ch. 686; NAT'L PROBATION AND
PAROLE ASS'N, STANDARD FAMILY COURT ACT (1959). See also YOUNG, SOCIAL TREAT-
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annulment, bastardy, adoption, child neglect, and welfare proceedings2
The scope of the schemes and the procedure involved vary from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction, but the usual practice is to receive evidence with a
greater degree of liberality than in other cases, and to maintain as informal
an approach as possible.3 Because of the statutory differences, the extent
to which the traditional rules of evidence have been relaxed is not constant
throughout the country.
The most liberal attitude toward the admission of hearsay evidence is
exhibited in child custody and child neglect proceedings where the primary
emphasis is upon the welfare of the child, not upon the rights of adverse
parties.4 Here the court is attempting to achieve the best possible result
from the point of view of the child's future. Frequently the courts rely
upon psychiatric and psychological reports from experts as well as in-
vestigation reports from court officers.5 If the hearsay rule were applied
strictly, such information would not be available.
The distinction between adjudicatory and dispositional stages must be
clearly drawn in juvenile delinquency proceedings as a result of In Re
MENT IN PROBATION AND DELINQUENCY 127 (1952), quoting Judge Charles Hoffman:
The purpose is . . . to establish a court for 'consideration of all matters relating
to the family .. . in which it will be possible to consider social as distinguished
from legal evidence.'
See generally GOLDSTEIN & KATZ, THE FAMILY AND THE LAW (1965); Ehrenzweig,
The Interstate Child and Uniform Legislation: A Plea for Extra-Litigious Proceedings,
64 MicH. L. REV. 1 (1965); Foster, The Family in the Courts, U. PrrT. L. REv. 206
(1956); Foster & Freed. Family Law, 1965 ANN. SURVEY Ams. L. 387 (1966); ten
Broeck, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development and Present
Situation, 16 STAN. L. REV. 257, 900 (1964), 17 STAN. L. REv. 240 (1965).
2 Dembitz, Ferment and Experiment in New rork: Juvenile Cases in the New rork
Family Court, 48 CORN. L. Q. 499 (1963).
3 See Foster, Family Law, 1962 ANN. SURVEY Am. L. 603 (1963):
Although in most states more Family Law cases are heard than any other type of
litigation comparatively few are appealed, and it remains characteristic that in-
formal negotiation and settlement are the usual basis for disposition.4 Doe v. People, 156 Colo. 311, 398 P. 2d 624 (1965) (hearsay admitted in the
post-adjudicative stage); Appeal of Dattilo, 136 Conn. 488, 72 A. 2d 50 (1950) (hear-
say admissible under a Connecticut statute allowing courts in such proceedings to
formulate whatever rules are necessary and proper); Harter v. State, ........... Iowa.
149 N.W. 2d 827 (1967) (hearsay factor goes to the weight of evidence); In Re
Yardley, ... Iowa . , 149 N.W. 2d 162 (1967); Callen v. Gill, 7 N.J. 312, 81
A. 2d 495 (1951) (rules of evidence ordinarily relaxed in child custody cases);
Dumain v. Gwynne, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 270, 275 (1865) (any reasonable source
of evidence proper in habeas corpus proceeding for custody of child). See also Note,
The "Adversary" Process in Child Custody Proceedings, 18 W. REs. L. REV. 1731,
1750 (1967).
5See, e.g., Harter v. State . ........ Iowa ........., 149 N.W. 2d 827 (1967); In Re Blaine,
54 Misc. 2d 248, 282 N.Y.S. 2d 359 (1967).
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Gault.6 In the New York Family Court Act such a distinction had already
been made not only in juvenile delinquency proceedings, but in all others
as well.7 Under this act, only competent evidence is admissible during the
adjudicatory stage, but incompetent evidence may be received at the
dispositional hearing.9 The trial judge has broad discretion in receiving
evidence during the latter stage. 10 The hearsay nature of the evidence
goes not to the basis of admissibility, but to its probative value."
XI. JUDICIAL DEVICES FOR CIRCUMVENTING THE HEARSAY RULE
A. Pretrial Conferences and Discovery Rules
Much of the rigidity of the hearsay rule can often be dispelled before
the trial even begins as a result of liberalized pretrial practices.1 Increas-
ingly, trial attorneys are relying upon pretrial discovery to the extent that
much which would have been objected to formerly is received without
objection because the element of surprise is eliminated before the case
comes to trial.2 The pretrial conference has proven to be an effective
means of eliminating troublesome evidentiary problems 3 Unlike the trial
6387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967); see p. 154, supra. See also GEORGE, GAULT AND THE
JUVENILE COURT REVOLUTION 41-44 (1968).
7N.Y. SESS. LAWS 1962, ch. 686; see Paulsen, The New York Family Court Act,
12 BUFFALO L. REV. 420, 432 (1963). The 1961 California Juvenile Court Act
makes analagous distinctions. CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE §§ 701, 706 (1962)
discussed in Note, 1961 California Juvenile Court Law: Effective Uniform Standards
for Juvenile Court Procedure?, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 421; 443 (1963).
8 N.Y. SEss. LAWS 1962, ch. 686.
9 N.Y. SEss. LAws 1962, ch. 686, § 346.
10 In Re Blaine, 54 Misc. 2d 248, 282 N.Y.S. 2d 359 (1967).
1t Id. at 366.
1 Cf. Morgan, The Future of the Law of Evidence, 29 TEXAs L. REV. 587, 607
(1951): "The first device for eliminating the sporting features of a lawsuit is the pre-
trial conference."
2 See ROSENBERG, THE PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND EFFECTIVE JUSTICE 39-40 (1964);
cf. Degnan, The Evidence Law of Discovery: Exclusion of Evidence Because of Fear of
Perjury, 43 TEXAs L. REv. 435 (1965). Degnan examines the impact of liberalized
discovery rules on some exclusionary rules other than the hearsay rule. The use of
hearsay, while it does not directly modify these exclusionary rules, is nevertheless under-
mining their effectiveness. See also Chandler, Discovery and Pre-Trial Procedure in
Federal Courts, 12 OKLA. L. REV. 321 (1959); Pickering, The Pre-Trial Conference, 9
HASTINGS L. J. 117, 125 (1958) (commenting on the interrelationship between the pre-
trial conference and discovery). See generally Holtzoff, Federal Pretrial Procedure, 11
Am. U. L. REv. 21 (1962); McCarthy, Pre-Trial in Virginia, 40 VA. L. REv. 359
(1954).
3 See Weinstein, Some Difficulties in Devising Rules for Determining Truth in Judicial
Trials, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 224 (1966).
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itself, which is characterized by formality and contentiousness, the pre-
trial conference allows the parties to settle disputed points and often the
case itself in the absence of any strict application of the hearsay rule.4
More recent pretrial devices, such as notice of intention to use hearsay
with opportunity for depositions, have limited further the effect of the
hearsay rule.5 This weakening of the hearsay rule has been accomplished
in this context entirely by indirection, that is, by reducing the amount of
surprise involved in the use of hearsay, by providing opportunities to settle
disputed issues of fact without applying the hearsay rule, by allowing
the opponent an opportunity to eliminate the prejudicial effect of the use
of hearsay (e.g., giving him a chance to cross-examine the declarant before
trial), and by substituting, at least in part, an atmosphere of objectivity
for one of contentiousness which is inherent in the adversary system.6
B. Expert Opinion Testimony
It is not surprising that the same offer of proof may run afoul of both
the opinion rule and the hearsay rule since the two rules have a common
origin.' When jurors ceased to serve the dual function of witnesses and
triers of fact and became triers of fact only, the testimony of witnesses
began to be scrutinized more closely. 2 Witnesses were restricted to presenting
facts and not what they concluded from such facts.3 Drawing conclusions
and inferences became the function of the jury alone 4 The opinion rule
excludes everything but the immediate sense impressions of the witness5
He is not to testify as to what he believes after observing such facts.
4 See Nims, Some Comments on the Relation of Pre-Trial to the Rules of Evidence, 5
VAND. L. REV. 581, 583, 588 (1952).
5 See Weinstein, supra note 3, at 224-25.
6 By reducing the contentiousness, the gamesmanship, or even the hostility of the
courtroom fight, these devises have undermined the very thing that gave rise to the
hearsay rule according to Morgan-the adversary system. See Morgan, The Jury and
the Exclusionary Rules of Evidence, 4 U. CHL L. REV. 247, 254 (1937).
1 Adams v. Canon, 1 Dyer 53b, 73 Eng. Rep. 117 n. 15 (K.B. 1622): "It is not
satisfactory for a witness to say, that he thinks or persuadeth himself." Thayer felt that
the roots of both the hearsay and the opinion rules could be traced back to a case in
1349, where the court said that the witnesses and jurors serve separate functions and
witnesses swear only to what they see and hear. THAYER 498-99, 523. See also Ladd,
Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. Rav. 414, 415 (1952). See generally WIGMORE § 1917.
2 See WIGMORE § 1364, at 14-15.
3 See THAYER 500.
4See id. at 524. See also Archbishop Laud's Trial, 4 How. St. Tr. 315, 399 (1644).
5See Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Chamberlain, 288 U.S. 333 (1933); Eastern Air
Lines v. American Cyanamid Co., 321 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1963); Dudek v. Popp, 373
Mich. 300, 129 N.W.2d 393 (1964). See also WIGMORE § 1918.
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That would be a perfectly sound rule if it were not for the difficulty in,
or even the impossibility of distinguishing between immediate sense impres-
sions and inferences drawn from them.6 In a sense, all testimony is based
upon inference.7 "[I]t is a conclusion formed from phenomena and mental
impressions." 8 Opinion is a higher order of abstraction than fact, but it is
misleading to treat fact and opinion as mutually exclusive alternatives. The
difference between them is not categorical, but one of degree. 9 Similarly, the
difference between hearsay and non-hearsay is a matter of "degree of
verification in personal experience underlying an assertion." 10 The hearsay
rule ignores the fact that the more educated the witness, the higher the
degree of hearsay involved in his testimony." Most of one's knowledge in
this modem age is derived not from personal experience, but from hearsay
sources.1 2 This is obvious, for example, where the witness, fresh out of a
college course in geography, testifies as to the climate in Burma. But it
would not be so obvious where the witness had made a visit to Burma
and was unable to distinguish what he personally observed from what he
read prior to his visit. Even less obvious is the hearsay element in an
answer to the question "How much money do you have in the bank?" or
"Who is the president of your company?" or "What is the date?" 13 The
courts constantly receive testimony that contains hearsay elements in these
less obvious cases.14 This is certain to continue and perhaps increase as
more and more of man's knowledge depends upon the reports and research
of others.15
The opinion rule has perhaps as many exceptions as the hearsay rule."
One of the more important allows an expert to offer his opinion when the
inability of the trier to resolve certain issdes makes the special skills, experi-
ence or knowledge of an experts necessary.' 7 In spite of criticism of the
practice of using experts because of frequent abuse,13 the continuation of
6Se THAYER 524; Loevinger, Facts, Evidence and Legal Proof, 9 W. REs. L. Rav.
154, 166-68 (1958).
7 See THAYER 524.
8 Ibid.
9 See Loevinger, supra note 6, at 168.
10 Ibid.
11 Cf. id. at 166.
12 See ibid.: "... all . . . 'book learning' is clearly legal 'hearsay.'"
13Id. at 167.
14 See Falknor, Indirect Hearsay, 31 TUL. L. REv. 3 (1956).
15 See Ladd, supra note 1, at 417.
16 Ibid.
17 Louisville & N.R. Co., 179 Ky. 478, 200 S.W. 952 (1918).
18 See Morgan, Suggested Remedy for Obstructions to Expert Testimony by Rules of
Evidence, 10 U. COi. L. Rav. 285, 293 (1943).
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the practice in one form or another is almost certain to continue. In fact,
reliance upon expert testimony will probably increase as knowledge becomes
more specialized.' 9
It is generally recognized that an expert may base his opinion on hear-
say.2° If this were not so, an expert's opinion would be admissible in very
few instances. Strictly speaking, an opinion based upon hearsay reports
violates the hearsay rule, but the opinion is not necessarily excluded as a
result of the hearsay element.21 The witness, however, must "give the
sanction of his general experience" 22 or rely upon his own observations as
well as the hearsay reports.23 The more difficult question, then, is whether
the expert may relate the hearsay reports to show the basis for his
opinion.24 The traditional answer was given by Holmes: ". . . the fact
that an expert may use hearsay as a ground of opinion does not make the
hearsay admissible." 25 A substantial number of courts have departed from
this view, at least to allow the hearsay to come in for the limited purpose
of supporting the expert's opinion 6 Other courts, perhaps recognizing
that the jury does not or cannot follow the limiting instructions, have gone
so far as to permit the hearsay reports to be used substantively.27
19 See Weinstein, Some Difficulties in Devising Rules for Determining Truth in
Judicial Trials, 66 COLUm. L. Rzv. 223, 224 (1966).
20 Grayson v. Lynch, 163 U.S. 468, 480-81 (1896); United States v. Delano Park
Homes, Inc., 146 F.2d 473, 475 (2d Cir. 1944) (L. Hand, J.); Commonwealth v.
Smith, 229 Ky. 345, 17 S.W.2d 203 (1929); National Bank v. New Bedford, 175
Mass. 257, 261, 56 N.E. 288, 290 (1900) (Holmes, J.). The fact that the expert
relies upon hearsay merely affects the weight of his testimony. American Luggage
Works Co. v. United States Trunk Co., 158 F.Supp. 50, 53 (D. Mass. 1957) (WyZanski,
J.). See generally, Maguire & Hahesy, Requisite Proof of Basis for Expert Opinion, 5
VAND. L. REv. 432 (1952); McCormick, Some Observations upon the Opinion Rule
and Expert Testimony, 23 TExAs L. REv. 109 (1945); Rosenthal, The Development of
the Use of Expert Testimony, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 413 (1935). See also MODEL
CODE OF EVIDENCE Rules 401, 503, 529; UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 58.
21 See MORGAN, BAsIc PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 287 (1957).
2 2 National Bank v. New Bedford, 175 Mass. 257, 261, 56 N.E. 288, 290 (1900)
(dictum).
23 Fred Howland, Inc. v. Morris, 143 Fla. 189, 196 So. 472, 128 A.L.R. 1013 (1940).
24 See Annot., 12 A.L.R.3d 1064, 1066 (1967). See also pp. 000-00, supra.
2 5 National Bank v. New Bedford, 175 Mass. 257, 261, 56 N.E. 288, 290 (1900). See
also People v. Alexander, 212 Cal. App. 2d 84, 27 Cal. Rptr. 720, 726 (1963).
26 United States v. 5139.5 Acres, 200 F.2d 659 (4th Cir. 1952); Lowery v. Jones,
219 Ala. 201, 202, 121 So. 704, 706 (1929); State v. Shiren, 9 N.J. 445, 88 A.2d 601
(1952); Village of Lawrence v. Greenwood, 300 N.Y. 231, 90 N.E.2d 53 (1949); State
Highway Com. v. Fisch-Or, Inc., 241 Ore. 412, 406 P.2d 539 (1965). But see United
States v. Katz, 213 F.2d 799 (1st Cir. 1954).
2 7 See, e.g., Stewart v. Commonwealth, 337 S.W.2d 880 (Ky. 1960); Recreation &
Park Comm'n v. Perkins, 231 La. 869, 93 So.2d 198 (1957); Baltimore v. Hurlock,
113 Md. 674, 78 Atl. 558 (1910); State Highway Comm'n v. Hayes Estate, 140 N.W.2d
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C. Judicial Notice
In recent years there has been an increasing tendency for courts to
broaden the scope of evidence which it will judicially notice. Previously,
courts would take judicial notice only of those matters of common knowl-
edge which were accepted as indisputable by persons of average intelligence
in the community.1 Of late there has been an extension of the doctrine
of judicial notice beyond the sphere of facts of common knowledge to a
broader sphere of the facts capable of immediate and accurate determina-
tion by resort to easily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy.2 Most
recently the trend has been to extend the scope of judicial notice beyond
the field of common knowledge to facts of "verifiable certainty." 3 In
practice, though, much is included that is neither indisputable nor easily
verifiable.4
One readily apparent result of this trend is the admission of evidence
that would otherwise be excluded as hearsay, such evidence now being
admitted under the guise of judicial notice. For instance, learned treatises
are hearsay and only a few jurisdictions have created an exception to the
680 (S.D. 1966). Some states by statute allow the hearsay to be used substantively.
CAL. EvI). CODE § 814 (1967); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:83-1 (Supp. 1965). Experts have
also been permitted to submit summaries of voluminous documents, especially in anti-
trust cases, where the documents themselves are made available to the court and the
opponent. Phillips v. Unittd States, 210 Fed. 259, 269 (1912); see WIoasoRE § 1320,
at 434 et seq.
Maguire suggests that an expert in mental ailments should be allowed to give his
opinion on the credibility of a patient whom the expert has personally examined and
should be allowed to testify as to statements made to him by the patient where there
is sufficient corroboration of the truth of the statement from the surrounding circum-
stances. In such a situation, there would be no stronger basis for a hearsay objection
than in the case in which evidence of what a thermometer registered outside of court
is offered. The truthfulness of the thermometer reading is corroborated by the reliability
of such devices, etc. The court may take judicial notice of the dependability of manufac-
ture and adjustment. Maguire, Heresy about Hearsay, 8 U. CHi. L. REV. 621, 628-32
(1941).
1 See McCoRAcsK, EViDENCE 688, 712 (1954); THAYER 277-312 (1898); WIGMORE
§ 2567a, at 535. Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 COLUm. L. REV. 945 (1955); Morgan,
Judicial Note, 57 HARv. L. REv. 269 (1944); Schiff, The Use of Out-of-Court Informa-
tion in Fact Determination at Trial, 41 CAN. B. Rv. 335, 338-55 (1963); Strahorn,
The Process of Judicial Notice, 14 VA. L. REV. 544 .(1928). This discussion focuses
on judicial notice of adjudicative facts, but much that is said herein applies to legislative
facts as well.
2 See Currie, Appellate Courts Use of Facts outside of the Record by Resort to Judicial
Notice and Independent Investigation, 1960 Wis. L. REV. 39, 40; Korn, Law, Fact and
Science in the Courts, 66 COLUm. L. REV. 1080 (1966).
3 Korn, supra note 2, at 1089.
4 Ibid.
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hearsay rule to allow their admission.5 Yet, with the difficult problems the
courts must encounter in the determination of technical factual data, the
likelihood that there will be an increase in admission of such evidence as
learned treatises and statistical data, until now excluded as hearsay, under
the doctrine of judicial notice is evident.6
It has been noted that the potential sweep of the "verifiable certainty"
standard in judicial notice "may embrace all scientific knowledge that
commands due respect within its own discipline." 7 In the field of social
science there is an apparent increase in admitting matters which normally
would be excluded as being hearsay but which the courts are willing to
notice judicially. A recent New York case is very much in point.8 In that
case the court admitted a psychiatric report even though the psychiatrist
was not present at the proceeding so as to be subject to cross-examination.
In allowing the introduction of the report of the psychiatrist, the court
pointed out its knowledge of the psychiatrist's qualifications and methods
of examination.9
Judge Talbot Smith of the United States District Court of the Eastern
District of Michigan in a recent article criticizing the hearsay rule suggested
that in regard to hearsay matter a standard of reasonable reliance should
be employed rather than a series of specific rules of admissibility.'0 This
is precisely the test the courts are currently using as they admit evidence
under the guise of judicial notice. Only the degree of reliability differs.
With the increased use of expert testimony and reliance on learned
5 There is little case authority to support such an exception, most of it being from
Alabama. See, e.g., Mississippi Power. & Light Co. v. Whitescarner, 68 F. 2d 928
(5th Cir. 1934) ; City of Dothan v. Hardy, 237 Ala. 603, 188 So. 264 (1939); Lambert
v. State, 234 Ala. 155, 174 So. 298 (1937); Russell v. State, 201 Ala. 574, 78 So. 916
(1918); Stoudenmeier v. Williamson, 29 Ala. 558 (1857). A Wisconsin court recently
ruled that it would receive medical treatises as substantive evidence in the future.
Lewandowski v. Preferred Risk Mutual Ins. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 69, 146 N.W. 2d 505
(1966). Some jurisdictions allow an expert witness to read from a treatise. Eagleston
v. Rowley, 172 F. 2d 202, 203 (9th Cir. 1949) ; State v. Nicolosi, 228 La. 65, 81 So. 2d
771 (1955). In other jurisdictions, counsel may read excerpts in framing questions.
See, e.g., Coastal Coaches v. Ball, 234 S.W. 2d 474 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950). See also
Dana, Admission of Learned Treatises in Evidence, 1945 Wis. L. REV. 455; Note.
Medical Treatises as Evidence-Helpful But Too Strictly Limited, 29 U. CINc. L. REv.
255 (1960).
6 Korn, supra note 2, at 1090.
7 Ibid.
8 In Re Blaine, 54 Misc. 2d 248, 282 N.Y.S. 2d 359 (1967).
9 In the same proceeding, a letter written by a private psychiatrist was rejected because
there was no evidence of the writer's qualifications.
10 See Smith, Hearsay Rule and the Docket Crisis: The Futile Search for Paradise,
54 A.B.A.J. 231, 236 (1968).
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treatises and other scientific data, it is apparent that the courts will
make even greater use of the judicial notice doctrine. Especially obvious
is the trend of the courts to take judicial notice of the accuracy of scientific
instruments and tests such as radar," thermometers,12 and blood tests.' 3
Weinstein claims that few attorneys would be bold enough to object to
evidence which assumes that a glass-sealed thermometer was properly
calibrated and that, if they were so bold, judicial notice would probably
be adapted to confound them.' 4 Where the testing device is of a complex
nature and requires periodic adjustment to assure its accuracy as in cases
involving radar or speedometers, Weinstein suggests that the courts may
not judicially notice accuracy quite as rapidly as they would in other
cases.
15
A Florida court took judicial notice of statistics gathered at various
sources giving the number of injuries caused by automobiles.'" Judicial
notice has also been taken of statistics with respect to births occurring
within a certain period of years in not one of which the mother of a baby
was over fifty-five years old. 17 In Ly Shew v. Acheson,18 a federal district
court in California took judicial notice of statistics in hundreds of cases
involving Chinese who claimed to have been sired by American citizens
in order to evaluate the credibility of a witness.
Other hearsay evidence which would usually be excluded has gained
admittance by judicial notice. Judge Frank in a concurring opinion in
United States v. Roth, 9 took judicial notice of a letter written to him by a
sociologist. He also judicially noticed published works of sociologists. In
passing upon the constitutionality of statutes, appellate courts have taken
judicial notice of social and economic data outside the record. 20 The
Supreme Court of the United States has taken judicial notice of such
things as a text and encyclopedia articles on vaccination, 21 and reports,
U1 State v. Graham, 322 S.W. 2d 188 (Mo. 1959); State v. Dantonio, 18 N.J. 570,
115 A. 2d 35, 45 A.L.R. 2d 460 (1955). See generally Woodbridge, Radar in the
Courts, 40 VA. L. Rzv. 809 (1954).
12 Super-Cold Southwest Co. v. First Baptist Church, 219 S.W. 2d 569 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1949).
13 State ex rel Steiger v. Gray, 30 Ohio Ops. 394, 145 N.E. 2d 162, 168 (1957); see
Britt, Blood Grouping Tests and More Cultural Lag, 22 MINN. L. Rlv. 836 (1938);
Annot., 46 A.L.R. 2d 1000 (1956).
14 Weinstein, The Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IowA L. REv. 331, 343 (1960).
15 Id. at 343 n. 68.
16 Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920).
17 City Bank Farmer's Trust Co. v. United States, 74 F 2d 692, 693 (2d Cir. 1935).
18 110 F. Supp. 50, 55-56 (N.D. Calif. 1953).
19 237 F. 2d 796, 814 (2d Cir. 1956) (concurring opinion).
20 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
21 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
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books and bulletins on the economics of the grape industry.22 One Vir-
ginia case,2 citing an Alabama decision,2 4 said that the concept of judicial
notice extends to information gathered in informal inquiries with experts.
That the trend is toward judicially noticing certain evidence normally
not admitted is apparent, particularly in cases involving scientific and
technical issues. With the trend to extend the scope of judicial notice to
facts of verifiable certainty, the cases show an increasing probability
that the courts will judicially notice what has previously been excluded
under the hearsay rule.2 5 The irony of the situation is that evidence which
but for the hearsay rule would be admitted and left to the jury for
determination as to its validity and weight will now be admitted freed
from those policies of proof which the law otherwise deems paramount to
the ascertainment of the truth in adjudication.
D. Hearsay as Circumstantial Evidence
Courts often circumvent the hearsay rule by treating the out-of-court
statement as circumstantial evidence which differs from direct evidence
in that the witnesses do not testify directly as to material facts, that is, they
do not assert the occurrence or non-occurrence of material facts of their
own knowledge, but rather relate facts from which the trier of fact may
infer that the material fact occurred or did not occur.1 Historically, the
hearsay rule excluded extrajudicial declarations used for either purpose. 2
The most noteworthy example of the refusal to accept hearsay as circum-
stantial evidence is Wright v. Doe d. Tatham3 where, on the issue of testa-
mentary capacity, letters written to the testator which contained no
assertions that the testator was sane were excluded. By the end of the
22 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
23 Richmond & Central Ry. v. Richmond R.R., 96 Va. 670, 674, 32 S.E. 787, 788
(1899).
24 Gordon, Rankin & Co. v. Tweedy, 74 Ala. 232 (1883).
25 Evidence of the extrajudicial conduct of animals has often been excluded as hearsay,
but two courts have gotten around the hearsay problem by taking judicial notice of
the instincts of the animals. Hodge v. State, 98 Ala. 10, 13 So. 385 (1893) (blood-
hounds tracking); State v. Wagner, 207 Ia. 224, 222 N.W. 407 (1928) (chickens
coming home to roost).
I Devine v. Delano, 272 Ill. 166, 179-80, 111 N.E. 742, 748 (1916) ; see Michael &
Adler, The Trial of an Issue of Fact, 34 COLUMN. L. Rv. 1224, 1276-77 (1934); Patter-
son, The Types of Evidence: An Analysis, 19 VAND. L. REv. 1, 4-8, 13-14 (1965). See
generally WIGMoRE § 25.
2 See THAYER 501.
3 5 CI.&F. 670, 7 Eng. Rep. 559 (H.L. 1838).
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nineteenth century, however, a trend in the direction of admitting hearsay
as circumstantial proof was discernible
The key is to determine the purpose for which the declaration is offered.
Suppose the statement "I am Napoleon" were offered. If the proponent
sought to establish the truth of that assertion, it would be treated as hearsay
and would be inadmissible unless it fell into one of the exceptions. On the
other hand, if it is offered as a circumstance which tends to prove the declar-
ant's insanity, it would not be treated as hearsay or rather it would not be
that type of hearsay that offends the hearsay rule. Hinton5 and Morgan
challenge such treatment of the above declaration. Both insist that the
evidence would be without probative value unless the trier of fact is asked
to believe that the declarant believed it to be true. Under this view, the
proponent is offering an assertion by an extrajudicial declarant and the
evidence is within the ambit of the hearsay rule. The better view seems
to be that hearsay dangers are involved, but the risks are so slight in
such instances that the evidence should not be excluded.7 Ironically, the
exceptions are justified by an almost identical rationale.8 The courts have
often confused hearsay used circumstantially with hearsay that is covered by
one of the exceptions.
Bridges v. State0 is one of the most frequently cited cases representing
the trend toward using hearsay as circumstantial evidence. There a seven-
year-old girl before trial described in detail the room of a man accused
of taking indecent liberties with her. Over hearsay objections, the court
admitted the evidence saying:
It is true that testimony as to such statements was hearsay and, as such,
4See TuAYER 522-23. But see Thompson v. Manhattan Ry., 11 App. Div. 182, 42
N.Y.S. 896 (1896).
5 Hinton, States of Mind and the Hearsay Rule, 1 U. Cnii. L. REv. 394, 397-98
(1934). The facts of at least one case closely resemble those in the example. Sollars v.
State, 73 Nev. 248, 316 P.2d 917 (1957). The court treated the declarations as circum-
stantial evidence.
6 Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HA.v.
L. REv. 177, 202-03 (1948). See also WIGMORE §§ 218, 1715, 1790; Rucker, The
Twilight Zone of Hearsay, 9 VAND. L. REV. 453, 475 (1956).
7 See American Luggage Works, Inc. v. United States Trunk Co., 158 F.Supp. 50, 53
(D. Mass. 1957).
8 See WIOMORE § 1420, at 22-23. See also Strahorn, A Reconsideration of the Hearsay
Rule and Admissions, 85 U. PA. L. Rav. 485, 487 (1937). But see Seligman, An
Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 26 HARv. L. Rav. 146, 156 (1913).
9 See, e.g., Cook v. Latimer, 184 So.2d 807 (Ala. 1966). The court should have ad-
mitted the hearsay as circumstantial evidence or under the mental states exception
rather than under the res gestae exception.
10 247 Wis. 350, 19 N.W.2d 529 (1945), noted in 44 MICH. L. Rv. 480 (1946).
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inadmissible if the purpose for which it was received had been to establish
thereby that there were in fact the stated articles in the room. . .. That,
however, was not in this case the purpose for which the evidence as
to those statements was admitted. It was admissible in so far as the
fact that she had made the statements can be deemed to tend to show
that at the time those statements were made . . .she had knowledge
as to articles and descriptive features which, as was proven by other
evidence, were in fact in or about that room and house.11
These statements were circumstantial proof that she had knowledge of the
room which tended to prove that she had been in the room at some time be-
fore. Morgan, in commenting on the case, said that the value of the evidence
depends on the perception, memory, and veracity of the girl and, because
these involve hearsay dangers, the evidence should be classified as hearsay.1
But McCormick feels that the evidence has value aside from her veracity.'3
He speaks of her statements as a "mental trace" of her visit to the room.
The justification for such a position would be that the likelihood of her
having been in the room is so great when all of the circumstances including
her statements are viewed together that the risks involved in receiving
the evidence are substantially reduced. Here the courts are inclined to
confuse the rationale of circumstantial evidence with the rationale of the
res gestae exception rather than with that of the mental states exception.
Hearsay admissible under the res gestate exception owes its trustworthi-
ness to other circumstances in that mass of circumstantial facts which is
labeled the "res gestate." 14 According to Thayer, each fact supports and
is supported by the other facts which make up the res gestate "in their
tendency to prove some principal fact. .. ,, 15 Spontaneous exclamations,
11 247 Wis. at 364, 19 N.W.2d at 535.
12 Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 HARV. L. REv. 481, 544-45 (1946).
13 MCCORMICK 467.
14See THAYER 522-23. Thayer did not classify spontaneous exclamations under the
res gestae rule. He gave res gestae its original meaning and defined the rule as allowing
hearsay to be admitted because of a "special intimacy of connection with the admissible
fact." Ibid. The term has been abused to such an extent that courts have often
admitted facts on the basis that they shed some light on a material fact in evidence.
See, e.g., State v. Hill, 241 La. 345, 129 So.2d 12 (1961). See also BAKER, THE
HEARSAY RULE (1950); Morgan, Book Review, 5 VAND. L. REv. 672, 675 (1952);
Thayer, Bedingfield's Case: Declarations as Part of the Res Gesta, 14 Aaz. L. REv.
817 (1880), 15 Am. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1881). The notion that a declaration made
within a reasonable time after a startling event is admissible as part of the res gestae
developed in the first part of this century. Actually, it is a misapplication of the res
gestae rule and has led to much confusion. See Hotzoff, Institute in Practical Evidence,
18 F.R.D. 367, 376 (1956).15 THAYR 523.
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which analytically do not belong in the res gestae category,16 owe their
trustworthiness to the fact that the declarant must have made such state-
ments when he would not have been inclined toward or capable of
falsehood.' 7 The distinction is obvious: some hearsay owes its trustworthi-
ness to the fact that it is substantially corroborated by other evidence
without regard to the declarant's lack of a motive to falsify; 18 other hearsay
owes its trustworthiness to the fact that psychological factors operating in
the declarant himself make it more likely that he would be sincere and
accurate than if such factors were not present.19 The mere fact that
several facts all tending to prove the same proposition occur together en-
hances the probative value of each. As Weinstein has demonstrated, a
single piece of hearsay standing alone may have insufficient probative value
to warrant its admission.2° But if that same hearsay is only one of a number
of facts tending to prove a single material fact, the other facts may
increase the probability that what the hearsay statement asserts is true.
As a result, the mere occurrence of such a declaration has probative force
of its own. 1
Consider, for example, the situation in which results of a survey are
offered. As pointed out earlier, 2 such survey evidence may not under
certain circumstances come in under the mental states exception. Yet the
mere fact that a large number of people were polled enhances the trust-
worthiness of each response. Resorting to first principles, as Thayer would
say, 3 courts have admitted the results because of the great probative
value of such evidence while ignoring or flatly refusing to follow estab-
lished rules of evidence. 24 In such cases the courts have been unable to
resort to the concept of circumstantial evidence because the hearsay evi-
dence was obviously offered to prove the truth of the statements or because
receipt of the evidence for limited purposes involved too subtle a distinction
16 See Holtzoff, supra note 14, at 376.
17 Anmmundson v. Tinholt, 228 Minn. 115, 36 N.W.2d 521, 7 A.L.R.2d 1318 (1949).
Wigmore disagreed with Thayer on the admissibility of declarations which were contem-
poraneous with the material fact. Wigmore treated these apart from res gestae, but re-
quired that the declaration be made while under some emotional shock or pressure so
that the statement would be made without a chance to fabricate. WIOMNORE, § 1750.
18See Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis, 139 Tex. 1, 6, 161 S.W.2d 474, 476, 140
A.L.R. 868, 872 (1942), discussed in MAGUIRE, supra note 9, at 147-48; Weinstein, The
Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IowA L. Rnv. 331, 343 (1961).19 See WimGORE § 1420, at 223.
20 See Weinstein, supra note 18, at 333.
21 See People v. Barnhart, 66 Cal. App.2d 714, 153 P.2d 214 (1944).
22 See p. 164, supra.
23 THAYER 523.
24 See, e.g., American Luggage Works Co. v. United States Trunk Co., 158 F. Supp.
50, 53 (D. Mass. 1957)
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for the trier to make.25 It would seem to be the better course to look to
the relative probative value of the hearsay rather than to arbitrary concepts
which exclude much that is of great value and involves minimal risk.26
The discussion of circumstantial use of hearsay necessarily involved cases
in which the distinction between circumstantial and direct evidence was
blurred or in which the courts found themselves in that marginal area
between the two concepts. In the section that follows, situations will be
encountered which clearly involved hearsay. Courts were forced to develop
new theories or to rejuvenate forgotten ones in order to justify the admission
of hearsay evidence that was inadmissible both under the exceptions and
as circumstantial evidence.
E. Hearsay as Corroborative Evidence
There is a continuous, but almost imperceptible line of authority stretch-
ing back to the period before the emergence of the hearsay rule as a rigid
rule of exclusion which allows hearsay evidence to be received if it cor-
roborates other evidence. 1 Even after the rule became settled, hearsay
clearly was admitted for such a purpose.2 Both Wigmore and Morgan
recognize this exception as a survival of the old notion about sufficiency and
quantity of evidence. 3 There is a hint that the court recognized this
2 5 See United States v Aluminum Co. of America, 35 F.Supp. 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1940);
Zeisel, The Uniqueness of Survey Evidence, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 322, 334 (1960).
26 See Weinstein, supra note 18, at 344.
1 Rolfe v. Hampden, 1 Dyer 53b, 73 Eng. Rep. 117 (K.B. 1541); Thomas's Case,
1 Dyer 99b, 73 Eng. Rep. 218 (K.B. 1553) (One of two witnesses may testify from
hearsay.); Raleigh's Trial, 2 How. St. Tr. 1, 18 (1603); Adams v. Canon, 1 Dyer 53b,
73 Eng. Rep. 117 n.15 (K.B. 1622); Knox's Trial, 7 How. St. Tr. 763, 790 (1679);
Lord Russell's Trial, 9 How. St. Tr. 577, 613 (1683); Cole's Trial, 12 How. St. Tr.
875, 883 (1692); Braddon, Observations on the Earl of Essex' Murder, 9 How St. Tr.
1229, 1272 (1725):
It is true, no man ought to suffer barely upon hearsay evidence; but such
testimony hath been used to corroborate what else may be sworn.
Wright v. Doe d. Tatham, 5 CI. & F. 670, 7 Eng. Rep. 559 (H.L. 1838) (dictum);
Atkins v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 500, 505-07, 110 S.E. 379, 380-81 (1922); Lucas
v. Morefield, 18 La. App. 79, 137 So. 633 (1931); Goldthwaite v. Sheraton Restaurant,
154 Me. 214, 221-24, 145 A.2d 362, 368 (1958) (". . . such evidence may properly be
given weight as corroborative of other competent legal evidence, but will not alone
support a verdict or finding."); Robinson v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 66, 68-69, 147
S.E.2d 730, (1966) (dictum); Fox v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 701, 705, 152 S.E.2d
60, 64 (1967). See also MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE: COMMON SENSE AND COisMON LAW
147-48 (1947); Payne, The Mysteries of Virginia's Res Gestae Rule, 18 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 17, 36 (1961).
2See WIGMORE § 1364, at 17; Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the
Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177, 181 (1948).
3 See WiGMORE § 1364, at 17; Morgan, supra note 2, at 181.
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exception in Wright v. Doe d. Tatham.4 Clearly, that court would not
allow hearsay to be admitted as circumstantial evidence, but a majority
of the court would have admitted letters written to the testator if there
had been some independent evidence that he had acted upon them.5 This
would not have altered the hearsay character of the letters, but such inde-
pendent evidence would have enhanced their probative value. In this
case, the hearsay would seem to be rendered admissible by the corroboration
of other evidence whereas formerly hearsay was admitted because it was
the corroborating evidence.
Unlike the exceptions that are predicated upon some psychological
factor which supposedly makes it more likely that the declarant is speaking
truthfully, hearsay is admitted here because the value of the evidence is
enhanced by other evidence. To that extent it closely resembles circum-
stantial use of hearsay.6 While the fact that the declarant is facing death
or risks losing property when he makes the statement may make it more
likely that the statement is trustworthy, a statement is also more likely to
be trustworthy where other evidence corroborates it. In this latter instance,
the trustworthiness is due to factors entirely apart from the declarant him-
self. The mere fact that the hearsay blends in with other evidence makes it
stronger and more reliable.7
A major area of corroborative hearsay in which the hearsay rule has
been ignored is prior unsworn identifications of an accused.8 A number
of courts have held that where a witness, who has previously identified
an accused, is on the witness stand subject to cross examination, a pre-
dominant hearsay danger is not present and therefore the witness' prior
identification should be admitted.9 The courts also contend that, due to the
shorter time lapse involved, the testimonial value of the out-of-court identifi-
cation is stronger than the in-court identification. 10 The argument has con-
4 5 CI. & F. 670, 7 Eng. Rep. 559 (H.L. 1838).
5 See MAGUIRE, WEINSTEIN, CHADBOURN & MANSFIELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EVIDENCE 372 (5th ed. 1965).
6 See THAYER 522-23.
7 See Weinstein, The Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IowA L. REv. 331, 333 (1961).
8 See WIGMORE § 1130; Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 451 (1960); 36 MINN. L. REv. 530
(1952). Prior sworn identifications of an accused are not hearsay. United States v.
DeSisto, 329 F.2d 929 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979 (1964).
9 Ellicott v. Pearl, 12 U.S. (10 Pet.) 179 (1836); Di Carlo v. United States, 6 F.2d
364 (2d Cir. 1925); Arrow v. State, 273 Ala. 337, 139 So.2d 309 (1961); Loser v.
E.R. Bacon Co., 201 Cal. App.2d 387, 20 Cal. Rptr. 221 (1962); Fernandez v. Di
Salvo Appliance Co., 179 Cal. App.2d 240, 3 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1960); State v. Sinclair
49 N.J. 525, 231 A.2d 565 (1967); Commonwealth v. Trignani, 185 Pa. Super. 332,
138 A.2d 215 (1958).
1OUnited States v. Farzano, 190 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1951); People v. Gould, 54 Cal.2d
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siderable appeal because it relies on the probative value of the prior identi-
fication and the absence of a major hearsay danger.I 1 As one of the
dangers inherent in hearsay testimony is the inability to cross examine
the extra-judicial declarant,2 this danger is not present where the witness
who makes a pre-trial identification is on the witness stand. 3
A logical extension of the argument, however, would be that in every
instance where a witness is subject to cross examination, his prior unsworn
statements should be admitted. 14 Yet what this argument ignores is that,
although a major hearsay danger has been removed, there are other
dangers inherent in freely admitting a witness' prior unsworn statements
as substantive evidence. In prior identifications of an accused, for example,
there are numerous dangers which should be considered by a court before
the prior identification is admitted into evidence.15
In the past, courts have not distinguished between the types of identifica-
tion techniques employed by the police, nor have they determined if the
identification was "suggested" by the police.16 Courts have also admitted
the testimony of a police officer present at the line-up to state that the
witness positively identified the accused. 17 This testimony has been admitted
621, 354 P.2d 865, 7 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1960); State v. Frost, 105 Conn. 326, 135 A.2d
446 (1926); Judy v. State, 218 Md. 168, 146 A.2d 29 (1958); Bosoff v. State, 208
Md. 643, 119 A.2d 917 (1956); Commonwealth v. Locke, 335 Mass. 106, 138 N.E.2d
359 (1956); State v. Williams, 39 N.J. 471, 189 A.2d 193, cert. denied, 374 U.S.
855 (1963); State v. Simmons, 63 Wash.2d 17, 385 P.2d 389 (1963); Annot., 71
A.L.R.2d 449 (1960); 109 U. PA. L. REv. 1182 (1961).
11 Wigmore § 1130; Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay
Concept, 62 HARV. L. REv. 177, 192 (1948); Strahorn, supra note 3, at 498; 78 HARV.
L. REv. 887, 888-89 (1965).
12 MCCORMICK § 39; 5 WIrmORE § 1403.
13 People v. Gould, 54 Cal.2d 621, 354 P.2d 865, 7 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1960); Johnson
v. State, 237 Md. 283, 206 A.2d 138, (1965); State v. Pitchford, 324 S.W.2d 684 (Mo.
1959); State v. Matlack, 49 N.J. 491, 231 A.2d 369 (1967); Comment, Admissibility of
Extrajudicial Identification as Substantive Evidence, 19 MD. L. REv. 201, 215 (1959).
14 McCoRmicK § 39; Morgan, supra note 3, at 192.
15 See Palmer v. Peyton, 359 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1966), noted in Comment, Due
Process in Extrajudicial Identification, 24 WASn. & LEE L. REV. 107, 109 (1967) ; 109
U. PA. L. REV. 1182 (1961); 8 U.C.L.A. 467 (1961).
16 See, e.g., People v. Cook, .. Cal. App.2d , 60 Cal. Rptr. 133 (1967) (photo-
graph-picture admissible but writing on mug shot inadmissible); People v. Gould, 54
Cal.2d 621, 354 P.2d 865, 7 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1960) (photographs); Miller v. State,
224 A.2d 542 (Del. 1966) (line up); State v. Childs, 198 Kan. 4, 422 P.2d 898
(1967) (photograph); State v. Owen, 15 Utah 2d 123, 388 P.2d 797 (1964)
(Photographs); 8 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 407 (1961). But see Palmer v. Peyton, 359
F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1966) (voice identification held violation of due process). Suggestive
line-up procedures have been severely criticized by the United States Supreme Court.
State v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967). See
also Edison v. United States, 272 F.2d 684, 686 (10th Cir. 1959); 4 WIOMORE § 1130.
1 7 See, e.g., State v. Chaney, 5 Ariz. App. 530, 428 P.2d 1004 (1967); State v.
[Vol. 3 :89
HEARSAY RULE
even when the witness either refuses, or is unable, to identify the accused
during the trial.18 The danger in admitting this type of testimony is obvious.
The police officer cannot be the proper subject of cross examination because
he has never identified the defendant. Yet the jury will, more than likely,
accept the testimony as if it were made by the identifying witness.
What the courts must consider, then, before admitting into evidence a
prior unsworn identification of an accused is not the hearsay danger in-
volved, but the probative value of the out-of-court identification. To deter-
mine probative value, the courts must consider the type of line-up technique
employed by the police, whether the witness will identify the accused
during the trial, and if the witness has a motive to falsify on the witness
stand.19
In criminal cases involving statutory requirements of corroboration, there
is a tendency for the courts to relax the rules of admissibility to comply
with the corroboration requirementt There is also a practice in some
courts to look for corroborating evidence in criminal cases involving sexual
offenses, even without the statutory requirement. 2' Due to the need for
corroborating evidence, hearsay has been admitted as substantive evidence
in cases involving perjury,2 seduction,2 sodomy,24 and criminal confes-
sions.2
Taylor, 99 Ariz. 151, 407 P.2d 106 (1965); People v. Slobovian, 31 Cal. 2d 555, 191
P.2d 1, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 835 (1948); Gallegos v. People, 157 Colo. 484, 403
P.2d 864 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 971 (1966); Johnson v. State, 237 Md. 283,
206 A.2d 138 (1965); State v. Matlack, 49 N.J. 491, 231 A.2d 369 (1967).
18 People v. Gould, 54 Cal. 2d 621, 354 P.2d 865, 7 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1960); Bullock
v. State, 219 Md. 67, 148 A.2d 133 (1959); State v. Jones, 152 N.W.2d 67 (Minn.
1967) ; Commonwealth v. Johnson, 201 Pa. Super. 441, 193 A.2d 833 (1963); State v.
Simmons, 63 Wash.2d 17, 385 P.2d 389 (1963). But see State v. Zaragosa, 6 Ariz.
App. 80, 430 P.2d 426 (1967); Commonwealth v. Sanders, 386 Pa. 149, 125 A.2d 442
(1956).
19 In the past, courts have considered the suggestive nature of the line-up as affecting
its weight. Note, Lawyers and Lineups, 77 YALE L. J. 390, 391 (1967). The test
proposed here is that the probative value of the out of court identification control its
admissibility rather than its weight because a jury does not have the intellectual potential
to properly weigh evidence. See 109 U. PA. L. Rav. 1182, 1185 (1961). But see 78
HARV. L. Rv. 887, 889 (1965).
2 0 See WiGtORE § 1061; Yahuda, Unconscious Corroboration, 116 NEw L. J. 607
(1966). But see Note, Developments in the Law--Conessions, 79 HARV. L. Rv. 935,
1075 (1966).
21 E.g., Goodsaid v. District of Columbia, 187 A.2d 486 (D.C. App.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 867 (1963). See also Yahuda, supra note 20, at 607
22 People v. Laymon, 117 Cal. App. 476, 4 P.2d 244 (1931).
23 Commonwealth v. Atkins, 132 Va. 500, 110 S.E. 379 (1922).
2 4 Konvalinka v. United States, 162 A.2d 778 (D.C. Mun. App. 1960), aff'd, 287
F.2d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
25 Stickney v. State, 169 Tex. Crim. 533, 336 S.W.2d 133 (1960), cert denied, 363
U.S. 807 (1961).
1968]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:89
In civil cases, corroborative hearsay has been admitted as substantive
evidence in cases involving extra-judicial statements made by an agent
against his principal. An agent's declarations concerning his status as
agent to a third person are inadmissible hearsay, unless admitted as res
gestae exceptions to the hearsay rule or as impeaching evidence. A num-
ber of courts, however, admit the agent's prior declarations as substantive
evidence once the fact of agency has been proved by other evidence. 27 The
agent's statements then are admitted to corroborate the evidence already
introduced. Other courts have extended this principle to admit an agent's
prior unsworn statements when a prima facie case of agency has been estab-
lished,28 or when later evidence is introduced to corroborate the hearsay
statements2
The courts do not amplify their reasons for admitting the corroborative
hearsay into evidence. Generally, the res gestae label is placed on this
type of corroborating evidence, but that designation is of little or no value. 30
What the courts should emphasize in admitting corroborative hearsay is
that the hearsay dangers are slight in admitting evidence which takes
2 6 See, e.g., Trigollos v. American Oil Co., 231 Md. 95, 188 A.2d 891 (1963) (res
gestae); Gorman v. McCleaf, 369 Mich. 237, 119 N.W.2d 636 (1963) (res gestae);
Brown Express Co. v. Dieckman, 344 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. 1961) (res gestae); Bankers
Ins. Co. v. Henderson, 196 Va. 195, 83 S.E.2d 424 (1954) (impeachment); Sullivan v.
Associated Dealers, 4 Wash.2d 352, 103 P.2d 489 (1940) (impeachment); 3 C.J.S.,
Agency § 322, at 280 (1936); Annot., 150 A.L.R. 623 (1944).
27E.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 275 F.2d 610 (4th Cir.
1960); Ralston Purina Co. v. Novak, !11 F.2d 631 (8th Cir. 1940); Wilson and Co.,
Inc. v. Clark, 259 Ala. 619, 67 So.2d 898 (1953) ; Pullman Co. v. Meyer, 195 Ala. 397,
70 So. 763 (1915); Miller-Brent Lumber Co. v. Stewart, 166 Ala. 657, 51 So. 943
(1909); State v. Creed, 2 Conn. Cir. 435, 200 A.2d 551 (1964); Tregallos v. Ameri-
can Oil Co., 231 Md. 95, 188 A.2d 691 (1963); Boden v. Corbin, 95 Ohio App. 249,
115 N.E.2d 711 (1952); Norton v. Harmon, 102 Okla. 36, 133 P.2d 206 (1943). But
see Reather v. Ward Furniture Co., 238 Ark. 70, 378 S.W.2d 700 (1964); Shektonian v.
Kenny, 156 Cal. App.2d 576, 389 P.2d 699 (1958).
28 See Baptist v. Shanen, 145 Conn. 605, 145 A.2d 592 (1958); Bell v. Washam,
82 Ga. App. 63, 60 S.E.2d 408 (1950); Turner v. Burford Buick Corp., 201 Va. 693,
112 S.E.2d 911 (1960). In Turner, the prima facie presumption of agency arose because
the agent was driving the principal's car. Since the likelihood of this arising in agency
situations is strong, the Virginia courts should be confronted with hearsay declarations
in a number of agency cases. Whether a prima facie presumption lends probative value
to the agent's declaration has been questioned by Laughlin, Evidence, 1959 Annual
Survey of Virginia Law, 46 VA. L. REV. 1506, 1516 (1960). See also 18 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 151 (1961).
29Lallatin v. Terry, 81 Idaho 238, 340 P.2d 112 (1959); Haywood v. Yost, 72
Idaho 415, 242 P.2d 971 (1952); Thomas v. Hearst Consol. Publications, Inc., 169
Wash. 290, 60 P.2d 106 (1936).
30 Payne, The Mysteries of Virginia's Res Gestae Rule, 18 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 17
(1961).
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its probative value from other evidence already introduced. Therefore,
with the need for a rigid rule minimized, the probative value of the state-
ment should be considered as the criterion for admissibility, rather than
whether the statement is, or is not, hearsay.
As has been shown in prior unswom identifications of an accused, a
substantial number of courts have abandoned the hearsay rule; and in
certain agency situations, the rule has largely been circumvented. In a
third category of cases, involving telephone calls to gambling or betting
houses, the courts admit corroborative hearsay by holding the hearsay rule
inapplicable 3l The typical example involves a police raid on a suspected
betting establishment. The police answer the phone during the raid and
receive calls from would-be betters. The telephone conversations are then
offered in court as proof of the use of the premises. Generally, the courts
admit the conversations, contending that no hearsay is involved because
the prosecution does not intend to prove the truth of the matters asserted
in the conversations. On the contrary, the courts argue, the telephone
conversations are offered only to prove that the establishment was used
for gambling purposes.33
Basically, the courts argue that the telephone calls are circumstantial
evidence, so there is no hearsay problem involved. 4 Yet this argument is
not entirely convincing. The fact that twenty-five persons called a particular
room or apartment only tends to show that the phone was in working
order, unless the conversations are introduced into evidence.35 Once the
31 See, e.g., United States v. Novick, 124 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315
U.S. 813, reh. denied, 315 U.S. 830 (1942); People v. Ines, 90 Cal. App.2d 495, 203
P.2d 540 (1949); State v. Tolisano, 136 Conn. 210, 70 A.2d 118 (1949).
32 See People v. Joffee, 45 Cal. App.2d 233, 113 P.2d 901 (1941).
33See People v. Barnhart, 66 Cal. App.2d 714, 153 P.2d 214 (1944); State v.
Roberts, 4 Conn. Cir. 271, 230 A.2d 239 (1967); State v. Tolisano, 136 Conn. 210,
70 A.2d 118 (1949); Chacon v. State, 102 So.2d 578 (Fla. 1959). Accord, People
v. Carella, 191 Cal. App.2d 115, 12 Cal. Rptr. 446 (1961); Courtney v. State, 18
Md. 1, 48 A.2d 430 (1946); McLaughlin v. State, 123 Neb. 861, 244 N.W. 799 (1932).
34The contention is that the telephone call is a fact like other betting paraphenalia
from which we can infer use of the premises. Thayer finds a justification for this
contention. THAYER 522-23:
There is, sometimes, a tendency to regard a hearsay statement as admissible if it
be one of a set of facts giving and reflecting credit, each to the other, on the
principle of what is called circumstantial evidence. . . . No doubt in point of
reason, hearsay statements often derive much credit from the circumstances under
which they are made . . . and it would in reason have been quite possible to
shape our law in the form that hearsay was admissible, as secondary evidence,
whenever the circumstances of the case alone were enough to entitle it to
credit, irrespective of any credit reposed in the speaker.
3 5 See People v. Barnhart, 66 Cal. App. 2d 714, 153 P.2d 214 (1944) (concurring
opinion).
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conversations are introduced, their hearsay nature cannot be ignored be-
cause the truth of the matters asserted in the conversations is not self-
evident.3 6 If the telephone calls were made by pranksters, then any num-
ber of calls would fail to show the nature of the premises, and would be
of such slight probative value as to be inadmissible.37 What is obvious, how-
ever, is that from the number of calls received taken together with the
betting paraphernalia found on the premises, there is a strong presumption
that the calls were placed by would-be betters.38 In other words, the proba-
tive value of the calls is strengthened because they corroborate each other
and the other independent substantive evidence already introduced. What
the courts could also emphasize, to further strengthen the probative value
of the telephone conversations, is their non-assertive nature.3 9
The major evidence text writers generally define hearsay as assertive
statements or conduct, and they contend that non-assertive statements or
conduct are not hearsay.4° The courts have not recognized this subtle
distinction in a number of cases which deal with non-assertive conduct
in breach of warranty situations, where evidence of no-complaints is in
issue.41 The most common example of a no-complaint case occurs in an action
by Seller against Buyer for the purchase price of allegedly defective goods
rejected by Buyer. Seller introduces evidence to prove that the goods
were of merchantable quality, and to further prove his point, Seller offers
evidence to show that a number of other reputable buyers received the
identical goods and did not complain. Buyer objects to the admissibility
of the evidence as hearsay, and the courts, refusing to discuss the non-
assertive nature of the evidence, either reject the evidence as hearsay or
admit the evidence, contending that no hearsay problem is involved.42
Similar examples may be found in cases involving the sale of foods and cos-
metics to consumers.43
36Despite the numerous definitions of hearsay, broadly it should encompass "any
action as declaration involving a hearsay danger." Weinstein, supra note 7, at 331.
37 Id. at 343.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 E.g., Falknor, Silence as Hearsay, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 192, 196 (1940); McCormick,
Borderland of Hearsay, 39 YALE L. J. 489, 491 (1930); Morgan, Hearsay and Non-
Hearsay, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1138, 1144 (1935); Seligman, An Exception to the Hearsay
Rule, 26 HARV. L. REv. 146, 148 (1912); Weinstein, supra note 7, at 343; WIGMORE
§ 459.
41 See cases listed in McCORMICK § 229 n. 26; 24 N.C.L. Rev. 274, 279 n.24 (1946).
42 See Althrug v. William Whitman Co., Inc., 185 App. Div. 744, 173 N.Y.S. 669
(1919) (evidence of no complaint is hearsay); St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v. Arkansas &
Tex. Grain Co., 42 Tex. Civ. App. 125; 95 S.W. 656 (1906) (evidence of no com-
plaint not hearsay).
43 See, e.g., Admitted: Katz v. Delokey Hat Co., 97 Conn. 665, 118 At. 88 (1922);
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When the evidence of non-assertive conduct is admitted, common sense
rather than a rule of evidence is invoked as a rationale.44 As the Mas-
sachusetts court has pointed out: "There is a reasonable inference that
if no one complained no one suffered." 45 Massachusetts is one jurisdiction
which has admitted evidence of non-assertive conduct in cases other than
those involving a breach of warranty. In Silver v. New York Central R.
Co.,4 the plaintiff, who suffered from a circulatory ailment, was a passenger
in defendant's pullman car. The plaintiff claimed that the car was too cold
and aggravated her condition, so that she suffered undue discomfort. The
porter testified that the car was not cold and offered in evidence the fact
that none of the eleven other passengers in the car had complained. The
lower court excluded the evidence as hearsay, but the appellate court
reversed, basing its finding on the probative value of the evidence offered.4 7
The court contended that if all the passengers in the car were under the
same conditions, then "... ordinary prudence might seem to require that
one speak out." 48
Obviously the people in the car had no reason to remain silent if they
were cold; therefore, the probative value of the testimony is strong and
any hearsay objection weak.49 Furthermore, the court also hinted that the
non-assertive conduct was a type of circumstantial evidence because it
"would be offered on the basis of a common condition which all in the car
encountered." 50 One could reasonably infer that if no one complained, no
one was cold; if no one were cold obviously the car was not unreasonably
cold.51 The court in Silver could just as easily have admitted the testimony
Ogden v. Rosedale Inn, 189 So. 162 (La. App. 1939); Jacquot v. William Fileni &
Sons, Co., 337 Mass. 312, 149 N.E.2d 635 (1958); Monahan v. Economy Grocery
Stores Corp., 282 Mass. 548, 185 N.E. 34 (1938); Gracey v. Waldorf System, 251
Mass. 76, 146 N.E. 232 (1925). Rejected: United States v. 111/4 Dozen Packages,
40 F. Supp. 208 (W.D.N.Y. 1941); Van Lill Co. v. Federick City Packing Co.,
155 Md. 303, 141 At. 898 (1928); Osborne & Co. v. Bell, 62 Mich. 214; 28 N.W. 841
(1886); George W. Sanders Line Stk. Comm. Co v. Kincaid, 168 S.W. 977 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1914).
44 Mears v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 75 Conn. 171, 52 Atl. 610 (1902) (It would
have been reasonable for the carrier to remark about the piano's condition.)
45 Landfield v. Albiani Lunch Co., 268 Mass. 528, 168 N.E. 160 (1929).
46329 Mass. 14, 105 N.E.2d 923 (1952).
47 105 N.E.2d at 926.
48 105 N.E.2d at 927.
49 "It was highly unlikely that all the other passengers were Eskimos or stockholders
of the company or masochists." Weinstein, supra note 7, at 343.
50 Silver v. New York Central R.R., 329 Mass. 14, 105 N.E.2d 923, 926 (1952).
51 This is another example of the evidentiary strength of corroborative hearsay. A
hearsay danger is so slight in the Silver case that the court treats the non-assertive
conduct as a type of circumstantial evidence. The same rationale is used by the
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as corroborative evidence to substantiate the porter's testimony because of
its high probative value. There are several isolated cases which have fol-
lowed this argument.
In Foelkner v. Perkins,52 the defendant entered into a written contract
with the plaintiff and alleged that by oral agreement, there was a modifica-
tion of the contract. The defendant worked under the oral agreement,
and evidence of his conduct was offered to prove that a modification had
been entered into. The court held the evidence of conduct admissible to
corroborate the defendant's earlier testimony, adding that there was less
danger in admitting the evidence because the defendant was subject to
cross examination.53
A similar factual situation was present in Lucas v. Morefield,5 but
hearsay statements rather than non-assertive conduct were involved here.
The plaintiff brought an action against his employer for the unpaid portion
of his salary. The defendant claimed that the original employment con-
tract had been modified and the plaintiff's salary had been lowered.
A mutual friend of both parties testified that the defendant informed him
that he had been forced to cut plaintiff's salary. The mutual friend
continued his testimony by saying that the plaintiff had told him that he
had "to make some money on the outside because he had had his salary
cut." 55 Both statements were admitted as corroborating evidence, not as
hearsay, ". . . having been made at a time and under circumstances not
suspicious." 5
The standard established by the court in Lucas v. Morefield is one of
trustworthiness in determining the admissibility of the evidence. What has
become evident from this case and from those dealing with non-assertive
conduct and prior consistent statements is that where the trustworthiness
of the statement or conduct offered in evidence is not questioned, then
the evidence should be admitted despite its hearsay character.57 The stand-
ard to be applied by the courts should be one based on the probative value
courts in cases involving telephone calls to betting establishments and with good
reason. The major objection to this rationale is that courts have a tendency to evoke
judicial reasoning when in search of a rule of admissibility, but they then reject the
reasoning for the rule. If instead of labelling a particular type of evidence as circum-
stantial or part of the res gestae, the courts determined its probative value, they could
achieve flexibility without sacrificing the quality of the evidence.
52 197 Wash. 462, 85 P.2d 1095 (1938).
53 Id., 85 P.2d at 1097.
54 18 La. App. 79, 137 So. 633 (1931).
55 Id., 137 So. at 634.
56 Ibid.
5 7 See also Goodale v. Murray, 227 Iowa 843, 289 N.W. 450, 461 (1940).
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of the evidence, not whether it falls within the stringent requirements
of a rule more noted for its exceptions than its restrictions.58
Generally, in administrative hearings, the probative value of the evidence
determines its admissibility.59 Administrative tribunals, which are not tied to
archaic rules of evidence, admit hearsay unless its evidentiary value is too
remote. In Union Drawn Steel Co. v. NLRB,6° a discharged employee had
participated in picket line activities and was not rehired after the strike
settlement. The employee testified that the foreman told him the mistake
he made was going on the picket line. The foreman testified that he had
said the employee was too old for the picket line, and he could have his
job back when there was work available. The court admitted the employee's
testimony because it was not remote, and because it was corroborated both
by the company's hostility to the union and by the fact that the employee's
place had been filled by other men.6 ' Administrative tribunals apparently
do not hesitate to receive corroborative hearsay, and treat it as any other
type of evidence.6
Courts could effect the same result by looking to the probative value of
the hearsay rather than arbitrarily classifying it as hearsay which must
be excluded. To determine probative value, the courts should begin by
testing the relevancy of the evidence introduced. If Fact A is introduced
to prove material Fact Z, and it has a slight tendency to prove Fact Z,
then Fact A has little probative value. Yet if Facts A, B, and C each
has a slight tendency to prove Fact Z, then the probative value of each is
enhanced by the other, and they should all be admitted in evidence. This
is simply an example of one fact corroborating the other to give it strength
and cogency, and ultimately to determine its admissibility.63
To place this example in the context of a case involving telephone calls
to betting establishments, one need only replace the letters A, B, and C
by actual telephone conversations. If, during a raid, the police received
one phone call from a would-be better, the probative value of the call
58 "The hearsay rule is more famous for what it permits than what it forbids." Stra-
horn, A Reconsideration of the Hearsay Rule and Admissions, 85 U. PA. L. REv. 485,
487 (1937). "In the sea of admitted hearsay, the rule excluding hearsay is a small and
lonely island." Weinstein, supra note 7, at 346.
59 In most jurisdictions by statute, the legal rules of evidence do not apply in adminis-
trative hearings. See DAvis §§ 14.04, 14.05.
60 109 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1940).
61 Id. at 592.
6 2 Fox v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 701, 705, 152 S.E.2d 60, 64 (1967). Reviewing
courts, in fact, strain to find some independent evidence elsewhere in the record in
order to corroborate the hearsay evidence. See DAvis § 14.12, at 314.
63 Cf. THAYER 522-23; Weinstein, supra note 7, at 333: "The probative force of
hearsay may, therefore, increase as it is fitted into a mosaic of other evidence."
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would not be strong enough to render it admissible in evidence. But if
the police received ten calls, the probative value of each call would become
stronger as more calls were received, and, hence, the conversations could
be admitted in evidence.64 In these cases, each call corroborates the other,
and further corroborates the evidence already gathered by the police from
the betting paraphernalia found on the premises. How many calls would
be sufficient to determine the admissibility of the evidence is a question for
the trial court judge, and his determination of this question should be
based on common sense and judicial discretion.5
The standard of admissibility that must be applied by the courts in
the area of corroborative hearsay is that for any testimonial proof. Neces-
sarily, the standard imposes a burden on the trial court judge, but no less
of a burden than the heavy anachronistic weight of the hearsay rule. To
facilitate the trial court judge's decision-making process, he may consider
the evidence from a common sense viewpoint in determining its probative
value. The standard proposed here is not new, nor should it be confined
to corroborative hearsay. 66 But, at present, it is in this area that the courts
have unquestionably drifted away from the stringent requirements of the
hearsay rule, and it is here that the need is great for a protective evidentiary
standard.
XII. DISCRETION IN THE TRIAL JUDGE AND CERTAINTY IN THE LAW
OF EVIDENCE
Of necessity, a simpler and more sensible hearsay rule entails greater
discretion in the trial judge. Any system which eliminates discretion in
favor of a fixed rule governing every situation in which hearsay is offered
will be arbitrary and harsh.1 Only the trial judge can weigh the dangers
involved in receiving hearsay in a particular case against its probative
value. Psychologists have shown that many of the assumptions upon which
the exceptions are based are unrealistic. 2 Other critics question the utility
and wisdom of any rule with so many exceptions.3 Still others believe that
64 See Weinstein, supra note 7, at 342-43.
65 Id. at 338-39.
66 See Smith, The Hearsay Rule and the Docket Crisis: The Futile Search for Para-
dise, 54 A.B.A.J. 231, 236 (1968).
I Cf. Smith, The Hearsay Rule and the Docket Crisis: The Futile Search for Paradise,
54 A.B.A.J. 231, 236 (1968).
2 See materials cited, supra, in note 23 of the Introduction.
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the exceptions exclude hearsay that is often far more trustworthy than
much that it admits.4 The Model Code would not tie the trial judge down to
any enumerated set of exceptions, but would allow him broad discretion
in applying a general principle rather than specific rules.5 The Uniform
rules retain the enumerated exceptions, but give the judge a freer hand
in applying them.6 The amount of discretion granted by both proposals
has been severely criticized. 7 At present, it is the greatest obstacle to reform
of the hearsay rule.
8
While certainty in the law of evidence is desirable, especially from the
standpoint of the trial bar, it must not be allowed to supersede more impor-
tant considerations. Whenever certainty can be achieved only by arbitrary
and inconsistent rules of evidence that unduly restrict the amount of relevant
evidence which the parties may present, then clearly it must give way.
Undoubtedly, there are reasons of policy for excluding relevant evidence. 9
For example, evidence that would involve too many collateral issues, has
too little cogency, is unduly repetitious, or is obtained by a violation of
some extrinsic policy such as the privilege against unreasonable search and
seizure should not be received.10 But whatever interest there is in providing
the trial attorney with a body of fixed rules by which he might safely
determine what evidence will be admissible at the trial does not in itself
warrant the exclusion of relevant, cogent evidence.
Ironically, the very uncertainty which the bar fears exists in large meas-
ure even under the traditional hearsay rule. Many courts have developed
,effective methods for avoiding the hearsay rule without frankly rejecting
it. 1 Other courts have remained steadfast in their adherence to the tradi-
[The] rule in its present form with its numerous exceptions in our view lacks
rational basis, results sometimes in injustice and often in considerable expense,
and introduces much unnecessary complication in the preparation and hearing
of civil actions.
4 See MCCORMICK § 300.
5 MODEL CODE OF EvIDENCE Rules 105, 303, 519; see McElroy, Some Observations
Concerning the Discretions Reposed in Trial Judges by the American Law Institute's
Code of Evidence, in MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 356 (1942).
6 UNIFORMI RULE 45.
7 See Stupher, The Uniform Rules of Evidence: Government by Man Instead of by
Law, 29 INs. COUNSEL J. 405, 406-07 (1962).
8 See Morgan, Practical Difficulties Impeding Reform in the Law of Evidence, 14
VAND. L. Rnv. 725, 733 (1961).
9See Richardson, Law and Policy: Emphasis on Exclusionary Rules of Evidence, 53
Ky. L. J. 663 (1965).
10 See Morgan, Suggested Remedy for Obstructions to Expert Testimony by Rules of
Evidence, 10 U. CHL L. REv. 285 (1943).
U See, e.g., Powell v. State, 332 S.W.2d 483 (Ark. 1960); Gray v. State Capital
Life Ins. Co., 254 N.C. 286, 118 S.E.2d 909 (1961).
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tional rule honoring its tenets in practice and refusing to pay lip service
alone.' 2 In the more liberal cases emanating from the former group, no
clearly discernible pattern can be established. Reform here has been piece-
meal.13 This situation is perhaps inevitable in any reform accomplished
by judicial decisions. The resulting confusion concerning the viability of the
old hearsay rule at any given time and in any given common law jurisdiction
is understandable. Often it has produced duplicity, which can cause
cynicism and work hardship on litigants who must choose between the rule
espoused by the court and the practice it actually follows. 14 In eliminating
this undesirable condition, a frank renunciation of the traditional rule
would, at least in this regard, result in a situation more favorable to the
trial attorney than the present one.
The heart of the objection to greater discretion in the trial judge is not
that certainty will be sacrificed, but that the trial judge cannot be trusted
with such discretion. Critics argue that judges will abuse the power just as
judges abused their power and discretion in the last century.15 That view is
not only lacking in substantial support, 6 but is also a dangerous premise to
adopt. The trial judge already exercises broad discretion in areas of more
importance than the reception of evidence.1 7 Weighing the need for a more
satisfactory system of determining the admissibility of evidence, the risk
involved in granting the trial judge broader discretion seems warranted.
It has been suggested that the proposal to give the judge more latitude
is analogous to the proposal made in the last century that parties be allowed
to testify.' 8 No one seriously recommends today that parties should be
12 See, e.g., People v. Tunnacliff, 375 Mich. 298, 134 N.W.2d 682 (1965); Prince
v. Flukinger, 381 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
13 See Cross, The Scope of the Rule against Hearsay, 72 L. Q. REv. 91, 117 (1956).
14 Cf. Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARv. L. REv. 463, 472
(1962). Professor Keeton criticizes those who would reform the law of torts by judicial
decisions which ostensibly follow traditional tort law, but in actuality reach results that
were not intended by traditional law.
15 See Stopher, supra note 7, at 406-07. But see Swietlick & Henrickson, Rule 303:
The Keystone of the Code, 1947 Wis. L. REV. 88, 91 n. 12: "There has never been
a hue and cry that trial judges have abused [the discretion of determining what
evidence is legally relevant as opposed to logically relevant]."
16See Goodhart, A Changing Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 VA. L. REv.
759, 783 (1965); McCormick, Law and the Future: Evidence, 51 Nw. U. L. REv. 218,
219 (1956); Morgan, supra note 8, at 733 (1961) ; Phillips, Foreword to the Symposium
on Evidence, 5 VAND. L. REv. 275 (1952); Smith, supra note 1, at 236; Weinstein,
The Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IowA L. REV. 331, 338 (1961).
17 See Payne v. S.S. Nabob, 302 F.2d 803 (3d ed. 1962) (refusal to allow amendment
to pretrial order) ; Hosie v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 282 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1960) (severance
of issues of liability and damages in personal injury case); State v. Schneider, 158
Wash. 504, 291 Pac. 1093, 72 A.L.R. 571 (1936) (change of venue).
18 See Goodhart, supra note 16, at 783.
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disqualified. In addition, the improvement in the manner of selecting,
disciplining, and educating judges has changed markedly in the last century
thereby minimizing the risk involved in giving them more discretion.' 9
XIII. CONCLUSION
Superficially, the hearsay rule has remained unchanged since its inception
except for occasional additions to or realignment of its many exceptions.
It has withstood direct attack by scholars and has survived periods of
major legislative reform of procedural law in this century and the last.
Yet, unquestionably, the rule has undergone much change beneath the
surface. The more liberal courts have chosen not to wait for legislative
reform, but have liberalized the rule in its practical application so that
it might conform more closely to psychological reality and satisfy the
growing demands of a modem society. These courts, then, have not only
questioned the utility of the rule, but have attacked its theoretical founda-
tion. Much of this liberalization has come about in response to the increas-
ing attractiveness of non-judicial tribunals to litigants who do not share
the attitude of those in the legal profession who consider the rule to be
the cornerstone of freedom and the embodiment of fair play. These
laymen share with scholars the belief that, simply because certain evidence
is suspect, there is no justification for disregarding it altogether.
The product of this liberalization by judicial decision is unsatisfactory.
Inconsistent holdings have resulted even within the same jurisdiction. The
time for radical reform of the hearsay rule by legislation or by the adoption
of court rules is long overdue. But the Uniform Rules of Evidence do not
provide the thoroughgoing reform that is needed: it is admittedly a com-
promise proposal that leaves the root problem of the traditional hearsay
rule untouched. The experience of non-judicial tribunals has demonstrated
the exaggeration of those claims which picture the drastic restyling of the
hearsay rule as an invitation to perjury, injustice, and chaos. These
tribunals, with an approach to hearsay closely resembling that of the Model
Code of Evidence, have developed an expeditious process for determining
fact while preserving the opportunity to cross-examine. The same result
could be accomplished in judicial proceedings by allowing the court to
receive hearsay of the sort that reasonably prudent men would consider
in their daily lives. Where the declarant is available and the circumstances
are such that one would expect the proponent of the evidence to come
forward with his strongest evidence, the court should exclude hearsay. Even
Judicial Trials, 66 COLUm. L. REV. 223, 224-25 (1966).
19 See ibid.; Weinstein, Some Difficulties in Devising Rules for Determining Truth in
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if the hearsay were not excluded under these circumstances, the factfinder
would naturally infer that the proponent is hiding evidence that is harmful
to his case. Such a rule would be a frank recognition of what the more lib-
eral courts have found to be a satisfactory practice and would eliminate
the problem of rationalizing results and distorting facts and theory to fit
the traditional rule.
